In the presence of suffering: toward a new understanding of evil by Lebedeva, Kristina
DePaul University 
Via Sapientiae 
College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences 
Theses and Dissertations College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 
6-2018 
In the presence of suffering: toward a new understanding of evil 
Kristina Lebedeva 
DePaul University, kvlebedeva@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Lebedeva, Kristina, "In the presence of suffering: toward a new understanding of evil" (2018). College of 
Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 246. 
https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/246 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at 
Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
 1 
In the Presence of Suffering: Toward a New Understanding of Evil 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented in 
 
Partial Fulfillment of the 
 
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
June, 2018 
 
 
BY 
 
Kristina Lebedeva 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Philosophy 
College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 
DePaul University 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Dedication……………………………………………………………………3 
 
 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………4 
 
 
Introduction: A Girl Remembers………………………………………………6 
 
 
Chapter One: The Passions of Time: Temporality, Affect, and Evil in Spinoza…..31 
 
 
Chapter Two: The Trajectory of Evil: From Privation to Superfluity…………...77 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Morality of Resentments & Truth-Haunted 
Affectivity…………………………………………………..........................134 
 
 
Chapter Four: Levinas After Ophir: Alterity Reconsidered…………………...192 
 
 
Conclusion: The Lamb Becoming a Lion; or, Hear me Roar…………………..260 
 
 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………..268 
  
 3 
 
Abstract: 
 
The present dissertation addresses the question of evil and suffering as intrinsically 
intertwined, linked by the notion of affective temporality, as distinct from ‘clock time.’ 
Following Adi Ophir, I define evil as superfluity, as what ought not to be, thus divorcing 
it from any idea of necessity, and its social production that must be reduced or disrupted. 
The catastrophes that are still happening take precedence over  past ones, since the 
former are still open to reduction, intervention, and alleviation. Here time becomes a key 
notion that alerts us to the possibilities of responding morally to present disasters. Time 
reappears again at the heart of suffering, understood as “the duration of the encounter 
with the unbearable.” I argue that affective time activates and conceptually revitalizes our 
moral agency, since it is phenomenologically described as open to interruption. Thus, we 
have the choice to either let the agonizing duration of another’s suffering go on 
uninterrupted or fragment this temporality, thereby offering the suffer a relief and a 
glimpse of a more ‘habitable’ temporality, the temporality of going about your business 
in the world and forgetting the ticking of the clock. Thus, we are capable of altering the 
suffering other’s sense of time. In my discussion of Spinoza, Ophir, Amery, and Levinas, 
I situate suffering as the very voice and language of superfluous evil and argue that 
understanding affective temporality in its relation to evil opens up new possibilities of its 
concrete, situated alleviation. If evil qua suffering is a language that can be studied and 
understood, our moral indifference becomes increasingly less justifiable. Ultimately, I 
submit that failing to exercise our agency in the face of the concrete suffering of others 
means allowing their torment to continue uninterrupted, thus forming the juxtaposition of 
moral action and complicity. 
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The measure of love is love without measure. 
 
—Saint Augustine 
 
if I do not love you I shall not love 
 
—Samuel Beckett 
 
 
For my mother, Ludmila, who is the true heroic presence behind all my dreams, all my 
accomplishments, and all my aspirations. She is the warm, tender radiance illuminating 
my forever disabled body and recalcitrant spirit, transforming my socially expected 
humility of a cripple into the courage of a tiny warrior, whose claws are as sharp as 
God’s. I would not welcome the person I would have become without her in my life. For 
my significant other and all my intellectually vibrant friends and colleagues who stood 
beside me during my hour of greatest need and who continue making this world a more 
hospitable place for me.  
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I’m a hero, you see. It’s easy to be a hero. If you don’t have hands or 
feet, you’re either a hero or you’re dead. 
 
—Ruben Gallego 
 
 
 
I wanted you to see what real courage is…. It’s when you know 
you’re licked before you begin but you begin anyway and you see it 
through no matter what. You rarely win, but sometimes you do. 
 
— Harper Lee 
 
 
 
Yesterday, awakening to the world, I saw the sky turn upon itself 
utterly and wholly. I wanted to rise, but the disemboweled silence fell 
back upon me, its wings paralyzed. Without responsibility, straddling 
Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep. 
 
—Frantz Fanon 
 
 
 
We do not understand, we are hungry and we are hungry. 
 
—Clarice Lispector 
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Introduction 
 
A Girl Remembers 
 
What guides moral knowledge (or practical reason, phronesis) is the interest in 
superfluous evils that befall particular and concrete others or threaten them. 
 
—Adi Ophir 
 
If there is something dangerous about me, there is also something pure. 
 
—	Clarice Lispector 
 
While I shall speak of evil and severe physical disability in a moment, let us start 
elsewhere. In her early student paper, Simone Weil wrote on Jacob Grimm’s tale “The 
Six Swans.” The tale tells the story of six brothers transformed into swans by their 
malicious stepmother. To help them return to human form, their sister spent six years 
sewing six shirts of white anemones.1 She was to keep completely silent until she was 
done with her task. This is how Weil commented on the story: “acting is never 
difficult…. we always do too much and waste ourselves in disorderly actions…. It is 
almost impossible to sew anemones together and turn them into a shirt, and the difficulty 
is such that it prevents any additional action that would alter the purity of that six-year 
silence.”  Thus, a strange, arduous, nearly impossible task, which I would liken to the 
tremendous difficulty of sustaining an ethical orientation throughout one’s lifetime, an 
                                                
1 According to the original tale, the shirts are to be made out of stinging nettles, making 
the process of sewing incredibly painful. To transpose this story onto this inquiry, it is 
clear that while experiencing a moral desire is more or less effortless, the labor required 
to sustain moral comportment toward others and the endeavors to alleviate suffering as it 
surges has a painful intensity to it. Your revolt in the face of injustice is more powerful 
than even the bleeding fingers. 
 8 
orientation toward singular others in distress in all of their maddeningly messy 
particularity.2 
I hope that the present inquiry will minimize the aura of near-impossibility 
surrounding moral endeavors, presenting the task of morality in the most practical, 
concrete terms, while preserving the pure, almost ascetic core of these endeavors and an 
uncannily steadfast, seemingly groundless commitment to the well-being of others that a 
moral subject3 cultivates. The slightly surreal nature of Weil’s retelling of the story 
speaks to the idea that while exemplary actions do take place on a somewhat regular 
basis, morality’s heart is strange, sublimely stubborn, shot through and through with 
radiant lucidity, and pulsating at the center of every disaster, if only as a possibility. My 
inquiry situates morality between the practical means of alleviating an other’s suffering 
and shirts of white anemones. 
This work is written with the sole purpose of reducing concrete evils in the world, 
with unexpected theoretical twists and turns resulting in the process of investigation, 
culminating in the findings that I, the author, admit not to have even anticipated. It is not 
concerned with understanding evil for its own sake, but understanding it only with a view 
                                                
2 Aristotle encapsulates the extreme difficulty of creating principles out of particular 
situations when he states, “it is always necessary for those who are acting to look at the 
circumstances surrounding the occasion themselves, just as is the case also with the 
medical art or the art of steering a ship.”2 We cannot predict what we’ll be confronted 
with next, just like it is futile to try and predict or systematize the thrashing of the sea 
waves in a storm. Which is to say that the correct course of action arises from out of a 
particular situation itself, not from out of any principle floating above reality. Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Joe Sachs (Newbury, MA: Focus, 2002), 1104a. 
3 It is important to note that while I occasionally parts ways with Ophir, utilizing his 
insights and concepts in a somewhat different way, I believe at least part of this 
divergence is due to the fact that Ophir seems to be essentially a humanitarian 
interventionist, which means that his moral subject is often the government or other 
organizations capable of intervention. The moral subject that I speak of and try to 
articulate is a person, any person. Maybe you. Maybe me.  
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to minimizing it. A constellation of concepts, an arrangement of figures under discussion, 
departures from the professional ideal of hollow exegesis, and a relation between 
different socio-political and ethical categories that you will find here are aligned 
according to practical and moral ways of responding to evil and suffering. 
While I have been engaging with Adi Ophir’s groundbreaking work The Order of 
Evils for many years, in my continued efforts to come to terms with the questions of evil,4 
the temporality of trauma, and suffering, my more recent experience of deep grief and 
loss made my search for understanding both even more personal and urgent. What 
follows is the product of my theoretical investigations and personal encounter with the 
senselessness of ongoing suffering, the encounter that convinced me that Ophir is correct 
in identifying it as a type of evil. I will go on to argue that we cannot study one without 
studying the other. More generally, I situate my work within the coordinates given to us 
by Ophir, Jean Amery’s harrowing account of the internal reality of the victim, with an 
attention to, and reinterpretation of, Emmanuel Levinas’s coupling of otherness and 
ethics.5  
First, I want to echo Oksala’s claim that “radical reflection on one’s own 
experience must be an essential element of feminist theory”6 by stating that radical 
                                                
4 For a discussion of the problematic use of the term ‘evil’ in the political realm, see the 
introduction to Valerie Hartouni, Visualizing Atrocity: Arendt, Evil, and the Optics of 
Thoughtlessness (New York: New York University Press, 2012). I define evil as the 
name of the experience of recoil, when we feel, viscerally and crushingly, that this ought 
not to be. 
5 While Ophir makes a clear distinction between the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics,’ I chose 
to use these interchangeably. To be more precise, I define morality or ethics as the 
subject’s movement toward another whose aim is the reduction of this particular 
suffering. 
6 Johanna Oksala, “In Defense of Experience” in Feminist Experiences: Foucauldian and 
Phenomenological Investigations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2016), 399. 
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reflection on one’s own experiences is inherently important to moral theory as well. As 
Scott, whose influential essay occasioned a dialogue with Oksala, puts it, “experience…. 
becomes not the origin of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) 
evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that about 
which knowledge is produced.”7 Furthermore, “experience is at once always already an 
interpretation and something that needs to be interpreted.”8 According to Scott, 
experience is a discursive event, it wants to be known, heard, understood, just like I 
attempt to give my experiences a voice in creating this work.  
As a woman with a severe physical disability, with her function amounting only 
to typing, in chronic pain, I have spent most of my life thus far attempting to understand 
why both the government and various charity institutions and individuals have been so 
thorough in their neglect of my basic needs. Is it not clear enough that I am in need of 
urgent relief somehow. I could not understand and I still cannot why condemning the 
disabled to such deep social abandonment, in an era of alleged inclusion, tolerance, and 
political correctness, has not been seen as an evil or even a legitimate cause for protest. 
Later, I will learn from Ophir disallowing an expression of evil, i.e., preventing it from 
being expressed and visible, which applied to my situation rather well. The evil done to 
the disabled is an evil still without an expression. When I fell violently ill as a small 
child, my life expectancy was about five years. I am thirty-five years old now, on the 
verge of getting my doctoral degree, and I am unanimously described as fierce and 
strong, though no one asks what happens to my strength when I am completely alone. 
                                                
7 Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 4 
(Summer, 1991), pp. 773-797. 
8 Ibid., 797. 
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(Adi Ophir wrote to me, generously and kindly, “what must credited is your courage, 
your insistence to go through all this unimaginable suffering, and keep thinking, and keep 
writing, against all odds, and make your suffering an object of philosophical reflection.”)9 
But I did not have to fight alone, only with my family by my beside, for the semblance of 
a life worth living. No one does. 
While this work is not directly about disability, I admit that in defending the 
moral value of a singular weaker one, I see “the lone girl in the power chair, failing to 
part the sea of human beings in a crowded hallway, comes to a halt, displaying infinite 
patience with the people in front of her, but she has little chance of being recognized as a 
person, of being addressed as a human being by those around her.”10 That is, if you are 
lucky enough to live in a place whose streets and curb cuts are make it possible to use a 
power chair. I see brittle bones, weak, half-atrophied limbs, and weirdly curved spines. I 
see the one almost always perpetually deprived of social visibility, human interaction, 
and inclusion. As will become glaringly clear throughout this work, ‘the recipient’ of the 
ethics I am investigating here is a single suffering individual, the forgotten one, the 
morally valueless one, in the din of the discussions of “untold millions… [who] suffer the 
crushing fate of being no use to the world economy.”11 My allegiance does not lie with 
the millions. While I acknowledge the suffering of “untold millions” as a highly serious, 
socio-political concern, possibly the concern, I reject the possibility of any practical 
ethics of millions.  
                                                
9 Ophir, personal correspondence, 09/08/2017. 
10 Tobin Anthony Siebers, Disability Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2008), pp. 160-61. 
11 Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 12. 
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To return to Oksala for a moment, experience also offers the building blocks of 
solidarity among the victimized, the marginalized, and the oppressed,12 which means, 
translating these defenses of experience vis-à-vis theory as such into the purely moral 
register, that I hope to speak, both humbly and passionately, for those victims whose 
voices are silent, who have no modicum of academic visibility the way I do, who are too 
crushed to take up a pen and write about their plight. Even though I write from the 
vantage point of the severely disabled, I believe that my theoretical journey toward 
practical ethics, an ethics that does not shy away from an overlooked other in distress, 
will be of value to everyone with the slivers of the irremediable inside them. 
In other words, here I am attempting to straddle and operate on the fine line 
between theoretical rigor and the experience of raw suffering, between speaking as and 
on behalf of. It is my conviction that the form of expression of the work itself must 
convey the urgency of the problem. The writing that you will find here will be laden with 
multiple intensities, ranging from sorrow to the slowly coiling anger of those who have 
been silent for too long, it will express an unmistakable rhythm, rising to a crescendo and 
falling to a whisper, it will make home in the element of the poetic, it will swell with 
mourning and the violent impatience in the face of the existing state of affairs.  
                                                
12 Referring to Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics 
by Sonia Kruks, Oksala writes, “Kruks wants to ground female experience in the female 
body, and she urges us to acknowledge the significance that nonlinguistic, embodied 
experiences such as pain must have in feminist theory. She draws on her own experience 
of working as a volunteer at a battered women’s shelter and argues that embodied 
experience forms an affective basis for solidarity among women: there is a direct 
experience of affinity among women that is possible because I can recognize as mine the 
embodied experiences of another woman, even while knowing that she and I are in other 
ways very different.” Ibid., 391. See also Sonia Kruks, Retrieving Experience: 
Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2001), pp. 166-67. 
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I will speak of water lilies and swords, of eternity and ashes, of lambs and lions, 
of celestial doors and terror, of stinging nettles and swans, of jewels and vultures, of 
Beckett’s fragile dead bees and fatality, of clay and delirium, of winged horses and 
hungry eyes.  
You will see why. 
According to Dana Villa, 
as the twentieth century draws to a close, it is difficult to avoid being 
overwhelmed by moral nausea. There are the well-known numbers: ten million 
dead in the First World War, a war fought over virtually nothing; roughly forty 
million in the Second World War, including the six million Jews killed in the 
Nazi concentration and extermination camps; twenty million or more in the Soviet 
gulag; thirty million dead as the result of the debacle of Mao’s “Great Leap 
Forward”; plus the millions from a host of less spectacular but no less horrific 
massacres. Any conception of human dignity that hinges upon the presumption of 
the moral progress of the species has been shattered by these events.13 
 
Which is to say, evil and the indifference to it are the guiding issues in the past and 
current centuries. In writing this work, I admit, however, that it is not moral nausea that 
overwhelms me. It is fury and grief.   
Let me begin my inquiry ethics by submitting that there is no moral summon or 
law that strikes us from up above, dictating a certain type of behavior to us,14 if only 
because the responses to suffering that could be called moral are too varied for them to be 
determined by any kind of law and because most people who have been called to respond 
to an instance of evil would confirm that encountering someone’s pain and addressing it 
has very little to do with rules and laws. According to Bergson, “we should find it very 
                                                
13 Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror, 11. 
14 In “On the Principles of Pure Practical Reason,” Kant appeals to what he calls there the 
“sole fact of pure reason,” which is consciousness of the fundamental law of pure 
practical reason, i.e., the supreme moral law. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press, 2015), 45. 
 14 
difficult to discover examples of such [a moral] imperative in everyday life.”15 Similarly, 
we have good reason to doubt the existence of the absolute other that commands moral 
dignity and respect because it is the absolute other, as if moral responses and an 
encounter with a kind of oversaturated otherness or uniqueness were cleanly aligned and 
if the circularity of the argument that the absolute other is synonymous with dignity qua 
the absolute other were not glaring enough. As I show further in the present work, we 
cannot appeal to universal bodily vulnerability either, i.e., the predicament of all human 
bodies wherein we are all subject to eventual decline and death, which is supposed to 
instigate or activate the thinking of empathetic relationality, for the reasons I will explain 
later.16 What else can we then appeal to if we ever hope to amplify and render more 
consistent the moral actions of specific individuals that do take place on a regular basis, 
even if these actions remain barely visible under the grid of globalized ideals of ending 
suffering for the greatest number of people, such that helping one specific other is not 
even recognized as a matter of importance? Indeed, given the current moral axiology, we 
must suspend the vantage point from which alleviating specific suffering appears 
meaningless, if we are to respond to a particular other in distress. 
I believe that people experience the desire to alleviate someone else’s suffering 
every day, as a matter of fact, as long as they experiences themselves as the addressees of 
the cry for help, which means positing as one of my starting points a kind of moral 
potential. In Bauman’s words, “ moral behavior is conceivable in the context of 
                                                
15 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2013), 15. 
16 See Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2016) and 
Erinn Gilson, The Ethics of Vulnerability: A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice 
(London: Routledge, 2016). 
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coexistence, of being with others, that is, a social context.”17 I further submit that the 
moral desire has a teleology built into it, such that the goal is the cessation or at least the 
reduction of suffering. (The point is to demonstrate how.) As Ophir eloquently puts it, 
“the passage from the amoral domain of evils, as facts about the occurrence of damage 
and suffering, to the moral domain, in which evils appear as wrongs and injustices, does 
not take a leap of faith over an unbridgeable gap. No Rubicon is crossed in the passage 
from an is to an ought.” Indeed, this is “not an extraordinary capacity.”18 Moral actions 
do not have an exceptionally rare, unusual provenance. Rather, moral actions are to make 
a transition from the occasional to the common, rather than from the particular to the 
universal. In short, to cite Vetlesen, what is at stake is “a conscious reluctance to 
subscribe to the effacement of the human important of the suffering.”19 
Yet, the world seems to be drowning in distress and indifference all the same, 
with one’s suffering usually confined to the private sphere, best left to family and friends, 
and with scant, severely underfunded social mechanisms of support (hospitals, shelters, 
humanitarian asylums, and so on) being either inaccessible to many sufferers or 
providing grotesquely inadequate relief.20 The sufferer and the addressee no longer 
                                                
17 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), 179. 
18 Adi Ophir, The Order of Evils: Toward an Ontology of Morals (New York: Zone 
Books, 2005), 342. 
19 Arne Johan Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 246. 
20 It can be further argued that the current moral standard of anonymous charity (e.g., we 
donate money not to a cancer patient we know, possibly a neighbor or an acquaintance, 
but to a cancer research organization) is a thorough erasure of personal judgment, where 
a specific individual has to exercise their judgment as to whom to help and how. We are 
encouraged to leave such moral decisions either to charity organizations or the state itself, 
further weakening our sense of agency. Furthermore, institutionalized charity reduces 
morality to a set of transactions, taking its living, pulsating unpredictably and singularly 
human heart out of it. 
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intersect on an equal surface. Just think of the instances when you ask for even minimal 
relief and you get a web link to a charity organization in return, which both has the value 
and the function of relieving the potential addressee of their judgment and responsibility, 
i.e., “sticking to a come-what may stance of abstaining from abstaining from deciding 
what or who, is right and what is wrong.”21 It is thus the failure to act morally and 
efficiently that becomes the real problem here, not the absence of moral desire. What 
arrests this moral desire then? 
Even though an obvious answer would have to do with the primacy of self-
interest, positing the existence of moral desire already implies a suspension of self-
interest, however temporary and fickle. Rather, I suggest a threefold answer. First, what I 
take to be problematic is the idea of the equivalence of victims or that all victims suffer 
the same, which indicates a confusion of what is with what could be, an equation of, or at 
least moral proximity between, the inevitable decline we are all facing with more 
unexpected, contingent suffering, commonly referred to as ‘twists of fate,’ in addition to 
a peculiar tendency to de-emphasize the role of the obviously unequal circumstances 
surrounding the victims when it comes to addressing their suffering. The universally 
human capacity to suffer and the unequal distribution of the means of remediation and the 
modes of recognition have to be clearly demarcated and understood in their 
implications.22  
                                                
21 Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency, 246. 
22 My emphasis on assessing the socio-political situation of a suffering other does not 
signal a return of numerical ethics. Rather, I will be arguing that the judgment of who is 
facing the greatest abandonment is something we owe to the sufferer, as I will elucidate 
in detail in chapter 3, which means that the provenance of this call to judgment is the 
victim’s internal reality. 
 17 
This is problematic for several reasons, but one that is pertinent here is that once 
suffering becomes undifferentiated, almost impersonal, and overwhelming, we are 
paralyzed with inaction. When the cries for help become one deafening din, we can no 
longer discern the others we can help with those we cannot.23 To assess one’s capacity 
for a moral response is to take into account the addressee’s positionality, i.e., their 
proximity to a scene of suffering, their health condition, financial resources, the amount 
of contacts they can activate and marshal to amplify the response, etc. Thus, 
undifferentiated, globally understood suffering disallows for a sense of agency. Morality, 
we might say, breaks down with the stranger, since it misses the relationality that lies at 
the center of moral endeavors.24  
As Ricoeur puts it, “every actions has its agents and its patients.”25 What I thus 
hope to accomplish here is to articulate a recipient of a moral action such that it is 
commensurate with a moral agent, stripped of infinite(ly) impossible demands and radical 
asymmetry between the two. To place a single suffering other at the center of moral 
inquiry entails that the addressee must be of an ‘equal standing,’ someone capable of 
                                                
23 “[T]he amazing improvement in access to means of communication, which can reach 
suffering almost anywhere and at any time and broadcast it all the time, is disproportional 
to the means of intervention of governments and other public bodies that could, in 
principle, intervene. The gap between the accessibility to suffering that various producers 
of images and representations have and the accessibility of the average viewer, who finds 
himself staring at the TV screen faced with a deluge of images of suffering, is larger still. 
No wonder, therefore, that this viewer tends to withdraw from the addressee position, 
stops hearing the cries for help, watches suffering as a spectacle. When the representation 
of suffering includes a representation of the distance and the accessibility of the sufferer, 
when this distance is very large and the accessibility is very low, the witness can 
acknowledge the suffering without occupying the position of the addressee of the 
utterance….  When footage of bombed cities, hunger-stricken villages, plagued refugee 
camps is shown, I am not invited to offer help.” Ophir, The Order of Evils, 301. 
24 I thank my friend Danielle Meijer for helping me refine this point, as well as for her 
other truly insightful suggestions. 
25 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), 157. 
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judgment, moral understanding, and differentiation. However, the ideal of tolerance is 
routinely internalized as if the individual, in their attempt to be fair and just, were 
obligated to see himself  “as a society, as if he should renounce his own agency…. 
Declining to make judgments or discriminations on the ground established on the ground 
of tolerance… What tolerance and pluralism teach is how not to choose…”26 Thus, part 
of the problem is the blurring of the individual and the social, where the former tries to 
absorb ‘the ideal moral values’ to the detriment of their ability to genuinely help 
someone. 
The second problem here, as I have come to gradually realize, is that the 
relationship between time and suffering, as it applies to morality, has not been 
sufficiently understood. Indeed, ethics is often atemporal, timeless, hovering above both 
the clocks and the experience of change, due to our continued desire to force it under the 
form of the eternal law, where time and universality are if not mortal enemies, but at least 
complete strangers to each other. I want to bring ethics and time together, but not in the 
semi-mystical way where we dip in the forever-obscure inkwell of mortality and learn to 
treasure each other because we are finite and the ones we love are subject to ultimate 
disappearance. We do not require the final threat of mortality to be interested in the well-
being of others.27 When Levinas tells us that suffering is the impossibility of nothingness 
                                                
26 Berel Lang, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1990), 237. 
27 I admit that few theoretical arguments and constructs upset me as much as an ethics of 
mortality, where the latter occasions an insight into our universal finitude and a 
comportment of care, stemming from the recognition of the dust-like fragility of our 
uniqueness. Having lost my fiancé and having almost my mother in a car accident, I 
know with a sword-like cutting certainty that I do not need people to suffer and die for 
me to love them or to experience their irreducible singularity. To give you an example, in 
the memoir following the death of her husband, Jamison speaks of seeing mummified 
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or when Ophir defines it as the duration of the encounter with the unbearable, just like 
Amery’s haunting meditations on moral time, we begin to see that ethics begins with an 
encounter with one’s torment and that suffering is the experience of pure duration, but 
what are the implications of this insight? If understanding suffering is inseparable from 
the constellation of socio-political, highly specific factors around it, how does this affect 
our understanding of time? 
Third, I believe that the ease with which people pass by a suffering other is 
accounted by the confusion regarding the ‘object’ of ethics. To be sure, it is a human 
being in distress, but is it this human being, in front of us, or some distant others, the one 
you have not met yet? It seems that in neglecting a single person, we engage in some kind 
of futural fantasy, where we do more and help more (anonymous) people. As I will argue 
throughout this work, the thinking according to which helping one person is not a big 
deal, not really and morally anyway, since there is always an almost-hallucinated 
possibility of minimizing the suffering of more people in the future is deeply and near-
irremediably ingrained in our moral imaginary. The notion of the moral imaginary stands 
for the repository of sedimented ideas, half-truths, cognitive habits, convictions without 
questioning, not to mention beliefs and values of long-forgotten provenance. In short, the 
                                                                                                                                            
owls at the Natural History Museum. She writes, “it seemed a violation of wild things to 
see such creatures stuffed and fakely perched. Yet had they not been dead and fixed, I 
could not have seen their wings and claws so clearly; I could not have appreciated the 
intricate beauty of their feathers and beaks. Had it not been for their deaths, I could not 
have seen what made them live…. with them dead, I took in—with awe— their parts and 
proportions, saw in their stillness what made a snowy owl a snowy owl and not an 
Eastern screech. Death had something to give.” “Grief,” she goes on, “puts into relief our 
mortal state. All die, says Ecclesiastes. All must die, it is written in the first statute of the 
Magna Carta. Grief is at the heart of the human condition…. There is a grace in death.” 
We adamantly reject any arguments that turn grief into a necessity and a lesson in the 
preciousness of life and we reject any dignity of death. Kay R., Jamison, Nothing Was the 
Same: A Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 134. 
 20 
contents of our moral imaginary struck the roots so deeply and thoroughly that they can 
no longer be defended with any theoretical rigor, yet they continue to guide our behavior, 
often without us even realizing it. 
As I will be explicating throughout this work, we need to understand the role of 
temporality in the alleviation of suffering vis-à-vis Ophir’s supposition that evil is 
socially produced and distributed, shifting our attention from searching for the causes of 
evil to its reduction. In other words, as I suggested a moment ago, we seek to understand 
evil strictly from the vantage point of minimizing it. Indeed, “evil is above all what ought 
not to be, but what must be fought against.”28 If we start distancing ourselves from the 
reign of universal, historical time seen as an iron-clad, inexorable succession of formally 
identical moments (“The clock ticks regularly,” notes Jean Amery),29 in order to make 
space for thinking through affective temporality, a temporality in which we encounter 
what’s good and what’s bad for us and in which either joy or sorrow organizes our sense 
of past, present, and future in drastically different ways, a new possibility for awakening 
moral agency emerges here. “The ability to dissipate suffering,” Ophir notes, “is related 
to the ability to deconstruct this temporality and sometimes based on it.”30 Importantly, 
this is not to invalidate ‘clock time’ or to put it out of work, as if such a thing were even 
possible. It is, I argue, simply not morally relevant. 
According to Ophir, “when what is present causes the one presented with it 
sorrow, suffering, or damage, or when what is present is the sorrow, the suffering, or the 
                                                
28 Paul Ricoeur, “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion, Vol. 53, No. 4, 75th Anniversary Meeting of the 
American Academy of Religion. (December, 1985), pp. 635-648. 
29 Jean Amery, On Aging: Revolt and Resignation (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 8. 
30 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 275. 
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damage itself, the discrete temporalization is preferable….”31 This is to say, what is 
needed here is the temporality that frees one from continuous agony. It thus seems that 
our task is, as Ophir suggests, to find out what the sufferer needs to be disengaged from 
in order for their agony to be alleviated. Let me return to the example of my personal 
experience. During the darkest time of my life, what did I need to be freed from for my 
suffering to subside? It was, simply put, the fact of my fiancé’s death. Since no such 
thing was or could ever be possible, it appeared that I could not hope to experience my 
present differently. However, my sense of being chained to the unbearable ‘now’ (it is the 
‘now’ of both clinging to and being persecuted by what cannot be undone) was in fact 
fractured, time and again, when the people who knew what was happening came over, 
held my hand as I cried, or took me out for a walk. Thus, while my situation did not 
formally change, my sense of time started to crumble. It changed or got destabilized 
enough for me to catch a glimpse of a less terrible affective reality because others 
disrupted the duration of my suffering. They asserted their moral agency through the re-
shaping of my temporality, however brief it was and could ever be. As Ophir states, 
“urgency is a moral category.” Ignoring the imperative of moral urgency and deferring 
our response to a plea for help means that letting someone’s suffering go on without any 
disruption is likely to be their point of no return, akin to the fatal tightening of the noose. 
The excuses for deferring help lie in the space between the moral sensibility that revolts 
in the face of a specific other’s suffering and the moral sensibility that aims to alleviate 
suffering for the greatest number of people, in which case deferral may appear necessary. 
This continuum of sensibility will be under discussion as well later. 
                                                
31 Ibid., 184. 
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Two things need to be clarified here. First of all, while it may not always be 
possible to remove the root of their torment for the victim, their suffering is inseparable 
from the circumstances surrounding them, such that, taking my example, there is the 
death of someone I loved and there is ‘being alone with it,’ combined with my very 
mundane and yet crucial inability to afford grief counseling. The very presence of 
compassionate others may be enough to fragment the duration of one’s suffering and it is 
the very least that must be expected morally. However, this is not to say that the worst 
experiences are made easier to bear if only we offer the suffering one our company. What 
it shows, rather, is that even something so minimal as our company has the potential for 
re-shaping the tortured time-sense of a suffering other. I am convinced that more others 
will be compelled to rupture the victim’s reality temporalized by suffering only when the 
efficacy of this rupturing is made clear through a rethinking of the constellation of time, 
suffering, and the world,32 of moral agency and what deadens it (e.g., while the common 
wisdom teaches us that time heals all wounds, I will argue that genuine healing is 
possible only when we acknowledge the possibilities for prevention or alleviation that 
were either taken up or missed), and of the non-equivalence of victims, thus bringing us 
closer to the task of rendering the moral actions of others more consistent. Barring that, 
we can appeal only to the vaguely defined goodwill of the addressees and, worse yet, 
their actions stand no chance of becoming elevated to a moral model.  
In asking, “What does the sufferer need to be disengaged from?” it is imperative 
that we study, examine, and understand both the affective reality of the victims and their 
socio-political circumstances, which include, among other things, the degree of one’s 
                                                
32 According to Amery, we become ‘bundles of time’ only when the world recedes into 
the distance. Amery, On Aging, 21. 
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abandonment, health, and access to support channels. The answer to this question will be 
inevitably contingent on the situation of the suffering other in its highest concreteness 
and singularity. This brings together the question of temporality and attention to one’s 
very concrete situation for the purposes of responding to their plight in a way that my 
work only begins to explicate.  
More broadly, my point here is that we take up our agency when it is clarified for 
us that we have the capacity to influence the victim’s sense of time, which means the 
recognition of the plasticity of time. If evil is socially produced and superfluous, the 
experience of suffering is the clearest expression of this superfluity, since suffering is 
precisely for nothing [pour rien, following Levinas]. This makes suffering not just one 
type of evil among several others, but rather its paradigm. In studying the experience of 
suffering, its relation to time, and its conditions of alleviation further, a connection 
between temporality and production begins to emerge as well. Just as an instance of evil 
is produced and is thus open to change, the experience of this evil, defined by its 
particular temporality, is also open to disruption and fragmentation. 
I thus submit that we take up our moral agency when we embrace a very different 
understanding of time, the time that is affective and plastic, and that it is up to us to 
choose to work a fissure in the monolithic duration of one’s torment or to let the suffering 
go on unchallenged. The task of the present work is to clarify and present the possibility 
of this choice. 
Finally, my hope is that the work under consideration will start bridging the gap 
between moral practice and philosophy, which is increasingly indistinguishable from a 
purely intellectual pursuit for its own sake, thus reviving the ancient tradition of practical 
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wisdom.33 We study the production of evils, the experiences and socio-political 
circumstances of the concrete suffering others, and different modes of time, as carefully 
and rigorously as possible, so that our response to human torment can rise to the 
challenge of its specificity. This is to say, my work is prescriptive in its character, to the 
extent that every problem I engage with lends itself, in one way or another, to practical 
application, and every account of the victim’s reality is carefully evaluated from the 
standpoint of the task of responding to it morally. 
To be sure, it does not escape my notice that the problematic in question is a kind 
of recasting of the ancient inquiry into fatalism (“forgive them, they believe in fatality 
and are therefore fatal themselves”)34 and its opposite, where universal time, with the 
things that happen in it, is decidedly outside of human influence. The affective 
temporality I am positing here means that time is no longer only universal, apolitical, and 
‘innocent.’ Time is no longer the form of all our cognition, but, reluctantly, its object. In 
the space of affective temporality, a failure to take up an opportunity for minimizing 
torment or damage is also a failure to recognize the plastic and man-made nature of this 
time. In an age when we are bombarded with depictions of suffering in every news outlet, 
from every direction, at every waking hour, when ignorance can no longer be an excuse 
for complacency and yet when the specific, localized ways of alleviation have not been 
sufficiently articulated, it is particularly important to study different expressions of 
suffering, situate them as concretely as possible, and to acquire a new sense of moral 
                                                
33 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, and the wonderful work by Pierre Hadot, 
Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Chichester: 
Wiley, 2013). 
34 Lispector, “The Burned Sinner and the Harmonious Angels,” The Complete Stories 
(New York: New Directions, 2015). Kindle ed. 
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agency vis-à-vis the vastness and omnipresence of human torment. It is particularly 
important to resist the urge to flee from this omnipresence of undifferentiated suffering in 
the direction of complacency or passivity, as opposed to undertaking the work of 
differentiation and assessing our capacities for alleviation in light of it. 
I began this introduction by referencing my personal experience and this is how I 
will end it. “Everyone, everyone deserves a day in court,” wrote Hannah Arendt in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. When I was discussing my experiences with an academic 
advisor, I said, “I am prepared to go to court and to present the facts, the facts that show 
that the degree of suffering in my life has been so high that I deserve urgent attention to 
my situation.” I am prepared to go to court and to let the weight and stubbornness of facts 
speak for themselves. Furthermore, I believe that my suffering deserves a greater moral 
urgency not because, in going from one ordeal to the next, I have acquired a sense of 
unwarranted superiority, but because my access to every support channel one can 
imagine has been thoroughly blocked. Which is to say that the illness that turned my 
body into living ruins (“the body is a thing that, when ill, we carry.”)35 and keeps casting 
a shadow of chronic pain over my days, as well as the death of the man I was going to 
marry, are only one part of what goes into this particular scene of suffering. In my own 
moral time, I am holding on to every missed possibility of making my life more livable 
that could and ought to have taken place, but, time and again, did not. 
By abstracting an instance of suffering from its messy, worldly circumstances, we 
solidify the sacred halo around it. But it is not the sacredness that is needed here. What 
we need is a recoil from the obscene fact that a lot of victims are still actively denied 
                                                
35 Clarice Lispector, “Beauty and the Beast or The Enormous Wound,” Selected 
Cronicas: Essays (New York: New Directions, 1996), Kindle ed.  
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access to mechanisms of alleviation and even more people or addressees remain content 
in their complacency. It is equally obscene that the category of victimhood can be framed 
as an advantage, if not become fashionable (Siebers claims, for instance, that minorities, 
with the suffering that often comes with exclusion and for other reasons, occupy a 
vantage point outside of ‘the system’ that allows them to discern its internal 
contradictions and critique its injustices, thus granting an epistemic privilege to the 
excluded and marginalized),36 while many victims are sinking deeper and deeper into 
social abandonment. The gap between those who bear the memory of suffering but are no 
longer suffering and those whose entire sense of past, present, and future is organized by 
their torment (“every moment of the present carries with it the entire duration of 
suffering”)37 must be made unmistakably clear. There are victims whose suffering can 
still be fragmented, due to its ongoing nature, and there are victims whose torment has 
already been dissipated, as much as it is possible, such that the former command moral 
urgency and the latter require a substantially different mode of acknowledging their past 
suffering. 
In short, suffering has the chance of becoming a true scandal in our existence only 
when we articulate it in its superfluity, evil, its relation to production,38 and patterns of 
distribution. In presenting human torment as the clearest expression of evil, the questions 
of evil and suffering are finally, fatally yoked together. To justify one is to justify the 
other, keeping in mind that every justification stifles a sense of revolt. I believe that it is 
                                                
36 Siebers, Disability Theory, 27. 
37 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 274. 
38 For instance, while my illness is probably natural (the medical professionals have been 
remarkably silent about its origin), the abandonment I have been subjected to because of 
it, scant access to medical services, and lack of both the proper living conditions and 
assistive equipment have nothing natural about them.  
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the task of any moral inquiry worthy of its name to widen the gap between evil and 
necessity as much as possible. Every image of ruins, the ruins of a city after an air strike 
or the ruins of a specific mind or body, must be accompanied with the knowledge that it 
is all for nothing and that it is within our power to do something about it. Understanding 
and internalizing the idea that we have the power both to produce evil and to fragment 
the undiluted duration of someone else’s suffering means that disavowing this power is 
the same as failing to reclaim our moral agency. 
Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of time and passions in Spinoza’s Ethics, thus making 
the figure in question an avenue into the broader problematic of evil and its prevention. 
The reason we go through Spinoza is because he is committed to immanence, which is to 
say, he does not gesture toward some true, eternal reality floating above our world, the 
way Plato would have it. If we are to think the problem of evil in its truth and 
concreteness, then we need to treat it as a problem of immanence, not transcendence and 
its temptation of theodicy. Once we are faced with the latter, we are already putting the 
question of evil in justificatory terms. 
Beyond that, I submit that Spinoza provides us a critically important tool to 
rearticulate the problem of evil, which is the notion of affective temporality. Insofar as he 
brings together affects, time, and bodies, it is important to keep in mind that Spinoza does 
not see affects as sheer receptivity. It is the alchemy of immanence where ideas and 
bodies affect one another, bump into each other, thus highlighting their relationality. It is 
a kind of responsiveness that is not just yours or mine. What this means is that we move 
from the subjective to the ontological. The tools that Spinoza gives us, sometimes quite 
reluctantly, allow us to go beyond his philosophy of plenitude, to think with and beyond 
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him about the temporality of the passion, the affectivity, expressivity, and experiential 
fabric of evil itself. 
First, I argue that while he equates time with illusion or an inadequate idea, 
positing the truth of eternity, time finds its way back into the Spinozist philosophy in a 
theoretically fruitful way. In differentiating between adequate and inadequate ideas, it 
turns out that both have a force of their own. Time as an inadequate idea exerts its force 
all the same through passions or affects, i.e., as something that human beings can 
experience either as a passionate time of joy or a passionate time of sorrow. Time impacts 
our entire embodiment insofar as it is given to us through affects. Having ‘extracted’ the 
idea of affective temporality from Spinoza, I raise the question of evil and conclude that 
we cannot address it morally on the Spinozist terms, since everything is necessary and all 
we can do is affirm evil. The task of the work under consideration, however, is to wedge 
a decisive gap between evil and necessity, affirmation, and justification. In the reign of 
iron-clad necessity, evil will always remain uncontested. My hope is that eventually the 
construct of necessity will be completely shattered, in an act of both practical, moral, and 
theoretical iconoclasm. 
I open chapter 2 with an analysis of two traditional views on evil, in order to 
depart from both for what I will argue is a far more practical, worldly account. I examine 
St. Augustine’s argument that evil is a privation and then Hannah Arendt’s famous 
equation of evil with thoughtlessness, exemplified in Adolf Eichmann. I submit that the 
former disintegrates the scene of evil into nothingness and the latter disintegrates the 
scene of evil into a failure of thinking or a kind of empty subjectivity, both of which 
refuse any intelligibility and deny evil a being of its own. I then turn to Adi Ophir’s work 
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The Order of Evils who, in rejecting transcendence and restating the question of evil in 
decisively non-theist terms, construes instances of evil as a superfluous mode of being 
and as social production that has its patterns of distribution. He further argues that while 
ongoing disasters and instances of suffering may be less horrible than the past ones, their 
moral claim upon us is much more urgent. It is more urgent because their evil is being 
produced right now and can still be stopped or alleviated. Thus, the question of what 
catastrophes and what suffering others ought to be more ‘morally relevant’ is decided 
from the standpoint of time, i.e., from the standpoint of prevention or alleviation. The 
structure of time itself is now saturated with moral urgency and responsibility. As I will 
show later, evil and suffering crucially coincide in their superfluity and in their 
temporality, the temporality open to human ‘re-shaping.’  
Furthermore, conjoining the notion of affective time and the temporal realm 
where evils are still open to reduction, I argue that Ophir gives us a way to disrupt 
someone’s suffering, which he defines as the duration of the unbearable. Challenging the 
monolithic continuity of suffering by infusing it with a different affect both activates a 
sense of moral agency within us and allows us to make different kinds of temporalization 
into a practice. Given Ophir’s introduction of the category of moral urgency, I argue that 
it further revives our moral agency and the faculty of judgment insofar as we must assess 
the socio-political circumstances of suffering others to determine whom I can help and 
how, i.e., we must determine who is facing the deepest, darkest abandonment and cannot 
wait. Since Ophir defines both evil and suffering in terms of superfluity, I transition to 
my next chapter in order to take up the phenomenon of suffering and its striking 
structural and experiential proximity to evil directly.  
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My goal in chapter 3 is to examine both the experience of and the internal 
structure of suffering, to solidify the link between suffering and evil. I examine Jean 
Amery’s essay “Resentments” where he sets out to describe the internal reality of the 
victim. Amery describes his predicament as the time of resentments, which is also his 
unique moral time. I begin to examine Amery’s harrowing insights by critiquing the 
equivalence of the victims, i.e., the idea that all victims suffer the same, in order to argue 
that an event of suffering (an irremediable loss or the torturer’s blow) does not happen in 
a socio-political void. Thus, I argue that if we want to do justice to the victim’s 
experience, we must study both the initial traumatic event and the circumstances around 
it in all of their specificity. It is undeniably true that some victims have a greater access to 
support channels and mechanisms of alleviation, while other sink deeper and deeper into 
social obscurity. Misrecognizing this inequality is seen here as the kernel of enduring 
pain of Amery’s internal reality, since it is forced under the rubric of equivalence and the 
specificity of his suffering remains obscured.  
What’s more, I submit that the moral truth of his resentments is a failure of an 
other’s agency. In other words, one’s experience of suffering necessarily, viscerally, and 
irrevocably indexes others as either exercising their moral agency or failing to do so, as 
being present or absent, as extending a helping hand or turning a blind eye to one’s 
torment. Suffering occasions a moral judgment on the part of the one in distress vis-à-vis 
those who could have helped, but did not, the judgment the victim has to live with and by 
haunted by. According to my argument, the only way to alleviate Amery’s ongoing 
torment is to face up to our failure of agency, to admit that we could have acted 
otherwise, and to assume this agency in our inhabiting of the world thereafter. In so 
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doing, I construe the victim’s affective reality as a repository of inconvenient truths and 
argue that moral agency qua the ability to act otherwise in the face of human torment has 
its origin not in the illusion of the self-sufficient subject and its freedom, but in the 
sufferer’s affectivity. To do justice to the experience of the victims, we must both take up 
our agency that corresponds directly to their vision of and the shattered desire for it and 
to undermine the idea that all victims suffer the same through carefully evaluating the 
circumstances surrounding their event of suffering.  
Lastly, I argue that holding on to moral time is refusing to forget that the 
possibilities of reducing his pain were available, yet not taken up, and that others in the 
proximity to his scene of suffering could have been morally present, but were not. To 
give up moral tine is to give up the hope that others are capable of acting otherwise in the 
face of human torment. 
My final chapter engages with perhaps the most influential thinker of ethics in the 
20th century Continental philosophy, Emmanuel Levinas, through the lens of Ophir and 
Amery. I reaffirm his assertion that ethics, seen as an encounter with the other in torment, 
is indeed primary because we ought to think and act from the vantage point of someone’s 
suffering. Levinas places pure alterity and the suffering other at the center of his moral 
thinking, as something that can drastically change our comportment in the world and 
reorient us from indifference or moral ‘lostness’ toward the efforts to minimize an other’s 
agony. However, he separates radical alterity from the world and being, since he equates 
the latter with the primacy of the same, such that there is no place for pure individuality 
or singularity. I believe that in conjoining suffering with pure alterity, Levinas helps us 
understand with an aching lucidity that suffering is radically superfluous and 
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inassimilable, like a needle-sharp foreign object in the human body. Moreover, in 
suffering, the value of one concrete individual is either affirmed or denied, since we 
either attempt to offer them relief or we choose not to. However, this is where I begin to 
rearticulate Levinasian insights against Levinas, returning to the theoretical insights given 
to us by Ophir and Amery. I argue that pure alterity is a key characteristic of suffering, 
rather than saturated human otherness. I further argue that alterity understood as the 
otherness of suffering is truly morally relevant because it alerts us both to the evil of 
human pain, the radically alien nature of suffering that runs counter our entire existence, 
the nature according to which the deadly force and duration of torment is more monstrous 
than the fatal cut of the sword, and to the role of time in it. We do not need the absolute 
human other to understand torment as thoroughly antithetical to human existence. It is 
enough, I submit, to experience the superfluity, radical foreignness, and evil of suffering 
and to see the experiential or affective temporality as something plastic and thus open to 
our influence to rise in revolt against human distress. 
I conclude this chapter by pointing toward not only the imperative to respond 
morally to a suffering other, but also to the inclusion of the victims in the shared world. 
They experience their inclusion only if we take up the agency that before resided in their 
grieving eyes alone, if we do not tuck away or hide the sufferer’s pain, but make it part of 
the shared space. in short, we do not stand beside the victims only in the acuity of their 
suffering. We stand beside the victims during the duration of our lifetime. 
The lifetime that lasts a very long time.  
Chapter One 
The Passions of Time: Time, Affect, and Evil in Spinoza 
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Passion moved the body like a stranger. 
 
—Unknown  
 
I begin this work concerning the question of evil and suffering with an insistence 
on immanence or worldliness, understood as a refusal to articulate and conceptualize the 
phenomena we encounter in our life by pointing beyond the world and gesturing toward 
the unintelligible, that which radically surpasses human experience, in order to (we note 
the irony) to explain them. In other words, we refuse positing something other than the 
world we find ourselves in. In holding on to immanence, we attempt to avoid dissolving 
the phenomena we seek to understand and alter into mystical obscurity and ineffability. 
Now, as Antonio Negri puts it with regard to his influential book on Spinoza, The Savage 
Anomaly, he was able to offer “a new perspective on the interpretation of Spinoza that 
was part of a wider process of renewal of the traditions of thought about 
transformation.”39 To think about transformation is to think about the fluid, plastic, 
dynamic nature of our existence, which is to say, about time and its duration. Thought 
about transformation, about experiencing change in all of its affective, intellectual, and 
embodied dimensions, finds its unexpected expression in the supposedly ‘eternalist’ 
philosopher of the 17th century.  
In addition to his remarkable commitment to the transformative nature of our 
existence and to immanence, Spinoza took human affectivity to be central in our lives. 
Thus, “Spinoza is thoroughly relevant to any discussion of human emotion and feeling. 
Spinoza saw drives, motivations, emotions, and feelings—an ensemble Spinoza called 
                                                
39 Antonio Negri, Spinoza for Our Time: Politics and Postmodernity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013), 2. 
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affects—as a central aspect of humanity.”40 As we will see, his conjunction of duration 
and affects will form the core of this chapter and will be the key building block of my 
moral theory, as tentative as it may be. 
Spinoza’s insistence on radical immanence, construed as a rejection of the 
otherworldly realm from which human beings are fundamentally barred, and the power of 
affects challenges all visions of world and being as devoid of ethics and politics. Indeed, 
Negri goes on to contrast him with the negative ontology of Martin Heidegger. As  
an enemy of socialism, he pretends to accept its critique of the capitalist and 
technological world of reification and alienation, only to switch the polarity and 
claim that existence entails abandonment to the purity and the nakedness of being. 
But being and substance are never either pure or naked: they are always made of 
institutions and history, and the truth issues from struggle, and from the human 
construction of temporality itself.41 
 
I thus begin my theoretical journey with the thinker who, as it were, forced even 
seemingly pure, ‘innocent’ concepts such as divinity, eternity, and time into this world as 
an adamant rejection of transcendence or the ineffable beyond. The overarching aim here, 
the aim whose outcome will be pivotal to the entire trajectory of this work, is to introduce 
and explicate the idea of time as experience or a type of affect or passion, as distinct from 
biological time or Kant’s claim there is pre-given categorical time that would order all 
experience and therefore ethics.42 In other words, it is to introduce the notion of affective 
temporality, defined as a kind of embodied, viscerally felt time we experience first and 
                                                
40 A. R. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Governance of Life 
(London: Heinemann, 2003), 8. 
41 Negri, Spinoza for Our Time, 5. 
42 Note that it is precisely the abstract nature of time, or the limits determined in advance, 
that secures the universalizability of the categorical imperative. Since time is abstract, 
affectivity cannot have any bearing on it and thus cannot transform it. 
 35 
foremost as affects.43 Given Spinoza’s commitment to the notion of eternity, 
individuating time, time as a type of experience, seems to be foreclosed in Spinoza as 
well. However, I will argue that there is a way to see time as an affect or a passion on 
Spinoza’s own terms. 
In rearticulating homogenous, universal time as a time of passions, I will set the 
stage for my further explorations of the issues of the production of evil, suffering, and 
ethics in the face of what ought not to be. My use of Spinozism here could be seen as my 
attempt to wedge a gap between the conjunction of temporality and pre-given 
universality, such that clock time enables and envelops all experience but does not 
become available to us as experience. Upon this traditional reading, time is the necessary 
condition for all our passions or affects, for all our pains and joys, but is never reducible 
to them. 
The question that interests me in Spinoza’s Ethics is this: What happens to the 
conflicting notions of eternity and time considered from the perspective of power 
(potentia) understood as the actual essence of the immanent first cause, i.e., the first 
cause that does not cancel out the world? More precisely, if eternity is the proper domain 
of reason at its height, how do we experience time at all on Spinoza’s terms? To be sure, 
we do experience time, this much is clear. What remains to be explained is how this 
experience is possible and what its meaning is, given Spinoza’s claim that the pinnacle of 
reason is to recognize eternity. The task is thus to locate time within human experience, 
                                                
43 From a more contemporary perspective, recall Bergson’s central philosophical claim 
that our lived experience of time is that of duration or flow. We have to ‘spatialize’ this 
flow in order to convert it into measurements and clock time, to facilitate our everyday 
life. Henri Bergson, Duration and simultaneity, with reference to Einstein’s theory 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 16.  
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which, as I will argue, runs along the lines of conjoining the idea of time and affects or 
passions.  
At the center of Spinoza’s thought stands substance or causa sui, that which is 
self-caused. One of the characteristics of substance for Spinoza is that it is eternal.44 What 
exactly do we mean by ‘substance’ though? Substance is something that requires nothing 
else in order to exist or to be available to reason. It is the living, all-encompassing heart 
of self-sufficiency, yet it is also something that cannot be separated from affective, 
singular beings.45 Interestingly, Pietersma argues that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh,’ 
nameless and ubiquitous, is close to Spinoza’s substance.46 Time, on the other hand, is 
seen as numerical succession that is inadequate to the expression of substance, i.e., to the 
way substance presents itself to the intellect, and can be explained as an effect of the 
imperfections of the human mind. Thus, it seems that there is in fact no problematic of 
eternity and time in Spinoza, since the latter is only an illusion or an error of the 
imperfect mind.  
                                                
44 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, tr. G. H. R. Parkinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), Part V, Demonstration to Proposition 30. The Latin edition I used is Benedict de 
Spinoza, Ethica (The Latin Library, May 2008), accessed on 12/05/2016, 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/spinoza.html, I have also consulted Spinoza, The Ethics 
and Other Works, tr. E. Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).   
45 In order to illuminate the workings of understanding, Spinoza delves into a lengthy 
discussion about the singular beings or intensities that are unavailable to the intellect we 
cannot conceive of them through themselves (we cannot abstract a singular being from its 
relations and co-implications) and about substance, which can be conceived of through 
itself alone. Thus, when Spinoza claims that substance is ‘prior to all affections’ (see Part 
1, Proposition 1), he means not an antecedence, but rather that substance is free of all 
affective relationalities insofar as it concerns understanding. Spinoza, The Ethics and 
Other Works. 
46 Henry Pietersma, “Merleau-Ponty and Spinoza” in Spinoza: Critical Assessments, 
Volume IV (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 312–318. 
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However, it is my contention that we can think the reality of both eternity and 
time if we take seriously Spinoza’s insistence on the parallelism between the attributes of 
thought and extension qua matter (what is the case in thought is also the case in matter 
and vice versa, somewhat akin to the Hermetic maxim ‘As Above, So Below’) as well as 
the real distinction between these two attributes, which means that the two mirror each 
other while remaining separate. To say that it is the infinite power of the first cause that 
both unites and holds in separation thought and matter is perhaps also to say that it is the 
same power that both unites and holds in separation time (understood, at least tentatively, 
in a non-numerically dynamic, affective way) and eternity. One could say that it is 
precisely this very power that accounts both for the real difference between the temporal 
and the a-temporal and the radical equality of the two.47 This is important to us in at least 
two ways.  
First, the reading of time and eternity in Spinoza that I will suggest attempts to 
bring to the fore the innovative nature of the Spinozist appropriation of these notions, not 
to mention the highly original nature of his philosophy as such. Indeed, it is my 
contention that the real equality and difference between the temporal and the a-temporal 
both demonstrate the uniqueness of Spinoza’s thought and serves as a significant 
contribution to contemporary discussions of time. Second, and this is to substantiate my 
first point, such a reading might help us to extract the hidden dimensions of the temporal 
                                                
47 It should be noted that it is not my intention to suggest an analogy or establish a strict 
symmetry between the thought-and-matter dyad and the time-and-eternity. As I hope to 
make clear later in the text, any pre-established distribution of the temporal and the 
eternal would contradict the originality of Spinoza’s understanding of these questions. 
However, it is my view that the logic of the absolute power (the divine expressivity that 
ensures both the multiplicity and the equality of the attributes) can be fruitfully applied to 
the notions of time and eternity. 
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and the a-temporal both in thought and matter, or, more precisely, human embodiment. In 
other words, it might begin to reconfigure the set of complications around the question of 
time, one of which is that, on the one hand, time is considered as purely internal, i.e., 
intrinsic to thought (synthesizing our experiences, while governing and remaining 
‘above’ them) and, on the other hand, alien to it (the ideas composing thought enjoy the 
notoriously a-temporal status, while the things of which they are the ideas bring their 
finitude from without).48 If we interpret time and eternity as equally necessary parts of 
the infinite divine expressivity (i.e., the divine power that expresses itself in an infinity of 
ways), it becomes possible to incorporate both of these notions into the dynamic 
individuation of the human mind49 and the construction of lived experience. That is, the 
temporal and the a-temporal are essentially interwoven with experience.  
Spinoza understands time to be the units by which the human mind marks and 
measures specific periods of duration.50 The reason why a particular durational unit is 
chosen to measure the durations of things and events is entirely conventional and depends 
on the point of view and purpose of a person. Duration, however, is itself indivisible and 
non-numerical. It is said to be “the indefinite continuation of existing.”51 The reason it is 
said to be indefinite is because it can be limited extrinsically (by an encounter with 
                                                
48 For a useful summary of the internal nature of time and Bergson’s attempt to restore 
the absolute reality of time outside consciousness, see Camille Pernot, “Bréves remarques 
sur la notion de temps” in Architectures de la raison: Melanges offerts à Alexandre 
Matheron, ed. Pierre François Moreau (Fontenay, St. Cloud: Editions ENS, 1996), pp. 
233-47.  
49 The way in which different experiences of time influence and transform our cognitive 
trajectory. 
50 Spinoza, Letter 12 in Benedictus de Spinoza, The Letters, tr. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995), IV/57.6 Ibid., Ethics, Part II, 
Definition 5.7, Spinoza, Letter 12, 5.8 Ibid., Ethics, Part II, Proposition 16. 
51 Ibid., Ethics, Part II, Definition 5. 
 39 
something that contradicts its way of existing, e.g., a fatality), but not intrinsically, that is, 
by its own essence or ontologically. The enduring corporeality of all the things in the 
world can be divided, enumerated, and measured only in imagination, which is to say that 
such qualifications apply to it only extrinsically. In other words, duration and 
measurement are radically separated. This leads Spinoza to postulate that measure, time, 
and number are nothing but modes of imagining.52 We could say that his notion of time is 
inseparable from numerical sequentiality (e.g., the appearance of the sun has a certain 
mathematical certainty about it), while there is nothing about extension (matter or 
corporeality) itself that lends itself to enumeration and division. Sequentiality is equally 
inseparable from imagination, which has to do with affections (affectio) in the sense of 
images or corporeal traces. What do we mean by that?  
Affections refer both to the body that is being affected and the external cause of 
this particular affection, i.e., what brought it about.53 In the broadest terms, they designate 
a corporeal change in the twofold sense of cause and effect. This twofoldness has to do 
with Spinoza’s reasoning that the ideas of external things can only ‘occur’ inside the idea 
of our own body. The mind (mens) considers external things acting upon its body and, as 
it were, filters the ideas of external things through the idea of its body. Thus, anything 
that happens outside the body can only be given to the mind with a necessary causal 
reference to its corresponding body. Mind and body cannot have ideas or experiences of 
their own.  
By the same token, time is regarded as an affection that gives us the image of our 
body as affected by an external body, the image that is necessarily double, i.e., ‘our own’ 
                                                
52 Spinoza, Letter 12, 5. 
53 Ibid., Ethics, Part II, Proposition 16. 
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and yet alien to us. For instance, the rising of the sun and the subsequently articulated 
solar time are given to a person only insofar as they affect or modify his or her body, i.e., 
as causing certain impressions. The body and the world are necessarily, inevitably 
conjoined. The mind can thus perceive infinitely many bodies as affecting its own body 
and measure the duration of any external body or any event by way of imagination. Thus, 
some of the things acting upon the body are experienced as temporal, as subject to 
division and enumeration. What imagination provides us with, however, are inadequate 
ideas, the ideas that represent not the external things of which they are the ideas, but 
rather the manner in which these external things are given to us. Indeed, inadequate 
ideas, we note, swarm “in the confusion of an image of thought with the activity of 
thinking itself… unable to relate to other ideas to produce an intensity that can displace 
the force of these images.”54 We take ideas to refer to the things of which they are ideas 
in an unproblematic way, remaining ignorant that the real content of these ideas has 
more to do with their impact on us than with the things that they are supposed to 
represent. Ideas are thus understood from the standpoint of their impact on us, i.e., ideas 
are forces of different intensities. Similarly, time refers to the way duration is given to us 
and experienced by us without indicating anything about the nature of duration. To use 
the language that will be employed later in this project, this duration may be that which 
floods our senses, as in joy or suffering, or it may be imperceptible, an easy flow of time 
in the background, as it were. It can either affect us with fiery intensity or recede into the 
background of our habitual, everyday comportment in the world. Before discussing the 
                                                
54 Stuart Pethick, Affectivity and Philosophy After Spinoza and Nietzsche: Making  
Knowledge The Most Powerful Affect (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 50. 
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reasons for Spinoza’s rejection of numerical time in greater detail, let us examine the role 
of power and those of affection (affectio) and affect (affectus) in this context.  
In Part III, Spinoza writes that “each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to 
persevere in its being.”55 Furthermore, “the endeavour by which each thing endeavours to 
persevere in its being is nothing other than the actual essence of the thing.”56 This kind of 
striving is necessarily inseparable from anything that is actual and amounts to the famous 
doctrine of the conatus, which could be understood as power, force, desire, or appetite.57 
Together with substance, the conatus forms another pillar of Spinoza’s thought. To speak 
of any actually existing thing is the same as speaking of its relation to its own being, the 
way it subsists in existence. As Spinoza puts it, “the power, i.e., the endeavour, of each 
thing by which, either alone or with others, it either acts or endeavours to act” is the 
necessary consequence of the actuality of each given thing.58 This necessary relation of a 
thing to its being is to remain in existence, which means staving off whatever contradicts 
or thwarts its power of existing. Thus, the conatus is clearly aligned with perseverance in 
one’s existence, i.e., it is to act and to be acted on in a way that increases one’s power.59 
                                                
55 Spinoza, Ethics, Part III, Proposition 6. 
56 Ibid., Proposition 7. 
57 While Spinoza will speak specifically of desire (cupiditas) and appetite (appetitus) in 
relation to the conatus, it seems safe to suggest that these phenomena are fundamentally 
interrelated and in a certain sense can stand for one another. 
58 Ibid., Demonstration of Proposition 7. 
59 Indeed, Butler convincingly argues that Spinoza’s desire to persevere in one’s 
existence is a far cry from clear-cut individualism, where the self attempts to maintain its 
life at the expense of others. In her words, “depending on what kind of response a being 
undergoes, that being stands a chance of diminishing or enhancing its own possibility of 
future perseverance and life. This being desires not only to persevere in its own being, 
but to live in a world that reflects and furthers the possibility of that perseverance… to 
live means to participate in life, and life itself will be a term that equivocates between the 
“me” and the “you,” taking up both of us in its sweep and dispersion. Desiring life 
produces an ek-stasis in the midst of desire, a dependence on an externalization, 
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The identity of power and action is validated and affirmed by the idea that all power is 
necessarily related to the capacity for affecting and being affected, to a being-able-to in 
the general sense. This capacity for causing change is enacted by affections, i.e., by one 
body acting upon and thereby causing change in another body. Spinoza immediately adds 
that “the endeavour by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves, not a 
finite, but an indefinite time.”60 This indefinite time is of course duration, i.e., existence 
itself. Yet, duration can be given to us in many ways. 
But how are we to understand this relation to the power that each given thing has 
in Spinoza’s thought taken more broadly? To start answering this question, we need to 
drastically shift our attention from the actually given multiple bodies to their immanent 
cause that is radically singular. Substance, God, or nature (natura naturans, which means 
nature in the sense of pure activity or creative production) is that which gives rise to all 
things and does so insofar as it has the absolute power (potentia) identical to its essence.61 
This is to say that the infinite power of substance is nothing other than the infinite power 
of its existence in the sense that the divine existence does not need any cause apart from 
itself.62 To be a substance is to be in itself and conceived through itself, i.e., it is not to 
need “the concept of another thing, from which concept it must be formed.”63  
                                                                                                                                            
something that is palpably not-me, without which no perseverance is possible.” Judith 
Butler, “The Desire to Live: Spinoza’s Ethics under Pressure,” in Victoria Kahn, et al., 
Politics and the Passions, 1500-1850 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 
112-13. 
60 Spinoza, Ethics, Proposition 8. 
61 By ‘active nature’ Spinoza understands “that which is in itself and is conceived through 
itself, or, such attributes of substance as express eternal and infinite essence.” Ibid., Part 
I, Scholium to Proposition 29. 
62 Ibid., Proposition 34. 
63 Ibid., Definition 3. 
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What is important here is that we attend to the way in which an immanent cause 
differs from a transitive one. A cause is called transitive when it is essentially different 
from the effect it produces, i.e., when the two do not coincide in a substantial way, or 
when it immediately withdraws from its effect. A craftsman producing a piece of 
furniture and remaining radically different from it is a good example of this kind of 
causality. A more familiar story is of the Judeo-Christian God who remains radically 
irreducible to his creation insofar as this creation takes place out of God’s free will and is 
accidental. Put otherwise, God’s existence is necessary, while the existence of his 
creation is utterly contingent, which is something we are well familiar with due to 
traditional theology. A cause is said to be immanent when there is no radical separation 
between it and the effect it produces. More precisely, “God is the cause of all things in 
the same sense as he is cause of himself.”64 The cause and its effect are not split into 
necessity and contingency inasmuch as there is equal necessity to both of them. For 
Spinoza, substance does not need any external cause to bring it into existence and to 
conserve its being precisely because its ability to exist is infinitely great. ‘To be self-
caused’ and ‘to exist infinitely and eternally’ are enfolded in the ability or power that 
constitutes its essence. This is to say that the absolute power of substance is absolute not 
because it was able to create something radically different from itself, but rather because 
there is no limit to its productivity. The expression of the absolute power cannot be 
limited simply because there is no other power that would be opposed to it. This power is 
the power to exist in the infinity of expressions without ever being different from or more 
necessary than its expressions.  
                                                
64 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 
103. 
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Finally, it is crucial to note that God’s power is active and actual, which is why it 
should be sharply distinguished from the notion of power as lack or the potential for 
destruction. The common people, Spinoza notes, “say that God has the power of 
destroying everything and of reducing it to nothing.”65 In other words, they understand 
God as being able to do something and yet not doing it. According to this view, divine 
acts are contingent and dependent solely on his free will. However, nothing could be 
further from Spinoza’s understanding of these matters. God’s very existence qua power is 
entirely identical to acting, such that the two are strictly synonymous. There are no 
possibilities that exist in the divine intellect and may or may not be actualized. Indeed, “it 
is just as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as it is impossible for us to 
conceive that God does not exist.”66 His power is thus fundamentally different from the 
power (potestas) of kings that lacks something and therefore requires a transition to 
actuality, a kind of acquisition of and striving for power. God’s power as actuality is the 
very guarantor of immanence if we understand immanence in the literal sense of 
‘remaining within.’67 
Thus, the absolute power of the cause of all things68 is one insofar as it is defined 
as the pure act of existing. It first appears that nothing could be more abstract than this 
existing devoid of any determinations. However, Spinoza immediately adds that the 
essence of God is expressed in the infinity of attributes, which is a term we saw earlier.69 
What is then an attribute? It is “what the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting 
                                                
65 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Scholium after Proposition 3. 
66 Ibid. 
67 From late Latin immanent- ‘remaining within,’ from in- ‘in’ + manere ‘remain.’ 
68 “There must follow, from the necessity of the divine nature, infinite things in infinite 
ways.” Ibid., Part I, Proposition 16. 
69 Ibid., Definition 6. 
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its essence.”70 Put otherwise, it is the way in which the essence of substance is given to 
the mind.71 Although Spinoza insists that there are infinite attributes, the human mind 
perceives only two of them, i.e., thought and extension or matter. To recall Deleuze’s apt 
formulation, “the essence that is expressed is an unlimited, infinite quality. The 
expressive attribute relates essence to substance and it is this immanent relation that the 
intellect grasps. All the essences, distinct in the attributes, are as one in substance, to 
which they are related by the attributes.”72 Thus, thought and extension lead us back to 
substance. What is important to underscore here is that there are two equally fundamental 
ways of conceiving power. One is as the pure power of existence understood as 
substance, the power outside all determinations. The other is as the distinct powers of the 
attributes and modes that are nonetheless fully expressive of substance. In other words, 
the latter way of understanding substance refers to thought and extension and their modal 
affections (roughly speaking, modes are the properties of thinking and extended things)	insofar	as they immanently and infinitely express the absolute power.  
Let us now take a step back from the perspective of power qua substance and 
focus on the powers of thought and matter as well as on their relation to the conatus and 
affection. Which is to say, let us examine how we relate to the absolute power of 
existence from out of the network of multiple intensities (i.e., all the external factors that 
affect us in various ways) that allows us to increase or decrease our own power of 
existence.  
                                                
70 Ibid., Definition 4. 
71 For a more recent discussion of the admittedly obscure relationship between attributes 
and substance, see David Davidson, Truth, Language, and History (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2005). 
72 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 51. 
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First of all, the insistence on the equality of the power pertaining to thought and 
the power pertaining to matter is of paramount importance. According to Spinoza, that 
which is true for things (broadly understood as the outside of thought) is true for thought 
itself.73 Thought and matter, as was indicated before, are paradoxically one in their non-
identity. This parallelism between the body and the mind means that since the mind is a 
mode of thinking and since it is proper for an individual to have an essence, the essence 
of the mind consists in that which is most intrinsic to thinking, i.e., an idea.74 But what is 
this idea? The key object of the mind’s idea is the being of the body in all of its actuality 
and its affective encounters with other bodies. As Deleuze puts it, “the idea that we are is 
to thought and to other ideas what the body that we are is to extension and to other 
bodies.”75 Since the mind and the body are the modes of two distinct attributes and yet 
they necessarily correspond to one another, each thing is at the same time the body and 
the mind, embodiment and thinking. The first reason why this is significant for us is that 
the power that aids or counteracts the individual’s perseverance in existence may reside 
either on the side of thought or on the side of materiality. The second reason is that here 
we get the idea of how power remains univocal (said of both mind and body) and yet 
involves a real difference.76 The power to endure in existence is one, yet it also harbors 
real distinctions. 
                                                
73 “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.” 
Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 7. 
74 Ibid., Axiom 3 and Proposition 11. 
75 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 86. 
76 A more implicit work that the emphasis on the equality and real distinctness of thought 
and matter is doing here refers to the possible ‘realignment’ of the temporal and 
atemporal with respect to these attributes. This twofold relationship between thought and 
matter seems to ‘split’ each of these attributes into the temporal and the eternal. As I see 
it, this split within one attribute itself undergoes change and actively changes the split 
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The possibility of an increase or decrease of individual power finally highlights 
for us the full significance of affections and affects. According to Deleuze, the difference 
between affection and affect is not that the former refers to the body, while the latter 
refers to the mind. The real difference is between the body’s affection and idea which is 
the idea of the external body (i.e., the change and the necessary presence of the cause of 
that change), and the affect, which has to do with an increase or decrease of the power of 
acting and can refer to both the body and the mind. Indeed, “the affectio refers to a state 
of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body, whereas the affectus 
refers to the passage from one state to another, taking into account the correlative 
variation of the affecting bodies.”77 We could say that the affection names an encounter 
between two bodies and that the affect names the difference that this encounter has for 
our existence and our body. With regard to the latter, let us note that 
bodies change and their senses and feelings are transient and instable, whereas our 
ideas and concepts are far more stable and truth as such is permanence itself. 
However, rather than this constant change and variability being considered as a 
weakness or a hindrance to life, Spinoza accepts it as the essential way in which 
we live and therefore something to be affirmed and appreciated… affectivity, the 
constant sense of transience and ‘inbetween-ness’ that relates each and every 
discernible experience of the world….78 
 
In a certain sense, then, affect indexes the degree of proximity or separation between our 
power of acting and the infinite power. It is the work of affects vis-à-vis our embodiment 
that interests us here. 
Having discussed action in its finite and infinite dimensions (the actions that we 
are capable of and the pure abundance of actuality that we strive to attain by way of our 
                                                                                                                                            
within the other attribute. All of this is to say that the ratio of the temporal and the 
atemporal is itself subject to a paradoxical kind of dynamic openings and refractions. 
77 Ibid., 49. 
78 Pethick, Affectivity and Philosophy After Spinoza and Nietzsche, 18. 
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actions), we can thus say that the experience of time belongs to the region of affections 
and affects. Time is an affection of the body insofar as it references the affecting body 
(e.g., the rising sun or the nightfall) over against the one that is affected. More 
importantly, it can also be an affect of the body and the mind alike inasmuch as it 
introduces a difference into our relation to our existence.79 This is to say that time itself is 
an affective route, however indirect, to the power of enduring in existence. Some affects 
enhance our power to persevere in existence by infusing our body with exuberance and 
some affects put us on our knees in crushing torment. While I will return to this idea 
later, it is important to note that happy emotions change our experience of transience (the 
old wisdom teaches us that the arrow of time flies fast when we are happy) and sorrowful 
emotions make our experience of time slow, anguished, overwhelming our senses with 
pain alone, which is the experience time standing still, without a helping hand and 
without solace. What I am calling ‘an affective temporality’ thus ties into the joys and 
sorrows of our existence, such that it either enhances our being or depletes it.80 
However, the fact is that Spinoza allows for little ambiguity when he speaks of 
the divine essence as eternal, thus appearing to repeat the more familiar gesture of 
privileging the a-temporal over the temporal. Any relation that the affects of time might 
have to an increase or decrease of our power is insignificant with regard to the infinite 
                                                
79 David Savan, “Spinoza on Duration, Time, and Eternity” in Spinoza: The Enduring 
Questions, ed. Graeme Hunter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 3-31. 
80 Note Spinoza’s claim that “an emotion toward a thing which we imagine merely in 
itself, and not as necessary, possible, or contingent, is the greatest of all emotions, other 
things being equal.” He thus postulates that the emotions or affects of reason, as that 
which is able to recognize the things that are free, i.e., in themselves, are the most 
powerful. Therefore, the affects stemming from this recognition are what impact us the 
most. Yet, this is an impact to reason, comparable, perhaps, to the rush one gets from 
making a major scientific discovery. However, I believe that other affects can have a 
stronger bodily impact. Spinoza, Ethics, Part V, Proposition 5. 
 49 
power understood as eternal. Not only an outright inadequate, ‘cut-up,’ fluctuating time is 
excluded from the divine nature, but even unlimited duration seems to be subsumed 
under the sign of eternity. Let us discuss the reasons for this emphasis on eternity in 
greater detail, in order to return to our discussion of affective temporality.  
In the definition that strangely echoes one of duration, eternity is said to be 
“existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow from the definition alone of the 
eternal thing.”81 This definition applies, first and foremost, to substance and its power to 
give rise to everything else. Indeed, “eternity is the very essence of God.”82 However, it 
is also said of modes, which means that it is said of any finite entities.83 Two points need 
to be unpacked here. First, the very extension of eternity into finite modes is decidedly 
new when compared to the ancient and medieval accounts of eternity. To take just one 
example, Spinoza rejects Plato’s notion of eternity qua timelessness because Plato gives 
the status of timelessness to ideas, the principles of logic, and mathematical truths.84 
These instances of the timeless are formally necessary on Plato’s part. Apart from being a 
nominalist85 who cannot accept the existence of universals, Spinoza understands that 
these instances are determinate (i.e., we can say what they are, point to their form) 
whereas pure existence is indeterminate. What is properly eternal is indeterminate 
precisely because it is capable of producing any determination. Furthermore, its 
fundamental indetermination stems from the fact that in substance essence and existence 
                                                
81 Ibid., Part I, Definition 8. 
82 Ibid., Part V, Demonstration of Proposition 30. 
83 Ibid., Proposition 21. 
84 Savan, “Spinoza on Duration, Time, and Eternity,” ed. Hunter, Spinoza: The Enduring 
Questions, 14-5. 
85 Nominalism is a doctrine, according to which universals or names have no 
corresponding reality to what they name, such that, in the final account, only particulars 
are real. 
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are identical. This identity means that substance cannot be a member of any class, for if 
we were able to point to it as this or that, it would suggest that it subsists as a pure 
existent and as this or that thing, which would indicate a split between essence and 
existence. Finally, mathematical timeless entities are abstract and whatever follows from 
them is also abstract. This is where we begin to see that Spinoza’s indetermination is to 
be taken in the most real and concrete sense. Indeed, mathematical entities and their 
relations are opposed to the limitless productive activity of nature.86  
The second point that needs to be addressed here has to do with the reasons why 
Spinoza wants to hold on to the fundamental characteristic of power as eternity, however 
revised this notion may be. Why should he insist on eternity and not be content with 
everlasting duration, as one would perhaps expect given the similarity that the definitions 
of eternity and duration share? What kind of work does the notion of eternity do for him? 
According to Spinoza, “nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.”87 
But what does he mean by effect? To exist and thus to make an effect on something is to 
cause a change in something else. It is an expression of and an impact on the conatus, 
which could be loosely compared to a wave changing and itself being changed by other 
waves. Any change is a motion that takes place in time, that has a beginning and an end, 
a before and an after. However, what happens when we start to explain one motion by 
another motion? The problem we immediately run into is that of the infinite regress, in 
which one thing is explained in terms of another thing that is essentially similar to it, and 
thus itself needs to be explained by something prior or external to it. The motive chain 
itself needs an explanatory principle. The way out of the problem of change that infinitely 
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spreads out in time is to refer to the a-temporal dimension that underlies this change.88 It 
is precisely the eternity that does the necessary work and not the duration, everlasting or 
not, for the latter implies at least a conceptual division into a before and an after.  
However, it is important to emphasize that Spinoza here does not revert to the 
traditional model of ‘distributing’ time and eternity as a rigid, pre-given framework and 
does not say that while the first cause is eternal, its effects are bound by time. Joining the 
first cause and eternity on the one hand and effects and time on the other would amount 
to placing the first cause ‘outside’ the world, i.e., outside of its effect. If Spinoza wants to 
maintain his commitment to immanent causation, he would have to radically reduce the 
gap between the first cause and its effects as well as the gap between time and eternity. 
This is the reason why we can assert that since it is one power that is expressed by both 
the first cause and by all of its effects, the eternal dimension is also necessary for finite 
things.89 A singular act of expressing the first cause on the part of a singular entity must 
involve the a-temporal, as a reference to substance. Any change by which the all-
encompassing power is expressed necessarily involves a paradoxical kind of tension that 
gives rise to change, but remains different from it. Change itself carries within it a 
difference from itself. My key thesis here is that change does not consist of the succession 
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of moments homogenous in their form. Rather that each instance of transition can in fact 
entail a transition to something genuinely different. 
What we see here is that every single phenomenon is necessarily composed of 
both the temporal and the a-temporal. It is temporal insofar as it acts and is acted upon, 
i.e., changes and is being changed. It is eternal insofar as its power of acting as a being-
in-motion (both in the active and the passive sense) refers to that which underlies and 
explains this being-in-motion. Finally, eternity is listed as one of the characteristics of 
substance precisely because it emphasizes the power insofar as it is one (i.e., capable of 
expressing all motions) and not insofar as it is expressed by the infinite number of 
singular things and their motions. It is only when we understand the true cause of the 
infinite expressions of power that we attain a proper relation to the power that we 
ourselves are.  
Now I would like to expand the discussion of those affects whose reference to the 
absolute power in the singular remains obscured, which will be a discussion of the force 
of inadequate ideas. As long as our affects come from an encounter with an external body 
and are explained by the necessarily inadequate idea of that body, they are called 
passions. This is to say that such affects are passions because we ourselves are only a 
partial cause of these affects, i.e., we are passive in relation to them.90 It is important to 
note that we do not see ‘beyond’ these ideas, just like we do not see ‘beyond’ affects. It is 
our relation to them that is subject to change. 
Spinoza divides passions into joyful and sad ones. Pleasure is linked to the 
passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection, which means that its power is 
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increased. Pain, in its turn, is associated with the mind’s transition to a lesser perfection 
or with a decrease in power.91 But why is it that joy, understood as an increase in power, 
is still a passion and not an action? It is a passion “in so far as a man’s power of acting is 
not increased to such an extent that it conceives adequately itself and its actions.”92 Thus, 
the passivity comes from the confusion of understanding. A clear understanding would 
directly communicate the essence of the affecting body as opposed to the indirect way in 
which this body is implicated in our state. It would also communicate an internal 
affection that would harmonize our essence with all other essences and the essence of 
God. These two instances of clear understanding (the affecting body as it really is and an 
auto-affection) amount to the same grasp of the necessary interrelatedness of all things, 
i.e., to the understanding that all things dynamically express the power of God by 
affective interaction with one another.93 This is when our affects become actions.94 What 
is crucial here is that passions refer to the fluctuating degrees of power, while actions 
name the full possession of it. For example, the stream of water may increase or diminish, 
but the essence of water understood as the constancy of power cannot change. Since 
actions are understood as constancy, the action in the fullest sense that Spinoza reserves 
for blessedness would be eternal. Eternal actions no longer depend on transitions, but 
“express themselves and one another in an eternal mode, together with the adequate ideas 
from which they issue.”95  
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However, Spinoza makes a striking claim that “the mind, both in so far as it has 
clear and distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persevere in 
its being for an indefinite duration, and is conscious of this endeavour.”96 The mind ‘lives 
from’ ideas and affects regardless of whether they are adequate or not. This claim 
inaugurates a strong emphasis on the real and inevitably strong character of passions in 
Spinoza. To make it clear, there is nothing illusory about affects. Indeed, we are not to 
look “beyond affectivity to see what really lies behind the ways in which bodies affect 
each other to get to the true essence of a particular entity, but rather look precisely to 
affectivity and its sense of temporality…”97 Indeed, they are part of nature and are as 
reflective of the all-encompassing dynamism as everything else.98 The same is true for 
inadequate ideas, where we remain ignorant of the true causes of particular effects. Given 
the necessary reality of passions and the inadequate ideas that they form, the task of the 
mind is to establish a specific relation to these ideas, the relation that would be as 
inclusive of the absolute power as possible.  
Once again, here we have the irreducibly two-sided approach that characterizes 
Spinoza’s commitment to immanence in the sense that the mind paradoxically conceives 
both the reality of inadequate ideas and their fundamental inclusion in the power of 
substance. Thus, the mind recognizes the force that inadequate ideas exercise on it and 
enacts the necessary ‘dissolution’ of these ideas in the power that is one. The inevitability 
of inadequate, weaker ideas is repeatedly encapsulated by Spinoza’s words that “there 
exists no particular thing in the universe such that there does not exist another thing 
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which is more powerful than it.”99 Our force of existence is necessarily limited and 
“infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.”100 It is thus only necessary that we 
are subject to changes of which we are not the adequate cause. Moreover, the ‘power by 
which we strive to persevere in existing’ and the ‘power of external causes’ are not in a 
distinct opposition to one another in the sense that the result of one power might negate 
that of the other. The two powers express the same power of substance, but do so 
differently. Their difference has to do with the allocation of the causal determination.  
When we act, we understand ourselves to be the cause of what happens, i.e., we 
recognize our radical embeddedness in the order of things and affirm it. Here we have the 
realization that all changes are one when considered from the point of view of the power 
that makes them possible. When we undergo the actions of external causes, our thinking 
becomes confused and we start to believe that the cause in question acts, as it were, of its 
own accord. It is as if it acquires a reality of its own. The confusion in our thinking 
introduces a false separation into nature, for we believe that the external cause has an 
independent power, the power that cannot be ‘folded back’ into the infinite power that is 
one.  
We get a sense of the ‘life’ of adequate and inadequate ideas alike in the 
illuminating discussion in Hasana Sharp’s essay “The Force of Ideas in Spinoza.” We 
read that a mens, which thus far has been rendered ‘mind,’ should be understood as a 
“radically dependent singular thing, an idea composed of many ideas, which desires to 
persevere in being.”101 It can only persevere in being and increase its power by 
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interacting with ‘ambient’ ideas. Thus seen, the proper essence of the individual mind 
(i.e., that which defines the singularity of a given mind) is fairly limited inasmuch as it is 
necessarily accompanied by what Sharp calls “the accumulation of haphazard and 
deliberate encounters with other ideas.”102 This is to say that the ideas that become 
forceful and powerful in the mind, that gain affective control over it, have little to do with 
the strivings of a given mind. The force of ideas jolts the mind. Thus, “they are not 
necessarily the truest ideas, but the ideas with the most life support, as it were, from 
fellow ideas.”103 Much like bodies, ideas are enhanced by favorable encounters with 
similar ideas and diminished by the influence of the ideas contrary to them. As Spinoza 
puts it, “nothing positive that a false idea has is removed by the presence of what is true 
in so far as it is true.”104 The fact that an idea is true does not add anything to its power. 
Strikingly, “there is no force proper to truth qua truth.”105 The mind does not attract true 
ideas any more than it does the false ones. True ideas do not “exert themselves upon 
subjectivities any more forcefully than absurdities, unless there is a constellation of other 
similarly true ideas to nourish and sustain them.”106  Only when ideas ‘join forces,’ so to 
speak, do they properly set in the mind, i.e., become a stable part of it.  
However, it is important to know that the force of ideas has much deeper roots. 
Descartes, to whom Spinoza was intellectually indebted, famously asked, in our words, 
“How do we know that what we take to be real is indeed so?” Perhaps he was the first 
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Western philosopher, like its Asian counterpart, Zhuagzu, who took the phenomenon of 
dream seriously. “In a deliriously paranoid opening that includes visions of the mad and 
the seeming indistinguishability of dreams and reality,” Descartes comments on the 
untrustworthiness of waking experience, 
As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure 
signs by which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep… Suppose 
then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars—that my eyes are open, that I 
am moving my head and stretching out my hands—are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I 
do not even have such hands or such a body at all.107 
 
Thus, Descartes subjected everything, including the evidence of his own senses 
and his beliefs, to radical doubt, in the hope to affirm something reality-like. After being 
lost in his thoughts, shut alone in a room, Descartes concluded that the idea of God as 
absolute perfection is the only idea that his mind cannot be the author of. This is the birth 
of the famous Cartesian cogito, which can be defined as “the first-hand experience of 
thinking.”108 Indeed, “the cogito is, nonetheless, a crucial orientating principle in terms of 
modernity: rather than looking to the heavens or some external authority to guide us, we 
turn to the thoughts, feelings and introspection of the individual.”109  
This confirmed, Descartes believed, the existence of benevolent God and, thus, 
reality, since if God could make things real rather than possible, he would have done so 
out of his perfect freedom. It is “the delirium of thought that threatened in the 
Meditations, where the world appeared bathed in a dazzling light haunted by demons, 
angels and spectres of dreams and madness, is filtered through the cogito, the idea of God 
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and various representations that trap and tame thought.”110 The power of this divine 
principle became the center around which other ideas orbited.  
While Spinoza inherited and took seriously the thought that ideas can be fragile, 
forceful, striking, quiet, or light as a feather,111 it is worth noting that he saw ideas are far 
more laden with affectivity than the Cartesian philosopher.112 This is the reason he 
considered belief to be part and parcel of an idea. Both have an affective claim on us and 
both ‘stick.’ The idea of a winged horse and the belief that the sky is covered with a thick 
coat of vibrant blue paint to conceal the demons lurking behind it both have their forceful 
intensities, unless they are replaced with more powerful ideas and beliefs. Thus, “the 
most important aspect of Spinoza’s refusal to accept that belief lies external to ideas is 
thus his insistence on the impossibility of getting beyond the affective relations that are 
always at play in experience.”113 It is also worth noting that affects, encompassing ideas 
and beliefs are durational and colored with affectivity, since an idea can haunt us and a 
feeling can gnaw at us.   
As Pethick puts it, 
ideas have a certain intensity that is only ever experienced in a web of relations 
that either reinforce or dissipate each other. Ideas are thus challenged and 
replaced by more forceful ones for Spinoza, and this inevitably involves an 
affective dimension to mental activity. It is not, therefore, a question of whether 
or not the correct mental picture of a thing is being operated with, but rather one 
of the activity or passivity of the mental processes in operation: are we stuck with 
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the images of things that affect us, or are there some ideas that can displace the 
force of these images?114 
 
Spinoza’s supposition of the power of affects, beliefs, and ideas is unparalleled when we 
consider his commitment to eternal substance. It is as if he is pushing the notion of 
eternity to its breaking point, conceptually stretching and molding it until it begins to 
encompass that which threatens to undo it and until it begins to fissure, if only a little bit. 
Refining the nature of affectivity,  
the first thing to note is that affectivity is not strictly identifiable with passion and 
should certainly not be confused with psychological or emotional states… 
Affectivity has rather more to do with the experience of ‘transience’ in the very 
precise etymological sense of a ‘going-over’ or ‘passing away’ Experience is 
never of static images, but rather always involves durational processes of ‘going’ 
and ‘passing away’ that betray a productive relationality rather than a field of 
interacting entities, and the transformations that this involves are not just cognised 
but felt as either joy or sadness…115 
 
Just like affects are duration, the body itself is defined as “a durational integrity.”116 The 
body is animated by time understood as transience, just like it is our bodily intensity is 
open to the intensities of ideas, affects, beliefs, and other bodies. It can be impacted for 
the better or for the worse. Thus, it would be incorrect to say that the body precedes 
affects and then accumulates them. Rather,  
a body is called such-and-such a thing because of a certain durational integrity 
that is experienced amongst affective relations. The body can thus be considered 
as the site of affectivity but not a ground, for it is the transience and relationality 
of the bodily that is pivotal here, rather than some kind of static substance…. the 
body as transitional or as the site of affectivity is always-already affective and 
durational. The body should not be considered as a mere thing that undergoes 
various events therefore, but as the very site of events, as ‘evental.’ This is 
precisely Spinoza’s point in his attempt to rethink the bodily in terms of the 
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immanence of affectivity and the body as the site of the transient and durational 
continuity of certain affective relations.117 
 
In an unexpected theoretical twist, Spinoza gave an affective dimension to ideas 
and he forever conjoined an affect, mental activity, embodiment and time. What does this 
mean for us and our question under discussion? Simply put, “for a supposed rationalist, 
there has probably never been a philosopher more interested and one who put more value 
in bodily experience than Spinoza.”118 More precisely, however, is that while the idea of 
eternity is adequate (“adequate ideas occur when an idea is affirmed by a reflexive 
thinking”119) and the idea of duration or time is not, this now beside the point. Since time 
as transience is tied to affects, chance are that we will be affected by time much more 
often than by eternity. Indeed, the body as such is the duration of various affectivities, a 
timepiece gone insane. 
We therefore learn that both adequate and inadequate ideas have their own 
affective claws that they sink into us, such that even the recognition of the falsity of 
erroneous ideas does not mean the erasure of their reality.120 Thus, the ideas or passions 
of time have as much force as the ideas that are indicative of eternity.121 What this means 
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is that such ideas or passions is their intimate proximity to change and contingency, with 
a seemingly arbitrary transition from presence to absence and vice versa. In other words, 
it is not the idea of numerical sequentiality that takes hold of us and that was the subject 
of Spinoza’s critique to begin with, but rather the experience of change qua temporality 
as such, the change that springs, as it were, out of nowhere.  
In this sense, the alignment of duration with passions appears to cast the 
phenomenon of time in a different light: if the affect of time is dependent on the 
condensation or intensification of force (i.e., on the condensation that, in its turn, is 
dependent on the chance encounters with ambient ideas), time itself attains both an 
affinity to and difference from power or force. The affinity in question means that time is 
now subject to intensification or diminishment, just as it is the nature of affects to 
oscillate and to make a joy turn to ashes, like those of Beckett’s fragile dead bees, which 
also means that some affects increase the body’s power and some lessen it, that some 
affects intensify one’s experience and some impoverish it.122 Furthermore, we see that 
there is no simple synthesis of time that would give the selfsame, homogenous form to 
our experiences or could be universalized on the basis of it, since time qua force is 
radically fluid and instable. The difference here is that power enjoys a certain priority 
over the passion of time insofar as it is the power itself that leads us to align ourselves 
with either the inadequate ideas of time or the adequate ideas of eternity, yet the way in 
which one idea ‘claims’ us over competing others both forever open and irreducibly 
                                                
122 “By emotion [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the 
body's power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together 
with the ideas of these affections.” Spinoza, Ethics, Part III, Definition 3.  
 62 
singular. The paths of seeing with cognitive clarity or seeing through a glass darkly lead 
to the same oceanic depth of force. 
In this final section, I would like to expand on the question of why the idea of 
time is not eradicated when considered under a species of eternity [sub specie 
aeternitatis]. It is only after we establish the impossibility of subsuming the idea of time 
under that of eternity ‘in the last instance’ (i.e., in the infinite divine intellect) that we can 
speak of time’s irreducible difference and reality. According to Spinoza, in God, “there 
necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a 
species of eternity.”123 Thus, everything can be seen through the lens of eternity. 
Furthermore, “whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands 
not from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the 
fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a species of eternity.”124 Here Spinoza 
seems to be claiming that it is only by viewing each single thing through the prism of 
eternity that we finally discover its true essence, which is its necessary dependence on the 
substance.  
Let us, however, recall that “God’s power of thinking is the equal of his actual 
power of doing.”125 The power of thinking and the power of acting are one and the same. 
This means that “whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God follows 
objectively in God from the idea of God, in the same order and with the same 
connection.”126 In other words, every affect and the idea of that affect is contained in the 
infinite nature of God. Spinoza goes on to say that “the ideas of particular things, i.e., of 
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modes, that do not exist must be included in the infinite idea of God in the same way as 
the formal essences of particular things, i.e., of modes, are contained in the attributes of 
God.”127 For instance, a sculpture does not exist until the sculptor creates it, but the idea 
of that sculpture could be deduced from the infinite idea of God.128  
But is this not saying that there is a kind of secondary being of ideas, being as a 
possibility, in God’s essence, the being that has little import on the actually existing 
things? Do we not understand the infinite idea of God as a ‘storehouse’ that contains all 
things, some of which become actualized and some do not? Such a reading would be 
perfectly warranted if it were not for Spinoza’s adamant insistence on God’s full actuality 
and the real connection between the attributes. Recall that the divine power is absolute in 
its expressivity and its absoluteness excludes once and for all the suspicion that 
something might remain merely possible. This means that there is not a single thing or 
idea contained in God that is not actual, including affects, durations, and intensities. As 
we saw earlier, we do not look beyond affects, ideas, and intensities to discover the 
hidden truths existing in a strict ontological separation. All ideas are necessarily 
affirmative and cannot be compared to ‘empty’ images because these ideas are the effects 
that an external thing exerts on one’s eye, body, and brain.129 Any idea thus indexes a real 
force behind it. Similarly, the idea of passional time, speaking in the language of affects, 
exercises a real force on us.  
I thus submit that Spinoza’s commitment to absolute actuality disabuses us of the 
idea that the affects or passions of time are less real or dissolve without a trace into all 
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other ideas in God’s infinite intellect. The affect of time never becomes other than itself, 
neither inside or outside the divine nature. To consider the idea of time under a species of 
eternity is then not to de-temporalize it, but rather to consider it as part of the 
dynamically infinite act of God and to translate it into actuality. More precisely, inserting 
the passion of time into its proper connectedness with everything else amounts not to the 
annihilation of time, but to its affirmation in the order of things and in the force in exerts 
on our bodies. The immanent version of eternity that is synonymous with the infinite 
expressivity of God and that ensures, to speak fast and loose, that the divine power does 
not ‘dry up’ in the course of time, but rather establishes its ontological solidity and 
paradoxically affirms the very existence of its opposite, i.e., time as the in-between the 
bodies. 
Excursus 
 
In light of the unfaltering actuality, how are we to understand the a-temporal or 
the eternal that takes place within our experience? What are the moments of the eternal 
injected into the interweaving of our experiences and passions? I will first take my cue 
from Merleau-Ponty and then venture my own suggestion, tying together, however 
tentatively, the experience of the eternal and suffering. My discussion will be brief for the 
simple reason that I do not see the notion of eternity as a useful tool to minimize 
suffering and thus relevant in terms of this work, yet this is not to deny that eternity seeps 
through our experience it now and then. 
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In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues that the experience of 
eternity is tantamount to our experience of objectivity as such.130 When we encounter a 
table, we do not in fact see all of its sides and aspects, and yet we see the table intuitively, 
as if from the bird’s-eye perspective. Here the eternal becomes synonymous with the 
unconditioned, the given that exists independently from all our imaginings and doings. 
The experiential error, according to Merleau-Ponty, is that we forget that the eternally 
given still arises from out of our experience.131 
If the eternal is neither duration that simply lasts a very long time nor is it 
reducible to mathematical truths, but the lived experience of something radically other 
than human, I want to suggest that the most visceral form the eternal assumes is that of 
blind chance, a senseless tragedy, a brute fatality, or an upsurge of the elements. As 
Neiman writes, “earthquakes and volcanoes, famines and floods inhabit the borders of 
human meaning.”132 The 1755 earthquake of Lisbon exemplified blind ruination that fully 
revealed the gaping abyss between the human and the non-human world. The lighting 
strike reducing a body to ashes in the split of a second would be another example of the 
inexplicable and the senseless here. In Neiman’s words, 
The random force of lightning is part of what made it a fitting symbol of divine 
power. Given the appropriate worldview, the sense that earthquakes are 
thoroughly inexplicable could increase the sense of mystery that furthers awe and 
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wonder. Our lack of understanding of why the gods strike can be one more sign of 
the distance between human and divine that moves some souls to reverence.133 
 
Occurrences like natural disasters, sudden death in the bloom of one’s life, and terminal 
illnesses, to name but a few,  can all be subsumed under the category of blind chance. It 
is so devoid of meaning that many people do in fact turn to the divine in an attempt to 
find at least some semblance of sense in the other world, when the world that we know 
fails to offer us any. When the lightning strikes, we are tempted to conclude that the sky 
itself decided to smite someone down or that it was the glint of an immense heavenly 
sword that came to life. 
I thus submit that it is the experience of blind chance and the suffering it creates 
that could be understood as a deadly glimpse of the eternal.134 To be sure, this is not the 
shining eternity of the first cause. This is the eternity of the abyss suddenly—and always 
suddenly—opening under our feet. This is the eternity that is truly lived and experienced 
in the victim’s futile question, ‘Why me?’ 
Allow me to end this digression on a personal note. As I was lying on the grass, in 
the nearby park, in the summer of 2015, I was thinking, incessantly and unbearably, 
about my then-fiancé’s late-stage cancer. The news of his diagnosis was profoundly 
sudden and shattering. Every ‘What if?’ (‘What if we’d have caught it earlier?’) crashed 
against the merciless rock of givenness. We didn’t. We couldn’t. I lay on the grass, with 
the numbing taste of the blind chance in the form of eternity on my tongue, the eternity of 
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the unanticipated and the senseless, the eternally non-human. The sky—so blue that it 
wasn’t blue anymore—and eternity became one as they pierced, like invisible, sky-borne 
needles, the experiential fabric of my life with the archaically non-human. In the face of 
the eternal, I sobbed like a mortally wounded animal. 
To continue after our interlude, it seems to me that to consider time and eternity 
with respect to force is to begin to examine the role both of them play in the individuation 
of both the mind and the body as well as in the composition and unfolding of experience. 
This reasoning allows us to avoid distributing or allocating the temporal and the a-
temporal in advance, which would dictate in advance the nature and form of our 
experiences. To put this into the language of the overarching problematic in this work, it 
is possible to say that what we experience as the unbearable duration of suffering or what 
we experience as joy or even simple everyday forgetfulness, such that the flow of time 
itself becomes imperceptible, is not pre-determined.135 This is the case when affective 
durations have the final say when it comes to the tissue of our experience and that the 
experience of intensive passages and thresholds is itself open to change and bears a 
genuine significance on the vicissitudes of our bodies and minds. 
What this allows us to do is to conceive of time and eternity as a kind of ‘lines of 
force’ (here the forces of pleasure or suffering) that thought would have to enter into a 
dynamic relation with and become living, fluid, and individuating, locked in an 
experiential back-and-forth or an intensive loop of thinking, the body, and passions of 
time. To reiterate, thus understood, time and eternity are not the pre-given forms or 
                                                
135 While this exceeds the limits of this project, it is worth asking if the Spinozist eternity 
could be understood as a kind of disappearance of the experience of time at the height of 
ever-so-brief joy and tranquility. 
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hierarchically organized abstract categories, but rather real experiences affecting our 
bodies. In short, to live in the world is to undergo the passions of time, seen as the force 
of affects and ideas.  
Thus, the notion of affective temporality means that, in the vision of radical 
immanence or in-worldliness, time is no longer seen as a ‘mere’ illusion to be dispelled 
by the human reason at its clearest. Temporality is given to us, in the dative, as an affect 
or passion, in the infinite multitude of intensities and durations, to the point where we no 
longer need the category of the dative case to make sense of this, since the ‘itself’ or 
essence of time in its maddening plurality resides in our eyes, lips, and bones. Indeed, it 
is what makes us beam with joy, what makes us quiver with delight, what makes our 
body contract and withdraw from the world in pain, from what stings, overwhelms, and 
floods. It is also that which splinters into innumerable modalities, i.e., affective 
intensities, since every affect leaves a unique imprint on our body or, more precisely, it 
animates our body differently. Furthermore, the temporality in question rises and falls, it 
swells and flickers, it gathers itself into uncanny stillness and shivers, in all of its 
incalculable intensities, as malleable, volatile, and fluid as the fabric of our experience 
itself. 
If we recall that the work in question is dedicated to the phenomenon of suffering 
as a type of evil, it is precisely the passion of suffering that interests us here. If pain, as it 
were, sneaks into Spinoza’s thinking and becomes intelligible to us as affective and 
durational time, as the time of suffering, I would like to turn to the exploration of whether 
time-as-pain truly fits in with the Spinozist terms and his insistence on both eternity and 
plenitude, i.e., the necessary self-containment of everything that is. Which is to say that I 
 69 
would like to examine if affective temporality, considered under the rubric of the 
experience of suffering, is, in the last instance, at home in Spinoza’s work. 
The central question is now, How can we account for the existence of evil and 
suffering in Spinoza’s system of univocity and ontological plenitude? Is the existence of 
evil nothing other than a part of the necessary self-containment that can never be 
eliminated? Does Spinoza’s provocatively anomalous philosophical system ultimately 
turn evil and suffering into necessity? To begin with, I will outline his understanding of 
evil and then suggest the reasons why it is important to leave the Spinozist terrain, while 
holding on to our discovery of affective temporality, in order to approach the question of 
evil from the vantage point of reducing it. 
Let us address the first question from Spinoza’s perspective. Indeed, 
Nothing at all is either good or evil, from the perspective of God or the natural 
world. Instead, he argues, good and evil are merely words that humans employ to 
label things we find pleasant or unpleasant, desirable or undesirable. We only 
ascribe intrinsic goodness or evil to things because we falsely believe the world to 
have been created for our benefit.136 
 
We are thus responsible, at least in part, for creating and utilizing concepts like ‘good’ 
and ‘evil.’ Upon this reading, the concepts in question are in fact indispensible to our 
existence insofar as they help gain clarity and better understanding about what benefits us 
and what harms us. These concepts are the theoretical tools by which we navigate the 
world. 
However, as Marshall argues, “he is not a simple subjectivist, taking good and 
evil to be whatever anyone happens to like or dislike, because, he argues, human beings 
                                                
136 Eugene Marshall, “Baruch Spinoza on Evil,” 1, Publication forthcoming, accessed on 
12/14/2016, https://www.academia.edu/4379554/Spinoza_on_Evil  
 70 
have a real and fixed nature that determines our good.”137 In other words, the things that 
harm human beings have a consistency and patterns, such that the variation in what is 
experienced as harmful is not endless. The same holds true for what we consider good. 
More precisely, evil is a type of activity, i.e., it is what prevents us from living a life 
guided by reason. 
Furthermore, human beings need to be part of the right kind of society so as to 
lead a flourishing life, which means that the ideas of good and evil not only aid us in 
navigating the world, but have a role to play in the creation of society. Thus, any 
disruption of the ‘right’ social whole is also rightly seen as evil. Spinoza thus conjoins 
these terms with the notion of utility,  
Spinoza denies the objective reality of good and evil but argues for the usefulness 
of retaining the words to identify what is beneficial or a hindrance to our living a 
life guided by reason, which can only occur in a well-ordered society. Thus, evil 
is nothing intrinsically real in things, but we can still use the term to describe what 
helps us to live rationally with others.138 
 
The Spinozist argument as to why good and evil are not truly real should be familiar to us 
by now. They are human constructs, used to explain what delights and what harms us, 
since affects themselves are neither good nor bad. In his own words, 
As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in 
things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of 
thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another. For one 
and the same thing can, at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. 
For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who is 
mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf.139  
 
                                                
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., 2. 
139 Spinoza, Ethics, Part 4, Preface. 
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The concepts of good and evil are thus useful for comparing, judging, and discerning 
things. To take his example of music seriously, we can conclude that what we are 
comparing are not intrinsic qualities of things or their essences, but rather the different 
effects they have on different people. These effects can turn out to be either positive or 
negative, depending on the physical and emotional capacities of the person in question. 
Soothing music can make the already-depressed person plunge even deeper into despair, 
while it can have a calming effect on someone who is too agitated. In short, the encounter 
or relation between sorrowful music and the mourner produces a negative affect. In other 
words, it is the very relation or encounter between a phenomenon and the human being 
that gives rise to these categories. With regard to affects, we can say that they are good or 
bad only from the standpoint of their impact. 
 Put otherwise, “there are always relations that agree with one another…. But 
relations that agree, according to the natural order, do not necessarily coincide with the 
preservation of a particular relation, which may be dissolved, that is, cease to be realized. 
In this sense there is no evil (in itself), but there is that which is bad (for me)…”140 Thus, 
the sense of badness that Spinoza is holding on to, in lieu of the notion of evil, has to do 
with co-mingling of relations, constellations of things and bodies, and an array of 
fluctuations and intensive impacts. 
Taking a step back and viewing Spinoza’s thinking of the universe as a whole, we 
could say that his rejection of the categories ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as woven into the fabric of 
reality or as ontologically non-ephemeral stems from his rejection of teleology, i.e., the 
false, yet admittedly tempting idea that the universe, to put it bluntly, cares about human 
                                                
140 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 33. 
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happiness. To recall and to cite Marshall once again, a purpose-free universe amounts to 
the view that “there is exactly one thing, or substance, in existence and everything else is 
a mode of that one substance.”141 In a universe without any final purpose, our human 
understanding of good and evil does not in fact reflect any intrinsic features of Spinoza’s 
cosmology. 
Taken as a human construct, evil (admittedly, the notion of good will plays hardly 
no part in what follows142) can still be seen as something to be avoided, precisely because 
of its power to bring harm to our bodies. First of all, this avoidance is central to my own 
flourishing. In Spinoza’s words, “since virtue…. is simply acting from the laws of one's 
own nature, and since no one…. endeavours to preserve his being except from the laws of 
his own nature, from this it follows, first, that the basis of virtue is the endeavour to 
preserve one's own being and that happiness consists in the fact that a man is able to 
preserve his being.”143 Thus, the desire to persevere is wired into our very being. 
Nevertheless, virtue, understood as avoidance of what’s harmful and the pursuit of what’s 
good for us is something that is common to all of us.144 Indeed,  
this commonality of virtue is a necessary consequence of the nature of reason. 
Reason is the ability to conceive of universal notions from common notions of the 
properties of things. Virtue, as acting under the guidance of reason, can be 
common to all because reason itself is a property common to humans. Moreover, 
by exercising reason, humans come to understand that virtue is something in 
which all human beings can participate.145 
                                                
141 Marshall, “Baruch Spinoza on Evil,” Publication forthcoming, 5. 
142 “Good neither adds nor subtracts in moral matter. We have no interest in Good, 
whether it is understood as happiness or as what gives happiness its value and weight, 
just as it gives value to any other entity….” Adi Ophir, The Order of Evils: Toward an 
Ontology of Morals (New York: Zone Books, 2005), pp. 438-39. 
143 Spinoza, Ethics, Scholium.  
144 Ibid. 
145 J. Curran O’Day, Finding Room for Altruism in Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics, accessed on 
01/14/2017, https://philosophy.kent.edu/philconf/sites/default/files/201115.pdf  
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Avoiding evil is thus common to all, and, seen under the rubric Spinoza’s immanence, no 
individual exists in isolation. Living in the right kind of society and wishing for the 
other’s flourishing are fully consistent with his logic of plenitude. In O’Day’s words, 
“virtue, therefore, can include the desire for another’s benefit. Moreover, the fact that 
human beings do not always live virtuously, that is, from the guidance of reason, makes 
the principle of harmonious living even more crucial to one’s survival.”146 The care for 
the other is thus embedded in our own striving for happiness. 
It is, however, the necessary nature of the idea of evil (recall that everything that 
can be actual, is actual) that makes its thinking highly problematic on Spinozist terms. 
Indeed, the notion of evil as the opposite of necessity and human creation or production 
will prove to be key to the project in question. The issue lies in the closed system of the 
Spinozist immanence. As Ophir puts it, 
evil, which is perceived from the point of view of the totality that is causa sui, 
disappears, for within this totality all is both necessary and justified, nothing is 
superfluous. The individual who understands this necessity in full—that is, in its 
totality—and who views himself from the point of view of the necessity, of the 
whole, has no reason to lament or feel sorrow. For him, from now on, good and 
evil will be affections of attraction to and repulsion at what is useful for, or 
harmful to, his subsistence and persistence as a distinct entity. Evils are the result 
of an individual’s aberrant attitude to an object that lessens his strength and 
causes him to aspire to (or generate) that which will harm him. The suffering 
involved in his revulsion will of course remain; only its superfluity will disappear. 
It will reappear only when the individual, at a weak moment, is tempted to 
compare the world as it is with the world as it seemingly should have been. But 
speaking of what should have been the case, in opposition to what is, means 
rejecting the totality of what is as it exists, and this is an idle attempt, for totality 
is necessary.147   
 
                                                
146 Ibid., 9. 
147 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 310. 
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What Ophir is telling us here is that the experience of suffering is pitted not simply 
against the human-made nature of evil,148 which would not subtract anything from its 
reality, but rather the necessity to affirm it as part of Spinoza’s totality, the totality in 
which absolutely nothing is superfluous. To be sure, suffering does remain, as do the 
pangs of hunger and the acute pain of injury. However, the enlightened mind will have no 
choice but to acknowledge that the suffering in question is under the yoke of necessity 
telling us that the totality of which it is a necessary part must be embraced and 
affirmed.149 Furthermore, being itself stands higher than the ideas of good and evil.150 In 
short, it is precisely the superfluity of suffering that remains unintelligible in Spinoza’s 
immanent universe where nothing can be otherwise.151 We can be mistaken about the 
source or cause of our pain, but the pain itself endures in the actuality of what is. 
                                                
148 This is hardly a possibility in Spinoza as well, since all human ideas are contained 
within the divine substance. 
149 Since Spinoza’s obvious goal is to outline an ethics, as my colleague Gil Morejon put 
it, his point is essentially therapeutic. That is, “if someone does something you don’t like, 
notice that you can either say: they did that freely, they chose to do that. Or, you can say: 
they were determined to do that, they did not choose any part of it, it is just what 
happened as a matter of necessity. If you believe the former, you will be much more 
affected than if you accept the latter. It is much harder to get angry at someone when you 
think they just were determined to do what they did. It's much easier to get angry at them 
if you imagine that they are pure and simple free to choose their actions, and that given 
this freedom they chose to do something that hurt you.” As an aside, I admit that I am 
much more affected when someone who hurt me chalks up their actions either to 
cosmological necessity or the oppressive political system. So much for Spinoza’s 
therapeutic efforts. 
150 To be sure, “the great rationalist theory according to which evil is nothing is doubtless 
a commonplace of the seventeenth century…” Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 
31. 
151 Badiou takes a somewhat similar issue with the unbridled necessity of plenitude when 
he writes, “it is clear that this is the philosophy par excellence which forecloses the void.” 
Furthermore, “everything that belongs is included and everything that is included 
belongs.” Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2005), 113-14. 
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Yet, it is precisely ‘the being otherwise’ that we must articulate and defend in our 
efforts to wedge a gap between suffering and necessity. Simply put, evil and affirmation 
or justification must part ways. If we are at the end of theodicy, i.e., the vindication of 
divine goodness in view of the existence of evil and suffering, using any absolute 
principle as a way of justifying the existence of evil becomes both untenable and 
antimoral. Let me refer to Emmanuel Levinas just for a moment, since his words on the 
failure of theodicy are particularly potent. “This is the century,” Levinas tells us, “that in 
thirty years has known two world wars, the totalitarianisms of right and left, Hitlerism 
and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia.” 
The monstrous atrocities we have seen abolish the language of justifications. It is 
precisely the event of Auschwitz that announces the end of all theodicy, since “the 
disproportion between suffering and every theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with a 
glaring, obvious clarity.”152 After Auschwitz, to justify suffering by referencing any kind 
of divine design itself becomes an obscenity. In addition to the moral taboo placed on 
seeking justifications of evil vis-à-vis the divine, we note that “antitheodicy,” much in 
tandem with Ophir’s commitment to the world in its immanence, “emphasizes responding 
to evil as opposed to theorizing about why it exists.”153 
While we cannot minimize suffering under the sign of necessity, I would still like 
to emphasize that the phenomenon of affective temporality has both a reality of its own 
and an ineliminable force, since it is not pitted against clock time or chronological 
                                                
152 Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” Entre-Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other 
(London: Athlone, 2000), 91. 
153 T. M. Rudavsky, “A Brief History of Skeptical Responses to Evil,” eds. Justin P. 
McBrayer, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil 
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succession. Rather, it rises up against eternity itself and emerges triumphant, i.e., not 
lessened in or ashamed of its affective power. Which means that the time of suffering is 
also real, bodily, and malleable, like an eerily shimmering clay. As Deleuze confirms, “In 
sadness there is something irreducible, something that is neither negative nor extrinsic: a 
passage that is experienced and is real. A duration. […[ There is sadness as a diminution 
of the power of acting or of the capacity for being affected, a sadness that is manifested in 
the despair of the unfortunate….”154 
However, while the duration of human torment can indeed be replaced with other, 
stronger affectivities, we are unable to truly revolt in the face of suffering, since this 
would require the abolishment of the category of necessity or at least significantly 
lessening its grip. However, Spinoza’s entire philosophy, for better or worse, is one of the 
primacy of necessity, with affects, bodies, and temporalities nesting both alongside it and 
within one another, meaning that dis-affirming human agony by refusing its necessity is 
an impossibility within his theoretical coordinates. 
Which is to say, even though we could defend the reality of affective temporality 
and the force of the idea of evil in Spinoza, he remains a philosopher paradoxically 
committed both to the necessity of the divine cause, causa sui, and the power of affects 
and human experience, to the point where his “cognition remains suffused with 
affectivity.”155 Given the therapeutic thrust of Spinoza’s ethics, the only thing we can say 
with any certainty is that he believes that knowing the necessity and the true cause of, say, 
one’s deep sorrow is meant to lessen it. In other words, we can relate to or interpret our 
                                                
154 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 39. 
155 V. M. Foti, “Thought, Affect, Drive and Pathogenesis in Spinoza and Freud,” History 
of European Ideas, 3:2, pp. 221-236. 
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or an other’s suffering differently, but we are powerless in the face of its phenomenon. 
As Ophir succinctly puts it, “the one who cries for help…. is interested in relief, not 
interpretation.”156 Furthermore, we can affirm the intensity of ideas, but we cannot 
simply do away with Spinoza’s heartfelt embrace of necessity and eternity, which is the 
issue concerning the question of evil. 
While both joys and sorrows, just like all other affects, are both necessary and real 
for Spinoza, I want to conclude this chapter by submitting that it is the passion itself that 
corrodes the alleged necessity of suffering. It is what ‘contaminates’ and ruptures from 
within the system of total necessity because to experience suffering is to experience its 
deeply meaningless superfluity. The suggestion I want to put forth here is that the ‘This is 
enough!’ of suffering shapes our experience in such a way that we are compelled to admit 
an affective fracture in the Spinozist totality. That is, “I would like to tell you that having 
passions does not mean living beautifully, but rather suffering pointlessly.”157 The 
experience and the force of the superfluity of suffering rises in revolt against the force of 
necessity. Indeed, “the suffering, or rather an act of suffering, is revealed as that liminal 
action which is already setting itself up in opposition to fate.”158 If the pesky passions of 
time persist even under the sign of eternity, now the fault-lines or the first signs of the 
fissuring of totality are becoming increasingly visible. In short, the passion of suffering 
makes visible its superfluity.  
In transitioning to examining the question of evil, affects, and time from a very 
different, contemporary perspective, I admit that I feel a twinge of regret, as I am parting 
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158 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 221. 
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ways with the philosopher who managed to sneak in embodiment as durational time and 
the force of affects and ideas right under the species of eternity. 
Chapter Two 
 
The Trajectory of Evil: From Privation to Superfluity 
 
There’s nothing beautiful about time. All clocks are ugly. 
 
—Sadegh Hedayat 
 
The central question of this chapter is best formulated by Forti, who asks, “What 
tools do we have at our disposal to understand that the scene of evil is a complex scene, 
where the power of nothingness and the death drive do not reign absolute at all?”159 The 
task here is to advance the idea of evil as social production and distribution, characterized 
first and foremost by superfluity, as well as to articulate the role of affective temporality 
in this understanding. If evil is now seen as essentially man-made and socially 
distributed, this is the conceptual vocabulary I will apply to my later examination of 
present or ongoing suffering understood as a type of evil. In Vetlesen’s powerful words, 
“evil as suffered is not a product of our consciousness. Evil is concrete. Its presence in 
the world is experiential. What we know about evil, we know from experience. As 
experienced, evil has the form of suffering.”160 
The first part will outline the traditional ways of construing the problem of evil, 
with a particular emphasis on Saint Augustine and evil as privation, i.e., his vision of evil 
as an act of the human will that strays from the divine goodness and on Hannah Arendt’s 
famous equation of evil with thoughtlessness, best articulated in her damning discussion 
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of Adolf Eichmann. The second part will discuss Adi Ophir’s contribution to the problem 
of evil, focusing on evil as production and the imperative to abolish or alleviate the 
ongoing production of “the things that make people suffer.”161 Having elucidated his 
account and the emphasis he places on the present in halting the production and 
distribution of evil, I will go on to discuss his notion of moral urgency. While this 
concept is first juxtaposed with the idea of deferral, I will conclude by deconstructing the 
apparent dichotomy between these two concepts, in an attempt to disabuse us of the idea 
that urgency is thoughtless, knee-jerk, and potentially dangerous. Indeed, I will 
demonstrate that acting under the sign of urgency has a very particular thinking, coupled 
with the activity of judgment, and that the thinking in question will have far-reaching 
consequences for disrupting ongoing evils, rethinking victimhood, and creating a new 
type of agency, the agency that aims at the creation of a world where victims are at home 
in the company of their fellow human beings. 
In other words, as I will show throughout this dissertation, if evil is, first and 
foremost, a production, according to Ophir’s key insight, and if suffering and its 
particular temporality is a type of produced and distributed evil, I will argue that, in 
suffering and in our efforts to halt its production, there emerges a specific type of agency. 
Just like the patterns of production and distribution of evil, this agency is to be studied, 
analyzed, and, above all, assumed and reinforced by practice. Indeed, the agency in 
question arises from gaining an understanding of the temporality of suffering and the 
experience of the victim, from disrupting the production of the victim’s encounter with an 
unbearable excitation, i.e., suffering, and from cultivating the practices of this very 
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disruption. While all of this remains to be demonstrated, my bigger claim will be that 
without actively learning how to help the one suffering before you or next to you, without 
assuming the agency of someone who prioritizes the urgent relief from ongoing suffering, 
the ideal of helping multiple and fairly abstract others in the future is bound to remain, at 
best, illusory and empty or, at worst, irredeemably hypocritical. The subject that justifies 
their inattention to those suffering around them in order to alleviate the distress of more 
people later, in the darkness and obscurity of the future, has to be seen as an ethical 
oxymoron, akin to a true falsehood or love without care. To use another analogy, which 
can grasp the heart of the problem only in a limited manner, this ethical subject is like an 
intricate, magnificent edifice, emeralds and runes cascading down its splendid walls, yet 
an edifice fatally missing a foundation. Thus, I will submit that a viable ethical subject 
can emerge only from out of the practice and understanding of moral urgency in the face 
of someone’s suffering. In other words, this subject, forged in the practical, finite efforts 
to help the person next to them, ought to be at the start of and underlie any and all future 
ethical endeavors of a more abstract, detached nature, i.e., the endeavors toward ‘the 
greater good.’162 
Let me begin by discussing the prominent idea of evil as privation or absence and 
as something that is attributed solely to the freedom of the human will, best exemplified 
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by the thought of Saint Augustine. As we will see, evil, while glaringly obvious in its 
many worldly manifestations, enjoys the questionable status of ephemeral deviation from 
the natural order of things, as created by the God of Christianity. Before I go any further, 
we might wonder if understanding evil as a kind of absence still exerts any kind of real 
influence in our contemporary world. While doing justice to this undoubtedly challenging 
question is the task for a different project, it seems to me that we often still do see evil as 
a surface phenomenon, as a blemish on human existence, as an unfortunate absence of the 
good, as evidenced by our undying readiness to come up with and have faith in various 
utopian visions. Taking this line of thinking further, I would suggest that utopias are 
possible only as long as we are not truly burdened by the immense, tangible weight of 
evils and torment in the world. Indeed, “a modern sensibility… regards suffering as 
something that is a mistake or an accident or a crime.”163 
As may be familiar to all of us, Augustine understands God as absolute perfection 
or as the assemblage of all superlatively positive qualities. God is fully, absolutely 
complete in existence, power, wisdom, and goodness. Since God is coextensive with 
being, the latter is infused with goodness as well. Indeed, “the idea that Being is 
coextensive with the Good, thus relegating Evil to Non-Being, was introduced by Plato, 
as we know, and developed by Augustine.”164 God is the highest principle to which 
everything in the world and above it owes its existence and it is the ultimate origin of 
every creature in the world. Similarly, it is a fairly clear-cut hierarchy or directionality 
where what is low is striving toward what is high, what is less beautiful is striving toward 
what is more beautiful, and what is good is striving toward what is better, nobler, more 
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perfect. Now, even in the face of the superlative divine goodness, “it is obvious to every 
observer that the world is full of evils: perversity and unpleasantness and disruptions of 
the natural order. How are these to be explained, if we believe that a divine Providence is 
watching over creation?”165 This is, to be sure, a perennial question that must have driven 
many a theologian into despair: How can God in his infinite benevolence allow for the 
existence of evil on earth? If we say that evil is part of God’s absolute completeness and 
that he is responsible for the wretchedness of the world, this God-centered view admits 
that the divine goodness is lacking in goodness. Moreover, it introduces a contradiction 
into the divine essence, which complicates the matter even further. This is something we 
saw in our explication of Spinoza’s thinking. If God is and isn’t good, there is now a 
clear rift at the heart of his very existence, the rift that indicates that the divine existence 
is conflicted or marred. As if this were not enough, “if you assumed that a thing was 
made good merely by God’s willing it, and evil, or not good, by his not willing it, you 
were debarred from reasoning at all about the implications of the attribute of 
goodness.”166 Since we cannot comprehend the greatness and the ways of God, 
speculating about the nature of good and evil is equally futile, condemning us to moral 
silence. 
 If we choose a man-centered view in order to explain evil, i.e., the view where 
evil is attributed not to God, but to human beings themselves, the human beings who 
commit acts of evil, we need to demonstrate how man can be free enough to exert his 
own, independent will and commit evil acts of his own accord, thus becoming removed 
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from the divine source of his very life, and how he can still maintain an indissoluble 
connection with his creator. In other words, we need to account for the freedom of the 
human being without completely severing his or her necessary relation and subordination 
to God. We need to explain how the capacity for wrong-doing is autonomous, while 
human beings owe their existence to God. 
It is the latter view that Augustine takes up as his lifelong challenge. In writing his 
book Confessions, he looked deeply and honestly into his own experience of evil, both as 
its perpetrator and as a rigorous thinker observing the ways in which evil presents itself in 
the world. As Siobhan Nash-Marshall points out, there is something truly contradictory 
about our relation to evil.167 Indeed,  
On the one hand, our intellectual horror before evil, our pain with respect to it, 
and our shock at its presence would indicate that evil is indeed something foreign 
to us…. Our incapacity truly to become accustomed to its presence would indicate 
that we do not have the capacity for evil. On the other hand, our capacity to do 
evil things and our vices show that evil is very much a part of ourselves and our 
lives. How can this be?168 
 
This is the paradox that deeply troubled Augustine himself. Indeed, how can we recoil 
from the sight of evil and fall prey to evil and vices? We learn that he became dismayed 
once he started enjoying theater, since it meant deriving pleasure from the tragic events 
on stage that would otherwise revolt him in the real world. As he puts it, 
Stage-plays also carried me away, full of images of my miseries, and of fuel to 
my fire. Why is it, that man desires to be made sad, beholding doleful and tragical 
things, which yet himself would no means suffer? Yet he desires as a spectator to 
feel sorrow at them, this very sorrow is his pleasure. What is this but a miserable 
madness? For a man is the more affected with these actions, the less free he is 
from such affections. Howsoever, when he suffers in his own person, it uses to be 
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styled misery: when he compassionates others, then it is mercy. But what sort of 
compassion is this for feigned and scenical passions?169 
 
How is he to make sense of the fact that he was striving to be a good person and a devout 
Christian and yet that he was enjoying seeing someone else’s suffering? Where did this 
rift within him come from? The task is then to find a satisfactory explanation both for our 
abhorrence of evil and our propensity to delight in it, as though our very soul has been 
split into two parts locked in a mortal struggle with each other. 
Another famous example of Augustine’s own capacity for wickedness comes 
from the theft of some pears in his adolescence. Upon examining the real source of 
pleasure he felt as a result of this action, he admits that “my pleasure was not in those 
pears, it was in the offence itself…”170 The purpose and the enjoyment of this petty crime 
did not stem from any hunger, any need for nourishment, and not even in relishing the 
sweet taste of the pears. Rather, it came from the ‘fault’ itself and the action had no other 
goal other than wickedness as such. Once again, Augustine is confronted by his abiding 
desire to be good and his enjoyment of wicked things. 
The solution that Augustine proposed was twofold and he arrived at it only after 
his disillusionment with the doctrine of Manichaeism. To explicate his proposed solution, 
I will first discuss his argument that evil is a privation, i.e., that it has no existence of its 
own. I will then follow Augustine in locating the source of evil in the errors of the free 
human will. Before doing so, let us remind ourselves that Manichaeism, founded in the 
third century by the Persian prophet Mani, postulates the eternal struggle of the forces of 
good and evil, as if mirroring the conflict Augustine felt within himself. Since human 
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beings have both the capacity for good and the propensity for evil, there must indeed be 
two opposing principles governing us. As Evans puts it, “the Manichees did not attempt 
to avoid the problem of evil. Indeed, by finding a place for evil in the universe they made 
it a fundamental principle in their system.”171 Opting for this doctrine meant believing 
that God himself was locked in the eternal battle against evil, rather than believing that 
man could be the agent of evil. While there are several problems with Manichaeism, as 
Augustine later began to recognize, I will point out only one of them. In attributing evil to 
an alien, fully existing force fully coequal with God, human beings essentially became 
exonerated of their own evil tendencies. The evil often found in the human heart was now 
seen as if it came from without, a fundamentally foreign element imposed on man. 
However, this view fails to account for the very complexities and moral contradictions of 
the soul that Augustine was attempting to come to terms with. In short, it cannot account 
for the experience of evil and for the pleasure human being derive from it. 
Augustine’s key objections to Manichaeism can be broken down into two parts. 
According to Nash-Marshall, 
The first is that in response to the Manicheans he points out that evil cannot be a 
positive thing or property. The second is that he points out that as a non-entity, a 
non-property, evil cannot be a primordial property… Instead, Augustine argues 
that evil is a privation that results from a choice of that which deprives a person of 
his true good.172  
 
He thus rejects the idea that evil has the status of something primordial, i.e., that it is 
some fundamental principle contesting the primacy of the divine Providence, the 
principle that antecedes the world and its creations. Furthermore, Augustine submits that 
evil, as a non-entity, does not challenge the equation of existence with goodness at all. In 
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his own words, “to Thee is nothing whatsoever evil: yea, not only to Thee, but also to 
Thy creation as a whole, because there is nothing without, which may break in, and 
corrupt that order which Thou hast appointed it.”173 If we postulate that there is no gap 
between existence and divine goodness, that both come from God, that existence and 
goodness are one and the same, it necessarily follows that whatever evil we may find in 
the world is the ephemeral absence or lack of existence. It points to what should be, but 
isn’t. As Evans elucidates,  
If all that exists is good, it follows that what is deprived of goodness is deprived 
of existence… Even corrupt things are good, for if there was nothing good in 
them, there would be nothing in them to be corrupted. If it were possible to 
deprive things of all goodness, they would no longer exist. Evil begins to look like 
a taking away, a privation, a tendency to nothingness, rather than a locus inanis, a 
pocket of nothingness in a good world.174 
 
In other words, evil is understood as a kind of process or activity, the end-goal of which 
is dissolution or the conversion of being into nothingness. Perhaps we could say that it 
the decaying of existence or being, the decaying that, nevertheless, has nothing inevitable 
or natural about it, for it comes not from the natural order of the universe, but from 
human beings. As we are about to see, “Augustine located the source of evil in the 
rational will, which is free to choose between good and evil,”175 which, in turn, means 
that evil is not any kind of substance, matter, or entity, but rather a misguided departure 
from the divine order of being. Indeed, according to the Catholic view, “evil is not an 
independent type of being but either a certain kind of activity on the part of a creature or 
                                                
173 Augustine, Confessions, 56. 
174 Evans, Augustine on Evil, 38. 
175 Ibid., 95. 
 87 
God’s just ruling of its perpetrator.”176 What is at stake here is thus not singling out a 
specific ‘region’ of existence that may be said to be the origin of evil or corruption (recall 
the equivalence of existence and goodness), but understanding the dynamic, malleable 
nature of the free will that is responsible for evil, all the while acknowledging that the 
origin of the human will still lies in the divine essence. Put otherwise, “to the degree that 
a being does exist and act, its reality derives from God. To the extent that it fails in being 
and falls short in operation is evil.”177 The origin of the will lies in God and our freedom 
comes from the divine essence, yet the subsequent vicissitudes of it are the work of the 
human beings. 
We are beginning to see here that the question of the will is key to Augustine’s 
response to the problem of evil. Let us briefly examine the way in which Augustine 
effectively drives the wedge between the superlative divine goodness and evil in the 
world by redirecting the question to the free choices human beings make. While no one is 
infinitely free the way God is, human beings still have the capacity to exercise their will 
freely. Indeed, “just as our minds can transcend the mere sensible world and rise to the 
contemplation of eternal truths, so too our wills can transcend the natural order and are 
able to resist all external influences.”178 Which is to say that we are not fully determined 
by external factors and circumstances, that we have the final say in the actions we 
commit to. This is a basic reinstatement of human responsibility, which, to be sure, 
remains a vital feature of contemporary ethics as well. 
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As Augustine asks, attempting to get at the autonomy of the will, “What is so 
much in the power of the will as the will itself?”179 In other words, unless we want to 
embrace the theoretically fatal risk of infinite regress, “there cannot be any prior cause or 
ground that determines the will in its free choices…. the freedom involved in free choice 
must therefore be a radical freedom, such that nothing whatever can determine its choice, 
including its own nature.”180 The question is then, “Why do some people act morally and 
others in reprehensible ways?” How do we account for the obvious moral difference in 
people’s behavior, especially with regard to God’s infinite benevolence? The challenge 
here is to explain why God allows the existence of morally abhorrent actions in the first 
place or why he allows the human will stray this far, such that truly heinous crimes 
threaten to eclipse or force into crisis the divine goodness itself. Once again, the notion of 
radical freedom is crucial here. We could say that God’s power lies precisely in 
endowing human beings with the ultimately free capacity to go one way or the other in 
their moral life, which, in turn, is anchored in their capacity to transcend material reality, 
governed by the senses.181 Conversely, we are free insofar as we are also able to be weak-
willed or perverse, which shows our capacity to choose even what is ultimately harmful 
to us. 
In unpacking his understanding of the human will, Augustine tells us that a good 
will is “a will by which we seek to live rightly and honorably, and to attain the highest 
wisdom.”182 One who possesses a good will has the ability to proper identify and locate 
the best possible good for the human beings, to not be led astray, deceived, and tempted 
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by the lesser goods, no matter how compelling they appear. Thus, the better the will is, 
the closer it is to God. Furthermore, “when anyone has a good will, he surely has 
something to be put far ahead of all earthly kingdoms and all bodily pleasures.”183 The 
good is thus animated by the desire of a completely different order, the desire for the 
greatest possible wisdom, not the worldly desires for material or sensuous things. We will 
go back to the question of bodily matters shortly. 
Following the logic of radical freedom, i.e., the freedom to will either good or 
evil, we are responsible for our choices that result in evil, since it is within our power to 
choose and act otherwise. Anyone can have a good will, for, as Augustine points out, 
“human wisdom is the governance of the human mind.”184 The mind is said to be ‘in 
order’ when it is cultivated and powerful enough to trump earthly desires and to pursue 
higher, divine wisdom. In other words, “nothing makes the mind a devotee of desire but 
its own will and free choice.”185 
What is important here is understanding the relationship between the mind and the 
senses or perception, since it is precisely this distinction that is responsible for the 
difference between a good will and a bad one. We easily believe in the existence of 
sensible objects because they are readily available to our senses. This is how we inhabit 
the world most of the time, making our way through what is given to us in our 
sensibilities. However, intelligible objects exists just as well, insofar as they are presented 
to our minds and insofar as we are able to conceive of them. The intelligible object par 
excellence is truth in its eternal character, and we see some of this truth in mathematics, 
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which is present to our intellect just as material things are present to our senses. The truth 
found in mathematics is independent of our minds, it precedes and surpasses them, and 
we must recognize it. It is not subject to our likes or dislikes, our arguments or opinions. 
Thus, this truth is higher and infinitely greater than our minds. It is eternal, unchanging, 
exceeding our senses and our private desires. What is higher than human beings and 
eternal is divine by nature, accessible not through perception, but through the intellect 
alone. Thus, we have to choose between following our senses or our intellect and the 
truths available to it. 
Augustine thus identifies those who orient themselves toward the highest, extra-
sensible good (since God cannot be surpassed in benevolence) as possessing virtue or a 
good will and those who align themselves with private, material desires. In his own 
words, “we have also explicitly and adequately distinguished two kinds of things, the 
eternal and the temporal, and again two kinds of people: some who follow and take 
delight in eternal things, and others who follow and take delight in temporal things.”186 
Furthermore, since God does not interfere with our exercise of our will, allowing for the 
radicality of our freedom, “what each person elects to pursue and embrace is located in 
the will, and that the mind is not thrown down from its stronghold of dominance, and 
from the right order, by anything but the will.”187 Which is to say, on Augustine’s terms, 
we cannot blame any external influences for making the choices we do. The pursuit of 
sensible goods and bodily pleasures comes from our independent, uncoerced decision. 
Finally, “when a person uses something in an evil manner, the thing should not be 
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blamed, but rather the person using it in that evil manner.”188 The objects that ultimately 
bring about our moral decline cannot be said to be inherently bad, since it is our relation 
to them that makes them appear so. 
What does this tell us about Augustine’s understanding of evil? As he defines it, 
“evil is turning the will away from the unchangeable good and towards changeable 
good.”189 It is the differences between recognizing the greatest good exceeding our bodily 
existence and choosing to pursue a lower kind of good. This, in a nutshell, is the 
difference between good and evil, where the human will is the final arbiter. We can thus 
say that evil is essentially a privation, since it is a negative relation to what exists truly 
and eternally. Indeed, it is an active, freely willed refusal of the highest possible 
existence, i.e., God, which means turning toward a kind of nothingness, dissolution, and 
decay. As Ricoeur elucidates, 
Augustine takes the idea that evil cannot be held to be a substance, because to 
think of being is to think of something one, intelligible, and good…. In return, a 
new idea of nothingness comes to light, that of the ex nihilo contained in the idea 
of a total and complete creation, and associated with it, the idea of an ontic 
distance between the creator and the creature, therefore of the “deficiency” 
pertaining to creatures as such. In virtue of this deficiency, it becomes 
comprehensible that creatures endowed with a free will could “turn away” from 
God and “toward” what has less being, toward nothingness.190 
 
Finally, it is worth noting a somewhat circular logic that Augustine employs in his 
discussion of the will and virtue, when it comes to accounting for why some people will 
good and some will evil. As Van Riel points out, “the virtuous person understands virtue 
and makes the right choices, in accordance with right reason because she is virtuous 
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already.”191 We are left with the fact that some people always already have a ‘taste’ for 
divine virtue, which sets them on the right path, and some do not. As Van Riel further 
explains, “this circularity will ultimately be reduced to the question of Grace: those who 
are elect will understand the Good and know the way to true happiness, even if their 
sinful nature prevents them from having a full understanding of it. But nevertheless, 
God’s Grace will enable them to make the right decisions.”192 Thus, the question of why 
some people choose good things and some choose to do evil remains ultimately 
unaddressed. 
While I was not able to do justice to the intricacies and sophistication of 
Augustine’s argumentation,193 I hope that I have highlighted the relationship between 
God as the pinnacle of existence, wisdom, and goodness, the freedom of the human will, 
and evil understood as rejecting the fullness of God’s existence. Simply put, God ‘allows’ 
for the presence of evil in the world because he endowed human beings with the freedom 
of choice. Furthermore, the evil that human beings choose is the absence of being, for 
being is God. Thus, we could say that Augustine disintegrates a scene of evil into 
privation or nothingness. 
Second, in addition to the decisive separation of evil and existence, we are going 
to see evils fundamentally divorced from thinking, at least real thinking. To be sure, there 
are premeditated crimes, but let us first look at a particularly eloquent, contemporary 
account of violence. As Jean-Luc Nancy puts it,  
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violence remains outside; it knows nothing of the system, the world, the set-up 
that it assaults (whether it is a person or a group, a body or a language). Rather 
than compossible, it wants, on the contrary, to be impossible, intolerable within 
the space of compossibles that it rips apart and destroys. Violence ‘doesn’t want 
to hear it’; it has no interest in knowing. It is not interested in being anything but 
this ignorance or deliberate blindness, a stubborn will that removes itself from any 
set of connections and is concerned only with its own shattering intrusion. […] 
This is why violence is profoundly stupid. It is stupid in the strongest sense, the 
thickest and most irremediable sense.194 
 
In other words, for Nancy, violence and aggression begin where thinking ends or rather 
fails. However, once we attribute profound stupidity to violence, we refuse to take into 
account the genesis of violent affects, the genesis that cannot be divorced from thought, a 
certain social narrative that forms the basis of the evil-doer’s identity, ideology, and 
consciousness. To say that violence is the pinnacle of stupidity, as if it appears ex nihilo, 
is to refuse to analyze the circumstances around it. 
A somewhat similar idea was expressed by the Jewish political philosopher 
Hannah Arendt when, in attending the trial of Nazi lieutenant-colonel Adolf Eichmann, 
she coined the infamous phrase “the banality of evil.” As she saw it, “evil had to be 
pulled down from the heights of the demonic to the lows of modern bureaucracy and 
thoughtlessness.”195 In her attempts to rethink moral responsibility in the aftermath of 
mass human destruction, later called ‘the crimes against humanity,’ Arendt saw 
Eichmann as fundamentally instrumental, obedient, shallow. To be sure, 
she did not mean that what Eichmann had helped to perpetrate was banal or that 
the extermination of the Jews, and of other peoples, by the Nazis was banal. It 
takes either a great deal of hermeneutic blindness and ill will or both to miss her 
meaning in the usage of this term, even if one may disagree with the assessment 
of Eichmann’s psychology. The phrase the “banality of evil” was meant to refer to 
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a specific quality of mind and character of the doer himself, but neither to the 
deeds nor to the principles behind those deeds.196 
 
This is to say, as we are about to see, Eichmann decided to become one of the 
driving forces behind the Holocaust neither out of fanatical anti-Semitism nor pure 
malice or sadism, but out of an utterly thoughtless combination of careerism and 
obedience. “Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal 
advancement,” Arendt writes scathingly, “he had no motives at all.”197 This is as if 
actions acquired their own life independent of the doer. Indeed, “the phenomenon that 
Arendt confronted was one in which monstrous deeds were committed without monstrous 
motives.”198 
As Richard Bernstein points out, in his turn, “Arendt constantly stresses how the 
unprecedented event of twentieth-century totalitarianism has ruptured our traditional 
moral and political concepts and standards.”199 In other words, the monstrosities of the 
receding century destroyed the basic coordinates of our structures of understanding. 
which is to say that no traditional views, habits, and concepts could help us understand 
the overwhelming monstrosity of the Holocaust. Nothing in our culture prepared us to 
understand the systematic annihilation of masses of people. Elsewhere, Arendt eloquently 
states that 
Comprehension does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the 
unprecedented from precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and 
generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer 
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felt. It means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden which our 
century has placed on us—neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to 
its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing 
up to, and resisting of, reality.200 
 
Thus, comprehension both pits us against reality and allows us enough space to not 
coincide with it fully, not to be swept by it without thinking or judging. We do not 
coincide with reality, even while facing up to it, insofar as we are capable of being 
shocked by our experiences and insofar as we can imagine things being otherwise, insofar 
as we are capable of judging between right and wrong, between what ought and what 
ought not to happen. It is this essentially human need and desire to understand that 
animates Arendt’s work Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
What was it then that ran against our comprehension in Eichmann’s case? 
According to Shoshana Felman, the unique problem he posed is that of understanding 
“crimes against humanity” outside the traditional framework of motif, intention, or mens 
rea?201 In describing Eichmann’s clichéd language (“he was genuinely incapable of 
uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché”202) and his all-too-credible self-
justification by the total absence of motives for the mass murder he passionately carried 
out (lack of mens rea), Arendt’s question is not, “How can evil (Eichmann) be so banal?” 
but, “How do we situate this empty, clichéd subjectivity vis-à-vis the problem of evil?” 
Indeed, “Eichmann’s crimes were not rooted in a wicked character… he had no character 
to be wicked.”203 How do we understand evil if the categories of character and intention 
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are now forced into crisis? It is worth noting that what is at stake here is not the suspicion 
that, thanks to his exceeding ordinariness, there is a little bit of Eichmann in all of us.204 
Rather, what is at stake is articulating what distinguishes him from the rest of us, if the 
usual measure of interiority (placing one’s intentions on a continuum of acceptability or 
viciousness, for example) is rendered useless. 
“Do the inability to think and a disastrous failure of what we commonly call 
conscience coincide?” Arendt asks.205 Following this crucial and perhaps rhetorical 
question, she attempts to articulate the key distinctions between a kind of ‘empty’ 
subjectivity, for whom reality is nothing more than following and obeying the demands 
of its superiors,206 without reservation, questioning, or judgment, without pausing in 
one’s tracks when asked to deliver millions of people to their death, the ‘demonic’ 
criminal who is very well aware of the evil nature of his actions, and the subjectivity that 
does not cease to engage in the activity of thinking and judging. The former is thus 
indicative of deadened passivity, leading to the capacity to commit mindless acts of 
horrific evil, a halted interiority, while the latter embraces the anguish of actively facing 
up to reality in all of its horrors and contradictions.207 
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While Arendt never contests the fact that Eichmann was undeniably guilty, guilty 
beyond any reasonable doubt, her bigger concern is the sweeping collapse of moral habits 
and moral behavior both among the victims and the perpetrators, i.e., the German society 
as a whole, and its devastating consequences. As Bernstein writes, “for Arendt the most 
intractable moral questions arose not from the Nazis’ behavior, but the behavior of 
ordinary, respectable people.”208 She charges the majority of the German people with 
their failure to resist the regime that commanded them to become the murderers of their 
own friends and neighbors, opting to collaborate with the enemy instead. Arendt took 
issue with the claim that Eichmann “closed his ears to the voice of conscience,” for it is 
precisely the lack of conscience that formed his most terrifying characteristics.209 Indeed, 
his “conscience” was akin to an empty cipher, a void, speaking in the voice of 
“respectable society.”210 This society failed to condemn his for murdering millions of 
innocent people, so much that Eichmann genuinely believed that there was nothing 
particularly wrong with his conduct. As Arendt writes in her lecture course “Some 
Questions of Moral Philosophy,” the central belief of her generation was that moral 
conduct was a matter of course, that it was taken for granted, yet what followed after the 
rise of the Nazis was the swift, devastating dissolution of mores, such that murder 
became completely permissible. In Margaret Canovan’s words, “although these 
[ordinary] people would never have dreamed of committing as long as they lived in a 
society where such activities were not usual, they adapted effortlessly to a system in 
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which blatant crimes against whole categories of people were standard behavior.”211 In 
the new society, murder became the new norm, it became fully acceptable, thus erasing 
the possible conflict between individual choices and actions and the judgment of the 
public. The question became, “How can I tell right from wrong if the majority or my 
whole environment has prejudiced the issue? Who am I to judge?”212 Which is to say, 
standing by one’s judgment vis-à-vis those who condemn it requires a certain degree of 
courage and even hubris. It is worth noting that Harpham sees distinctions and 
refinements as “central to the ethical enterprise itself,”213 while Grants states that “a 
morality of nuanced judgment exhibits a rich moral imagination, an intelligent and self-
critical encounter with a complex world.”214 Furthermore, “mores, customs, habits, rules, 
traditional standards could all change effortlessly… they provided no barrier to 
committing evil deeds.”215 The tradition that was supposed to safeguard us against truly 
monstrous acts of evil and the prospect of the annihilation of an entire people was now in 
ruins. 
Before returning to Eichmann, let us say a bit more about Arendt’s response to the 
moral failure of the German people, such that Eichmann’s actions remained unchallenged 
and even widely accepted. According to Bernstein, “Arendt came to believe that the 
capacity to distinguish right from wrong, good from evil, presupposes the exercise of the 
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mental activities of thinking and judging.”216 As we are about to see, this is precisely 
what Eichmann disastrously lacked, which is why his subjectivity remained empty and 
shallow. What Arendt terms ‘the banality of evil’ is the failure to exercise one’s capacity 
to think and to judge, i.e., to become fully human. Thinking attempts to go behind the 
surface, to study and attempt to understand its depth, and yet it is precisely what 
Eichmann was missing. 
Continuing with the claim that Eichmann was thoroughly unable to engage in the 
activity of thinking, Arendt writes, “it was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no 
means identical with stupidity—that predisposed him to become one of the greatest 
criminals of that period.”217 Even facing his own death, moments before his execution, 
Eichmann approached the gallows with the lofty, clichéd words, the words borrowed 
from the funeral speeches he had heard before, thus showing his inability to find the 
words of his own, in the wake of his monstrous actions, even facing his own death. We 
thus read that “such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more 
havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man—that 
was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem.”218 One could thus say that 
Eichmann’s thoughtlessness protected him from any possible conflict between his 
individual actions and the devastating ‘ripples’ of these actions permeating the fabric of 
the world around him. 
In the remaining part of this discussion, I intend to flesh out the term “the banality 
of evil” some more, albeit cursorily, and to briefly examine Arendt’s understanding of 
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thinking. In her essay “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” she attempts to clarify the 
former by saying, 
some years ago, reporting on the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, I spoke of “the 
banality of evil” and meant with this no theory or doctrine but something quite 
factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which 
could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological 
conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps 
extraordinary shallowness. However monstrous the deeds were, the doer was 
neither monstrous nor demonic, and the only specific characteristic one could 
detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding 
police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but 
a curious, quite authentic inability to think.219 
 
Thus, what Arendt finds so deeply troubling about Eichmann is not his deviousness or 
some sort of satanic grandeur of pathological delusion. As Felman reminds us, Arendt’s 
goal was not to provide a psychological portrait of the criminal. It is his rather 
“ordinariness” and “normality,” which is synonymous with his thoughtlessness, that truly 
stunned her. Eichmann famously denied having any personal hatred for the Jews. His 
actions thus seemed to have been motivated by nothing other than his genuine desire to 
please his superiors and to advance his career. What continued to haunt Arendt for many 
years to come was the fact that that an average, seemingly normal person, neither feeble-
minded nor indoctrinated nor cynical, could be perfectly incapable of telling right from 
wrong.”220 
It is worth noting that Arendt did not regard Eichmann’s empty talk with 
suspicion, as a ruse, meant to conceal his true devious thoughts and intentions, which is 
something I will briefly return to. Instead, she saw it as the only thing he was capable of 
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when it came to his justifications of his behavior. The horror of his actions could not 
penetrate the wall of shallowness and thoughtlessness. Indeed, 
clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of 
expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us 
against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention which all events 
and facts arouse by virtue of their existence…. the difference in Eichmann was 
only that he clearly knew of no such claim at all.221 
 
Just like comprehension means facing up to reality and the refusal to neutralize the shock 
of experience, thoughtlessness isolates us from the weight of reality, promising the kind 
of comfort where other human lives are truly worthless, worthless because they did not 
even enter Eichmann’s mind, which is to say, because other human beings did not even 
really exist for him. According to Arendt, a failure of thinking means disengaging from 
the contradictions of the world around us, meaning that one is no longer driven to 
understand reality as it truly is. 
As Arendt subsequently asks, “Is our ability to judge, to tell right from wrong, 
beautiful from ugly, dependent upon our faculty of thought?”222 Can judging right from 
wrong be inseparable from and dependent on thinking? Furthermore, “could the activity 
of thinking as such, the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to 
come to pass, regardless of specific content and quite independent of results, could this 
activity be of such a nature that it conditions men against evil-doing?”223 If the exercise 
of thinking has the potential of safeguarding us from committing the worst crimes 
imaginable, the task is then to understand what exactly Arendt means by thinking, 
especially in its relation to evil-doing. 
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Thinking, for Arendt, is emphatically not that of professional philosophers, a skill 
limited to the learned few, but is something everyone can practice. It is something that is 
inseparable from what it means to be human and to inhabit the world. She defines it as a 
kind of “the soundless dialogue between me and myself, the two-in-one,”224 where one 
converses with oneself about the events in the world and one’s role in them. As she puts 
it,  
the Socratic-Platonic description of the process of thinking seems to me so 
important because it implies, albeit only in passing, the fact that men exist in the 
plural and not in the singular, that men and not Man inhabit the earth. Even if we 
are by ourselves, when we articulate or actualize this being-alone we find that we 
are in company, in the company of ourselves…. Seen from this standpoint, it is 
indeed true that my conduct toward others will depend on my conduct toward 
myself.225 
 
The Socratic relentless questioning famously destabilized and destroyed the 
preexisting certainties of his interlocutors, such that, when asked and prodded about the 
definition of, to take an example, justice, his interlocutors felt their facile grasp of the 
issue at hand crumble. The aim of Socratic questioning is to strip away the comforting 
simplicity and lack of ambiguity from the matter at hand. This internal dialogue Arendt 
ascribes a high value to, a kind of incessant interpretation and assessment of the events of 
the day and one’s own actions, does not result in any doctrines or certainties. If anything, 
“thinking inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, 
values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct 
we treat of in morals and ethics.”226 Thus understood, one who engages in thinking does 
not arrive at anything properly positive or productive, thus remaining an essentially 
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negative activity. Yet, Arendt also insists that while thinking requires a withdrawal from 
the world, it is inseparable from the activity of judgment, which is concerned not with the 
universals, but with the particulars.227 In withdrawing from the world, we still remain 
surrounded or even haunted by the worldly phenomena insofar as we undertake the work 
of judgment. Even in the solitude of thinking, we engage with the worldly affairs. 
“Thinking beings,” she states, “which still belong to the world of appearances even after 
they have mentally withdrawn from it, have an urge to speak and thus to make manifest 
what otherwise would not be a part of the appearing world at all.”228 Thinking is thus 
inseparable from its expression in the world.  
Furthermore, our retreat allows us to be alone with ourselves, which, on Arendt’s 
terms, means conversing with one’s inner interlocutor. In this silent dialogue, one 
narrates to oneself the events of the day, so to speak, the events in which one is an agent 
or actor among other actors, in order to make sense of them and to integrate them into 
one’s life-story. Indeed, “the thinking that she describes and practices is a creative 
activity which requires remembrance, story-telling, and imagination… It also requires the 
virtues of both courage and independence.229 We need courage and independence to 
unmoor ourselves from the weight of social beliefs, a kind of facile ‘going along’ with 
whatever the majority of people happen to agree on, and to stand by one’s own judgment, 
no matter what kind of reception it provokes in others. In and through thinking and this 
dialogue, we bring into existence the self we must live with, the sense of the self that is 
most pronounced in solitude and yet is also reflected back to us from the world, insofar as 
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the world is the space of visibility where we act. Thinking, for Arendt, thus necessarily 
includes judgment. Indeed, “reflection is the beginning of judgment. Resolving not to do 
wrong in the understanding of how wrong-doing puts thinking out of joint, goes beyond 
thinking itself. This is what judgment must do.”230 
However, why exactly does Arendt place so much value on thinking as a kind of 
banister against evil? Indeed, are evil and thinking truly antithetical, as she wants us to 
believe? After all, Eichmann was seen as lacking the faculty of thinking first and 
foremost, not judgment as such. It seems to me that Arendt sees some hope in the process 
of thinking for two main reasons. One is that stepping away from the world gives one a 
chance to not be simply swept away by the current of the present, i.e., to not blindly 
follow whatever might be happening at the moment, freeing up the cognitive space for 
judgment. For example, risking a certain oversimplification, we could say that, if one is 
given an order, thinking ought to make one pause to evaluate the order in question and 
decide, via judgment, to either obey or disobey it. Thinking allows an order or, more 
generally, an event or a political situation to become a problem. Furthermore, it has to do 
precisely with the sweeping collapse of all moral habits and tradition, the collapse 
devastating in its swiftness. If mores can indeed change overnight, we can no longer trust 
societal norms to act as a barrier against evil. Thus, we can argue that the destructive 
nature of thinking, such that it dismantles all certainties, is not an unfortunate feature of 
it, but rather its key advantage, since it can and does ‘work’ even in the absence of mores 
and certitudes. Once we realize that no mores truly hold up to scrutiny, that there are no 
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‘exterior’ barriers against evil, we fall back on our own sense of right and wrong. 
According to Arendt, 
in refusing to be a person, Eichmann utterly surrendered that single most defining 
human quality, that of being able to think. And consequently, he was no longer 
capable of making moral judgments. This inability to think created the possibility 
for many ordinary men to commit evil deeds on a gigantic scale, the likes of 
which one had never seen before. It is true, I have considered these questions in a 
philosophical way. The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge, 
but the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And I hope that 
thinking gives people the strength to prevent catastrophes in these rare moments 
when the chips are down.231 
 
Paradoxically and perhaps dangerously, thinking frees us from our reliance on the 
existing traditions and the comportment of others around us. Thinking individualizes, for 
it gives us the opportunity to tap into our inner sense of right and wrong and to judge 
matters accordingly, even if everyone else decides that, for instance, murder of innocent 
people is quite acceptable. This is the resistance of one mind to the opinions and actions 
of the many. According to Bernstein, “Arendt also stresses that thinking is essential for 
the formation of conscience. She claims that the supreme imperative for Socrates is to try 
to live in such a manner so that he is not in contradiction with himself.”232 However, the 
hope that, in turning to our sense of right and wrong, we will judge with human decency 
or fairness and make the right decision in the face of injustice, is slim at best, yet I 
believe that it constitutes the heart of Arendt’s response to the collapse of all moral 
traditions and attitudes. 
Thus, the subjectivity exemplified by Eichmann does not converse with itself in 
solitude and it does not perceive any conflict between one’s actions and one’s account of 
these actions. Eichmann failed to see a monstrous incongruity between his alleged lack of 
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hatred of the Jewish people and his efficiency in killing them, even though recognizing 
this incongruity might have made him see his actions in a different, moral light and 
possibly put an end to them. However, I submit that Arendt’s equation of evil with 
thoughtlessness is problematic at worst and insufficient at best.233 In Situating the Self, 
we read that 
if the basis of the validity of our moral judgments is that they allow us “to be at 
home with ourselves,” are we not in fact making validity a matter of the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual psyche? Was not one of the most perplexing 
characteristics of Eichmann in Arendt’s eyes precisely the fact that he was “at 
home” with himself? Arendt fails to convince that an attitude of moral reflection 
and probing, such as enjoined by the procedure of enlarged thought, and the 
Platonic emphasis on unity or harmony of the soul with itself can be reconciled.234 
 
The problem is that, in appealing to some kind of drive to internal unity that we 
supposedly have, the unity defined by an engagement with contradictions and 
incongruities, Arendt understates the idea that even the most horrific criminals may in 
fact have an internal dialogue where they narrate their actions in their silent voice and yet 
remain perfectly at home with themselves. The idea that individuals, at least the 
individuals such as the likes of Eichmann, fail to think while committing acts of evil 
seems admittedly odd.235 Likewise, it is unclear why the dissolution of all certainties that 
results from thinking would lead to a sense of unity within oneself, although it is possible 
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that genuine introspection has the potential of fortifying our existing beliefs. The problem 
goes even further insofar as Arendt does not truly differentiate “the thinking that may 
prevent catastrophes from the thinking that does not,”236 possibly because nothing is said 
about the content or orientation of this thinking. Which is to say, in accordance with this 
view, even the right kind of thinking remains individualistic or idiosyncratic and, in 
encountering catastrophic injustices, it does not seem to articulate any concrete features 
of evil that might help us resist and halt it.237 While Arendt’s account is undoubtedly both 
provocative and nuanced, I would like to suggest that the banality of evil, at the very least 
of Eichmann’s evil, is the absence or failure of thinking, i.e., a particular kind of 
privation. Indeed, “for Arendt evil is ontologically describable only negatively, in terms 
of what it destroys and what it lacks.”238 This banality means that there is no depth to 
probe, no hidden motifs to fathom. Similarly, it is worth noting that aligning the question 
of evil with a failure of subjectivity tells us more about the possible origins of evil and 
not about the ways in which evil presents itself in the world or the specific measures that 
need to take place to reduce the amount or intensity of evil. The life of the wrongdoer, as 
we learn from the analysis of one of the worst criminals we know as Eichmann, is the life 
that is arrested in its development, paradoxically deadened, i.e., not properly or fully 
human. 
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What we have learned about the phenomenon of evil so far, given the accounts 
outlined above, indicates that it is mute, thoughtless, devoid of intention, either because it 
is a purely destructive affect (such that, in committing acts of evil, human beings turn 
away from God qua being) or because it is driven by, for example, an utterly prosaic, 
superficial careerism or obedience, which would be the example of Eichmann. Once 
again, evil is a kind of absence, i.e., thoughtlessness.239 It has no being of its own. It is the 
Good that failed to take place.240 We read that 
evil is essentially a matter of absence… Not simply a metaphorical and subjective 
“absence,” such as the absence of conscience in the individual actor; rather, it is 
the literal absence of a lively and responsive presence with which we can engage 
in mutually creating and sustaining a human and public world. Evil is essentially a 
threat external to our real “worldly” existence, a threat whose “reality” exists only 
beyond the boundaries of our world.241 
 
Thus, we can conclude that while Augustine dissolves a scene of evil into nothingness, 
Arendt dissolves it into the failure to think.242 
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However, in a decisive departure from the view that sees evil as privation, as 
radically divorced from being, it is the very category of being that becomes the starting 
point of Adi Ophir’s investigation of the question of evil and morality in The Order of 
Evils. In fact, the strength of his theory is that he pulls evil back into this world. No 
longer is it simply the concern of the theologian or those concerned with the transcendent 
realm. Stating the problem in decidedly non-theist terms, Ophir sees evil as real, it is of 
this world, and it has a being of its own. 
It is worth noting from the outset that Ophir uses the term ‘Evil’ to designate the 
totality of evils in the world. The ways of Being (roughly understood as what determines 
beings as beings,243 that maddeningly mysterious and elusive spark that separates the 
living from the dead, following Heidegger’s famous distinction between Being and 
beings who take up the former in their questioning) are infinitely great. What I want to 
emphasize here, however, is the specificity or tangibility of the category of being, the 
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way Ophir understands it, such that it is stripped of any ghostliness or unintelligibility. 
Taking into account the conjunction of being and evil, our attention is redirected from 
what has fallen through the cracks of existence, has been omitted, or failed to take place, 
to what can be described, studied, contextualized, and ultimately halted or prevented. 
This is no longer the question of imagining things to be otherwise, but rather of 
recognizing their stubborn presence. 
The possibilities of being fall along the lines of necessity and contingency or 
superfluity,244 presence and absence, past and future, what may be and what could have 
been. The possibility that Ophir seizes on is superfluity. In other words, it indicates a kind 
of excess, an overflowing, or abundance. Superfluity has no uses and no justifications. 
Crucially, Ophir submits that evil is a superfluous way of being,245 i.e., that there is 
something irredeemably stubborn and concrete about its multiple manifestations, and that 
it is superfluous, that it should not be, that has no place and no part to play, unless it hides 
in plain sight. Indeed, superfluity can and often is disguised as necessary, as part of the 
natural order of things, as something that goes far beyond the workings of human beings, 
yet, once the masquerade is undone, it refuses justification and normalization. In other 
words, evil becomes an ontological category and activity, insofar as it is tangibly present 
in the world and insofar as it is subject to increase or reduction, worsening or 
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amelioration, prevention or remediation. It is, therefore, neither a diabolical element in 
the darkness of the human heart, something that forever eludes scrutiny and visibility, nor 
a meaningless, thoughtless absence of the good. One of the tasks Ophir takes up in 
addressing evil is precisely to strip superfluity of its disguises. 
As he writes,  
the moral ‘ought’ is not presented here as the opposite of the ‘is.’ Rather, it is the 
opposite of a certain possibility of the being of Being—the being of a superfluous 
excess, which is precisely the being that ought to be abolished. For one to 
understand what is proper (that is, what ought to be done), there is no need for a 
moral law that allegedly floats above reality or is somehow intuited or uncovered 
beyond it. It is enough to understand superfluous evil, whose unnecessary evils 
that could have been prevented or reduced but were not.246 
 
This is Ophir’s task, which is to understand, to think, to examine, with a view to reducing 
evil, which is exactly the task I take up as well. To understand something is to inhabit 
language, it is to give something an expression, a specificity. Thus, he seeks to give evil a 
tongue, “an idiom that will enable one to express Evil as part of reality, a quotidian, 
routine…. Instead of confronting the source of Evil, that which allegedly lies at the 
essence of man’s body or soul or of the political regime, this treatise examines the 
unnecessary social and historical production of evil.” We can probably all agree that 
locating evil in the darkness of the inevitably singular, idiosyncratic human heart is futile. 
We should also take stock of the idea that to locate evil in one particular political regime 
is both to drastically limit its scope (if totalitarianism produces evil, then how do we 
account for evils under the conditions of democracy?) and to reduce its being to the being 
of the political regime in question. The task of understanding, as Ophir presents it, aims 
not at the full exercise of the properly human faculties (e.g., cultivating the faculty of 
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thinking or judging), but rather at grasping and unmasking the superfluity of evil for what 
it is. What is at stake here is not a general examination of whatever situation we find 
ourselves in, but questioning into the guises superfluity tends to assume. Thus, the first 
step in understanding evil is both to anchor it in worldly specificity and to see it as 
fundamentally unnecessary, superfluous, to de-naturalize it. 
Let us think about this for a moment. What does it mean to say that something is 
unnecessary? This is certainly not the banality of the subject, the way Arendt saw it, since 
we are no longer fusing together the question of evil with whatever subjective features of 
the person who commits a crime that might accompany it. Rather, we are starting with 
the seemingly straightforward, yet central insight that most of us tend to leave things 
unaltered and unchallenged when they appear necessary to us and we seek change when 
the superfluous nature of the situation is fully revealed to us. In short, superfluity 
activates our agency, while necessity fails to incite us to action. Stated more strongly, 
necessity condemns us to passivity in a world where even change or transformation is 
stripped of spontaneity and unforeseen blossoming into existence, without a shadow of 
possible non-existence falling over it. The idea of superfluity is, on the other hand, 
closely associated with the drive to change the things we believe ought not to be. If 
necessity goes hand in hand with acceptance, superfluity provokes revolt. Furthermore, 
this claim is followed by the observation that things often appear necessary when we are 
immersed in them, when we get so used to them that we no longer pay any attention. The 
function of habit and mundaneness is thus to reinforce the semblance of necessity. 
Indeed, all this stuff around us just is, e.g., things, ideas, experiences, habits, saturated 
with false familiarity and man-made character, comprising a dynamic web of human 
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actions and decisions, past, present, and future. But what if we are suddenly talking about 
“the evil things that make people’s lives bad”? Things like, Ophir goes on to say, “pain, 
suffering, loss, humiliation, damage, terror, alienation, and ennui.”247 If these things are 
man-made as well, how do we unmake them? 
One other key element that emerges here, in addition to the notion of superfluity, 
is the term ‘production.’ The man-made things have a story to tell, a story written in the 
ink of human action. To take a fairly innocuous example, imagine an unfortunate spat 
you had with your friend recently. It turned out to be much more serious and injurious  
than it first seemed. Your friend’s feelings are hurt and the relationship has been 
damaged. In this case, you are the cause of saying something hurtful to them and, in a 
moral moment according to Ophir, you say, “I’m sorry.” If your apology is sincere and 
your friend is willing to accept it, the pain of the conflict is lessened or gone completely. 
Using this logic in a wide array of other scenarios, we can say that to examine an instance 
of evil is to break it down into ‘chunks’ of human actions, decisions, experiences, and 
words, the chunks it depends on for its very existence, so as to minimize or undo it 
completely. 
Thus, “to assume that the social production of evils has more or less ordered 
patterns, which can be exposed and changed, is to attempt to develop a more or less 
ordered and systematic moral discourse… a systematic effort of the kind that lays its own 
foundations without presuming in advance to know how secure those foundations are.”248 
The moral theory that Ophir is outlining for us can be characterized by at least two things 
that concern us here. First, the first act of resisting evil is to learn to recognize its 
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superfluous nature, to strip it of its disguises, to de-naturalize it. It is to twist evil free 
from the illusion of necessity. Second, it tells us that the production and distribution of 
various evils has patterns, which de-emphasizes the question of origin and explains why 
we become accustomed to the presence of evil in the first place. What I mean here is that 
the production of evil tends to become repetitive, familiar, even dull, i.e., deeply 
entrenched in our daily life and in our basic sense of the world, accruing the semblance of 
necessity, an uncontested givenness, and justificatory narratives in the process. While 
recognizing the superfluity of evil does not always amount to revolt and while can does 
not automatically amount to will, Ophir points us in the direction of what is to be 
exposed, studied, and prevented in the most concrete terms possible. The subject of our 
study is thus the patterns of the social production of evils from the standpoint of reducing 
them.249 
In conjoining evil, its patterns of production and distribution, and superfluity, 
Ophir introduces another key element, which is temporality. To state the obvious, the 
evils and catastrophes of the world happen in time. As we are about to see, however, time 
becomes a kind of link between our subjectivity or, more precisely, agency and instances 
of evils or catastrophes. Determining the temporal nature of a catastrophe (“Is it past, 
present, or about to happen?”) is the necessary precondition for responding to it morally 
and for deciding on the measures that must be taken in order to halt, minimize, or prevent 
it. Thus, grasping the nature of time when assessing a disaster as inseparable from the 
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production of evils has far-reaching ethical and practical implications. Ophir’s morality is 
thoroughly temporal, given the force of his argument that time and practice are perfectly 
capable of entering in a genuinely fruitful synthesis. But more about this later. 
The nature of time and the category of urgency, a kind of moral prohibition on 
waiting, first come up when Ophir writes about the meaning of the Holocaust in Israeli 
culture and the status of ‘Auschwitz’ as a synonym of ‘absolute’ or ‘radical’ Evil, “a 
criterion for every possible evil, and an exemplary model for every future evil.”250 There 
is, as he puts it, a sacred halo surrounding this name, such that there is no space at all for 
thinking and responding to other evils.251 Yet, it is precisely this space that he wants to 
create in Hebrew and in Israeli culture, “for thinking about other catastrophic events that 
may be less horrible than Auschwitz, perhaps, but whose call upon thought is much more 
urgent.” “More urgent,” he explains, “also because they involve an evil that is produced 
now, in conditions that can still be amended, or a future evil that could still be 
prevented.”252 While the catastrophe of Auschwitz does defy thought and comprehension 
in its monstrosity, which is to say that it resists becoming disassembled into the sum total 
of human actions and being placed on a continuum of other disasters, Ophir determines 
its significance here and now in terms of human agency by pointing out that the evil in 
question has already taken place. Past instances of evil demand a different kind of 
                                                
250 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 22. 
251 For a further discussion, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, “On the Social Construction of 
Moral Universals: The Holocaust from War Crime to Trauma Drama,” European Journal 
of Social Theory, Volume: 5 issue: 1, pp. 5-85.   
252 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 23. 
 116 
response than those that are still unfolding.253 In short, the past disasters do not exert a 
pull on our sense of agency as much as the ongoing ones. 
Here Ophir reorients us in time, as it were, infusing it with moral significance and 
potential for activating our agency or capacity for revolt. Even though what has happened 
before us may have been unprecedented in its heinousness, we cannot change the past, we 
can only learn from it, if even that. As agents oriented toward the past, we remain 
powerless, oscillating between the simple and often tempting forgetting of what has 
happened and a culture of mourning, which does nothing to change the present for the 
better and serves as an invitation to passivity. Arguing about what is unprecedented and 
what is not is beside the point, since the taxonomy of crimes also does very little to alter 
the existing order of things. More importantly, in accordance with Ophir’s key assertion, 
we cannot turn a blind eye to the suffering that is taking place right now insofar it can 
still be lessened. To do so is to mistake superfluity and the production of evil for 
necessity. It is a failure to discern the potential for change vis-à-vis ongoing catastrophes. 
Thus, the question of what catastrophes ought to be more ‘privileged’ or more 
‘important’ is decided from the standpoint of time, which is to say, from the standpoint of 
prevention or alleviation, i.e., from the standpoint of whether it is too late or not. The 
structure and modality of time itself now becomes saturated with moral urgency and 
responsibility. We cannot become moral subjects without experiencing disasters as past, 
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present, and future and without understanding which temporal modality allows for 
change and which does not.  
Let me then say more about the notion of urgency before going any further. Later 
in the book, Ophir discusses, in what I consider to be one of his most achingly honest 
passages, the relative practical uselessness of the category of ‘Good’ in the excessive 
presence of ongoing evils and suffering (note that he defines suffering as “an excess of 
presence”),254 
a theory of morals that has gone through the ontological turn has no interest in 
Good. Good neither adds nor subtracts in moral matter. We have no interest in 
Good, whether it is understood as happiness or as what gives happiness its value 
and weight, just as it gives value to any other entity […] Not the Good that isn’t 
there, but the superfluous loss and suffering, present in their excess, in the 
imperative. Not the absent Good, not even the absence of Good, but the presence 
of superfluous evils. Not what is lacking or even the lack itself, but the superfluity 
of the tormenting lack, the lack that can be fulfilled and removed. Not the 
generosity or the fairness, but the humiliation and the injury that can be avoided 
and removed. Not the virtue but the unnecessary brutalization whose results 
should be stopped. People who have undergone horrible suffering or irreplaceable 
loss may never again know how to be happy. Memories will haunt them, mistrust 
toward every person may sabotage every relation they seek to create, torment of 
mind and body will continue to plague them. The imperative to stand beside them 
concerns not their future happiness but their present torture.255 
 
Here Ophir firmly rejects any promise of ‘happiness-to-come,’ a wish to alleviate 
suffering for the sake of a better future. If this were the case, we would not be revolting 
against the suffering we are faced with, but rather seeking to bring about a particular 
future. We tolerate ongoing suffering in the hopes of building a better tomorrow where 
this suffering will come to an end. We do not attempt to address the particular suffering 
in question, but to prevent its further emergence in the future. In other words, we seek to 
alter the world by bypassing a moral expenditure vis-à-vis addressing a concrete instance 
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of individual torment. What Ophir seems to suggest, on the other hand, is that the 
brutality of excessive suffering is powerful enough to jolt us and that the very being and 
tangibility of suffering is enough to snap us out of complacency, as long as a scene of 
suffering is accessible to us and we are able to take up the position of the addressee and 
as long as we have a viable theoretical vocabulary to re-describe ourselves as moral 
agents. As I will show later, the notion of moral urgency and the activity of judgment are 
closely and necessarily linked together. According to Ophir, he intolerability of suffering 
has little to do with Good that promises to come from the future, which is certainly a 
significant departure from what we might call ‘ethics of the future,’ construing the future 
as infinitely open and vocal in its seemingly unwarranted promises of a different, better 
state of affairs. Ophir, however, does not put much stock in the ethical potential of the 
category of the future qua the provenance of Good. Indeed, he admits that “it’s possible, 
of course, to define Good as the prevention of superfluous suffering and loss. But such a 
statement would neither add nor subtract, only provide some work for an unemployed 
concept.”256 
This is a really important shift of emphasis that we will continue to examine. In 
calling our attention to the suffering that can and ought to be stopped or reduced because 
it is still happening, he thus reinforces the category of urgency. Some people are suffering 
right now and since their suffering is superfluous, produced, unnecessary, we have a 
chance of disrupting it. The concept of Good or any utopian vision and messianic 
thinking does not convey this sense of urgency, for it diverts our attention from the 
shivering limbs, hungry mouths, and eyes filled with despair. If anything, these concepts 
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neutralize the experiential and affective weight of suffering. In fact, there may not be 
anything good or happy in store for those who are undergoing or have undergone 
tremendous suffering. The future plays virtually no role in our attention to their 
predicament.257 Once again, since evil is no longer construed as privation, we must 
address the evil of suffering in its excessive presence and specificity. 
Ophir goes on submit, unsurprisingly, that “urgency is a moral category.”258 This 
is the case, as indicated above, because “time has a constitutive role in causing 
suffering.” In other words, time, which is something we all inhabit, is the central 
experiential feature of suffering, as we are about to see. For some of us, time is merely 
the ticking of the clock in the background, while for others time becomes the duration of 
unbearable suffering. Time either protrudes through the fabric of our experience or fades 
into the background. If the evil of agonizing time is expressed affectively (the victim’s 
cry, “No more!”), we are capable of disrupting the painful affect of the victim by offering 
them some relief, which means we alter their experience of time. Setting aside the view 
of time as universal, homogenous, and indifferent, preceding and delineating our 
experience in advance,259 we embrace affective temporality, the temporality that can be 
morally or immorally shaped by human actions. As Ophir writes, “when what is present 
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causes the one presented with it sorrow, suffering, or damage, or when what is present is 
the sorrow, the suffering, or the damage itself, the discrete temporalization is 
preferable….”260 This is to say, what is needed here is the temporality that frees one from 
continuous agony. On the contrary, the continuous temporalization or a flowing duration 
is preferable when we are in the presence of something that brings us joy. We want the 
source of our enjoyment to persist in existence, such that the time of pleasure never ends 
at all, just like we desperately need the source of our suffering to disappear. 
I consider this to be one of the most important and decisive insights into time 
available to us today. The question of temporality itself is now drawn into the moral 
domain, such that we revolt in the face of the temporality that is causing suffering and we 
use a particular vision of time to guide us in our ethical efforts. Suffering is, for Ophir, 
“the duration of the encounter with the unbearable” and it happens when it is “impossible 
to disengage from an encounter with casualties.”261 Indeed, the temporality of suffering is 
“an incessant duration.” According to these deeply disconsoling words, “this is a 
chronicle from the Planet Auschwitz. Time there was not what time is on Earth.”262  
The presence of suffering is so excessive and painful that it stops us in our tracks. 
Recoiling from the presence of suffering attests to the fact that there is something in IT 
that fractures our habitual indifference. But how exactly do we revolt against it? While I 
will expand on this point later, the key here is the creation or fabrication of the discrete or 
discontinuous “temporalization.” We wedge a gap in the agonizing continuity of 
suffering even when we simply speak to an other in torment, when we take the ailing 
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person for a walk, when we open a window in the sickroom letting the sunshine and the 
gentle summer breeze rush in. No matter how small the disruption of the unbearable 
continuity, we exert our agency to alter the sufferer’s experience of time. The upshot of 
this is that human beings can inhabit radically different temporalities, which, in turn, are 
determined or at least acerbated by the social conditions they are in. Thus, 
temporalization is a practice.  
I thus want to argue that suffering is the locus where evil is at its most visible and 
unbearable, which is why, at least for the purposes of this work, I have been using these 
terms more or less interchangeably. Suffering is a temporal scene where evil shows its 
ugly figure of senselessness and superfluity. Thus understood, suffering is the 
experiential kernel of evil qua superfluity. Suffering is the ultimate for nothing and the 
death knell for all its justifications. In other words, ongoing suffering exposes the 
phenomenon of evil in its superfluity, intolerability, and man-made character, making it 
not simply one type of evil among others, but its highest point of saturation and, in fact, 
its paradigm. To experience suffering, both firsthand and as a witness, is to experience 
affective time in such a way that allows us to try and disrupt an ongoing evil. To disrupt 
one is to disrupt the other. Thus, presenting evil as necessary or natural determines our 
sense of time, time as an indifferent, inexorable succession of events, utterly alien to 
anything human, such that we remain powerless and resigned in the face of it. This 
understanding of time is indifferent to the concrete socio-political circumstances of the 
victims, it is universal, apolitical, ‘innocent.’ It is the time of ‘That too shall pass’ that 
fails to invoke a sense of revolt vis-à-vis that which is intolerable. We need, Ophir tells 
us, a different understanding of time if we are to experience evil as the scandal of 
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superfluity. We need to discern what type of time is synonymous with evil, which would 
be the superfluous, uninterrupted duration of pain. 
However, Ophir goes further in situating moral urgency in its relation to the 
problem of deferral. Let us now look at what he understands by deferral, as it stands in a 
clear tension with urgency, according to his interpretation. Ophir argues that to defer 
addressing present suffering is sometimes necessary in order to determine its underlying 
structural cause or to understand the general structure of suffering so as to respond to it 
morally. However, it is also to cultivate what Ophir unflinchingly calls a kind of 
toughness or ‘cruelty.’ Thus, 
victims of cruelty are an extreme case (even if not the most extreme) of others we 
should care for. The care for others gets its concrete expression in the space 
between urgency and deference. Urgency is always related to a concrete other, 
near or far, who is in dire need of help. The reflective deferral opens the way for 
an other that has not yet appeared, that is not yet known, or for evils that have not 
yet been expressed. Deferral, as we said, obliges us to ignore, even for a while, 
the evils that befall concrete others; it cultivates toughness that could become 
cruelty.263  
 
To respond to the call of distress is to risk remaining blind to its real cause and thus to 
perpetuate the suffering, even with the best of intentions, the way Ophir sees it. While it 
seems that all one can do is to be aware of and keep negotiating this crucial tension 
between urgency and deferral, at least within the work under discussion, I wonder if 
Ophir goes far enough in his admirable commitment to the alleviation of present 
suffering. Recall his words that “people who have undergone horrible suffering or 
irreplaceable loss may never again know how to be happy…. The imperative to stand 
beside them concerns not their future happiness but their present torture.” To my mind, 
the imperative to stand beside one who is suffering demands a kind of moral prohibition 
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on the prioritization of the practice of deferral, i.e., toughness or cruelty vis-à-vis cries 
for help. It is possible to speculate that the moral agency of urgency and that of deferral 
are constitutively and experientially different, since the experience of responding to the 
plight of one single person and the experience of, say, writing a work on the refugee 
crisis are different as well. However, the lessons and the implications of moral urgency 
do not end here. 
We can illuminate the problem that stems from prioritizing deferral over urgency 
as follows. Whoever becomes the addressee of the plea for help and responds to it by 
taking the measures necessary to alleviate this person’s suffering is acting both morally 
and humanly, revolting in the face of someone else’s distress and attempting to remove or 
at least minimize it.264 In so doing, one correctly situates catastrophes in the cascade of 
time, he or she responds to the evil in question from the standpoint of the present 
understood as open to change (that is, our experience of time changes as we transition 
from grief to joy) seizing the moment before this catastrophe forever drowns in the 
unchanging waters of the past, forever closed to any intervention, and forever embedded 
in the bloodstained monolith of history.  
We could say that the moral agent snatches this particular production of evil from 
the fast approaching grip of the past and its illusion of necessity, the illusion turning it 
into what could not have been otherwise. In other words, this moral agent is driven both 
by the revolt against suffering and the key link between evil and superfluity, which 
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amounts either to fragmenting the temporality of pain or condemning the sufferer to a 
continuous temporality, where all moments are identical in their capacity for torment. As 
Ophir puts it, “the being of the one-who-suffers is experienced as time, a time of 
continuous suffering, an expectation for the moment it will cease.”265 The duration of the 
suffering is contingent, to a great extent, on our timely and efficient response to it. There 
are victims who can neither act nor wait. The more time passes and the more we wait, the 
more superfluous suffering accumulates. It is in this sense, I believe, that urgency is a 
moral category. 
However, Ophir goes on to say, “the concept of justice oscillates between the 
demand to decide immediately and respond to the call and the demand to suspend 
judgment and defer the response. To act justly means to act immediately…. to act justly 
means to take everything into account… an endless reflection and infinite suspension of 
the decision.”266 In other words, a moral action is suspended between the immediacy of 
responding to a suffering other and the need to examine the structural conditions or 
underlying causes of this evil “in order to ease the suffering of many others, who are 
more or less abstract.”267 The suffering other who puts you in the position of the 
addressee must wait in the hopes that similar suffering can be prevented in the future, 
which remarkably resembles using a particular scene of suffering as an occasion for 
research, even if one hopes for its practical applicability. This shift of emphasis of a 
singular scene of suffering to a future-oriented task is less innocent than it might first 
appear. Ophir goes on to say that the one dealing with “prevention conditions” must 
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“teach himself and those around him to overcome pity, to repress ruth.”268 However, I 
must admit that I am skeptical about the feasibility of easing the suffering of many 
‘abstract others’ unless the moral subject in question is the state and we are discussing 
humanitarian interventions. Which we are not. 
“The deferral,” Ophir tells us, “in order to reexamine the order of evils, aiming 
ultimately at a more just distribution of evils, participates in the existing distribution and 
reaffirms it in silence. In both directions, the moral deed forces us to readopt a ‘cultured,’ 
‘cultivated’ kind of indifference to the suffering of others….”269 Thus, deferral is a 
particular kind of thinking about the material conditions of suffering with a moral goal in 
mind. In refusing to respond to one’s immediate suffering of concrete others, we produce 
and acquiesce to the duration of their agony. To wait and to postpone does indeed 
reinforce the existing order of evils and suffering in the world.  However, according to 
Ophir, the promise of deferral is the eventual reduction of suffering not just for one 
person, but, as it were, across a given society. Thus understood, helping one person is a 
temptation, but not the birth of the moral subject. Contrary to Ophir’s rejection of the 
idea of a better future vis-à-vis ongoing suffering, he seems to be willing to sacrifice a 
concrete suffering other precisely for the sake of what’s to come later. The crime of 
turning away from even one singular suffering other lies at the heart of every deferral. 
With this in mind, I want to argue that rejecting even one suffering other in the present is 
to diminish, if not negate, the moral dimension of temporality.  
Furthermore, Ophir sees the task of deferral as running counter to one’s moral 
sensibility, such that the practice of deferral is something that must be learned and 
                                                
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid., 398. 
 126 
cultivated. Its work is to harness one’s impulse to act immediately and to yield to 
temptation to offer relief when faced with suffering. Ophir turns to Nietzsche and his idea 
of self-overcoming to illustrate his point. As he puts it, “self-overcoming entails cruelty, 
in particular self-cruelty, an indifferent expenditure of power and an excessive 
indifference to suffering, the suffering of the one who overcomes himself and others.”270 
According to this logic, self-overcoming is necessary on the assumption that to suppress 
one’s impulse to help a person in need causes genuine suffering either in someone else or 
in the future, the suffering comparable to the one being witnessed.  
In short, Ophir claims that the revolutionary, ignoring suffering others for the sake 
of a sweeping change or a better tomorrow is “cynical about what is and naïve about the 
relation between the proper and the possible. The benevolent one, the one responding to 
moral urgency without any reservations, “ignores the social order that produces evils and 
distributes them… he is naive about what is and cynical about the relation between the 
proper and the possible.”271 He thus situates moral comportment between the urgency of 
responding to someone’s plea for relief and the deferral of preventing more suffering in 
the future. We decide whether it is worth to accumulate and produce the time of suffering 
by not disrupting it or whether it is worth to defer help. 
What I aim to demonstrate in the following section, counter to Ophir, is that the 
subject shaped by moral urgency is, in fact, the opposite of someone who turns a blind 
eye to the existing social order and the social production of evils. Indeed, I position this 
very subject as the moral paradigm of what it means to inhabit time as expressive of the 
production of evils, time that is given to us through affects and that is open to human 
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disruption.272 Once again, a transition from sorrow to joy is a transition from one 
temporality to another. As Ophir writes, “it is the moral responsibility of the intellectual 
to be attentive to what is most urgent, and what is most urgent for anyone capable of 
thinking is to understand the moral condition of a society.”273 However, I submit that “the 
moral condition of a society” is not the first and perhaps not even the last task 
confronting the subject who takes up the challenge of moral urgency. Rather, the 
challenge is to cultivate the subjectivity wherein one sees the present qua the domain of 
evils before they congeal into the immutable past and to inhabit it accordingly, in the 
name of moral urgency and the predicament of the weaker one in distress.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to further call into question Ophir’s 
juxtaposition between urgency and deferral, which could be broadly construed as the 
opposition between acting and thinking. While I will discuss these matters in 
significantly greater detail in the following chapter, I want to introduce the idea of the 
non-equivalence of victims. Here I will approach this from the standpoint of moral 
urgency. What do I mean by non-equivalence? When Ophir speaks of the plea of a 
suffering other, we are left with the impression that one is overwhelmed by a call of 
distress, i.e., what is at stake here is a kind of emotional assault on our moral sensibility. 
Thus, this call for help is radically passionate, forceful, desperate, brimming with the 
victim’s inability to bear suffering even for one more instant. It is as if the unbearable 
itself found a voice and it rejects any distinctions or differentiations. In other words, 
human beings are fundamentally equal in their response to brute pain, such that it 
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becomes a singular equalizing force. All human beings are the same in their cry for help. 
However, I want to argue that suffering is inseparable from the socio-political position of 
the victim, which means that the ‘temptation’ to rush to the unbearably affective plea of 
the victim is not the whole story. As moral subjects, we ought to differentiate between 
victims and various instances of suffering as well as what comes in the wake of it, so as 
to salvage concrete, suffering others from an almost impersonal, undifferentiated pathic 
cry for help, the cry that makes us all sound the same, and to position it within concrete, 
worldly circumstances.  
We have to recognize that the mechanisms for the alleviation of suffering have 
their own patterns and unequal distribution across a wide range of victims. While it all 
begins with a gut-wrenching plea for relief, a universal, primordial cry for help, we must 
acknowledge that some victims need help more urgently than others. In other words, I am 
construing urgency not as a blindly affective, emotional ‘tug’ at our moral sensibilities 
and certainly not as something that precludes thinking, but as something that inevitably 
differs and demands different types of responses from one situation to the next. To act in 
the name of moral urgency is a far cry from a thoughtless, hasty reaction. To engage in 
these moral efforts, we must recognize that an event of suffering does not happen to 
disembodied subjects in a socio-political vacuum. We must exercise our judgment, learn 
the circumstances surrounding each instance of suffering, and determine who is facing 
the greatest neglect and the lowest visibility in the world. We must determine what we 
are able and not able to do in this particular case. This is a matter of a shift of emphasis 
from the brute fact of pain, which is as theoretically fruitful as a phenomenology of fire, 
to what happens thereafter. This is not about who suffers the most. This is about who has 
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the fewest, the scarcest means of redressing this suffering, making it known, and 
obtaining relief, as well as who is facing the greatest neglect. 
Thus, rearticulating Ophir’s notion of moral urgency, we distance it from a pathic 
cry for help and rushing to it out of compassionate weakness, especially when deferral 
holds the promise of futural moral improvements, at least as its defining characteristics. 
What I am suggesting instead is that urgency, properly understood, encompasses the 
vicissitudes of personal judgment, assessment of our positionalities and abilities, and, to 
be sure, thinking.  
As an aside, one might wonder, “Is this not utilitarianism in reverse?” It does 
indeed seem like ‘numerical ethics’ with its promise to save a greater number of singular, 
irreplaceable individuals by sacrificing one person is a grief-haunted necessity that stands 
to reason. The key problem with it, the way I see it, the moral value we have assigned to 
numerically inspired ethical measures has been decided long ago, such that it is no longer 
even subject to questioning, and a single individual stands no chance in the course of 
action that has been millennially taken for granted274 and refuses any kind of critical re-
assessment. Thus, what I am calling into question is the very moral imbalance wherein 
the fate of a singular other  is decided in advance. 
                                                
274 With regard to the practice of condemning the weaker ones to death or worse, let us 
consider the claim Siebers makes when he submits that “no human group [other than the 
disabled] has ever been so subject to violence, none so marginalized. In ancient Greece 
we were left to die on the cold mountain hillsides, in Africa we were food for beasts, in 
Europe dropped down a well. People forget the Nazis perfected their death machine on 
the disabled before they moved on to the Gypsies and Jews. Visit an orphanage in any 
civilized country today, and see who is abandoned there: the deformed, the maimed, the 
diseased, the mentally impaired.” Tobin Anthony Siebers, “My Withered Limb,” .” 
Volume XXXVII, Issue 2: Disability, Art, and Culture (Part  
One), Spring 1998, accessed on 02/24/2017, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0037.202;view=text;rgn=main;xc=1;g=
mqrg 
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In learning how to assess and respond with moral urgency, we situate suffering in 
the world, as concretely as possible, such that the question is no longer about a suffering 
other and multiple more or less abstract others that come from the future, but about giving 
expression to those whose predicament is so dire and urgent that their immediate future is 
death or what is worse than death. It is about discerning those who can still wait and 
those who cannot, which means discerning their singular circumstances. We must 
separate urgency from pure pathos if there is any hope for those facing death or extreme 
abandonment.275 This, in a nutshell, is the non-equivalence of victims, as victims do not 
suffer equally. 
Now let us go back to Ophir’s tension between urgency and deferral. Once again, 
the tension here is between action, presumably hasty and thoughtless action,276 and 
reflection. Reflection arises in order to situate and evaluate the supposedly purely 
affective responses to a cry for help, as well as to postpone the response. According to 
Ophir, responding with urgency leaves no room for thinking, since “contemplation 
requires time and space.”277 
                                                
275 See Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer on his notion of ‘bare life.’ Which, in a 
nutshell, means bodies stripped of any rights, condemned to social death outside of the 
political realm. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010). 
276 Cf. Scarry who wants to challenge the view that, when faced with emergency 
situations, we fall back on ‘thoughtless,’ knee-jerk habits, routines, and customs. In an 
emergency, one “can either think or one can act, and given that it is absolutely mandatory 
that an action be performed, thinking must fall away.” In the example of CPR, which 
could be construed as a mindless, automatic routine, Scarry points out that the practice in 
question congeals a vast amount of knowledge about the human body and that one must 
be clear-headed enough to perform this procedure. Indeed, “rather than emergency 
bringing about the end of thinking, thinking should bring about the end of emergency.” 
Elaine Scarry, Thinking in an Emergency (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), 10. 
277 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 393. 
 131 
This is precisely the point I want to contest. To acknowledge that victims do not 
suffer equally is to learn to discern the victim’s particular circumstances, to situate their 
suffering in the world, to exercise judgment when it comes to evaluating the degrees of 
urgency. This thinking which goes hand in hand with the imperative of moral urgency 
rescues it from the equalizing force of agonizing affect and it is precisely through 
thinking and judging that the moral subject establishes the non-equivalence of victims. In 
other words, thinking does not happen in the wake of action, but alongside it. It happens 
alongside of one’s efforts to reduce suffering and, furthermore, it establishes a different 
relation to victims, such that we are no longer suspended between the idea that everyone 
suffers equally278 and pure, overwhelming alterity or the pandemonium of anonymous 
victims blurred in their immense multiplicity and distress. As long as we are separating 
thinking and acting under the sign of urgency, we evade confronting victims in their 
singular circumstances and we fear judging, partly thanks to the ineffable halo 
surrounding the experience of suffering, that, while suffering as such is intolerable, the 
                                                
278 Cf. Theodor Adorno on the tragedy of existence: “it is deeply dubious to transfer an 
aesthetic term such as the tragic to the reality and the communal life of human beings and 
the ethical relationship they have to one another. According to this way of thinking, all 
thought that takes happiness seriously is deemed shallow, whereas thought is said to be 
deep i it treats denial and negativity as something positive that gives it meaning. [...] I 
believe that the position I am trying to explain to you could not be expressed more clearly 
than by pointing out that it is not prepared to endorse an idea of tragedy according to 
which everything that exists deserves even to perish because it is finite, and that this 
perishing is at the same time the guarantee of its infinite nature--I can tell you that there 
is little in traditional thought to which I feel so steadfastly opposed as this. What I’m 
saying, then, is that this concept of depth, which amounts to a theodicy of suffering, is 
itself shallow. [...] It is shallow [...] because it reinforces the idea that failure, death and 
oppression are the inevitable essence of things--whereas important though all these 
elements are and, connected as they are to the essence of things, they are avoidable and 
criticizable, or at any rate the precise opposite of what thinking should actually identify 
with.” Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a 
Lecture Course 1965/1966 (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), pp. 104-5. 
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situation of some victims is far more urgent than that of others. As I will argue in the 
following pages, we need to strip suffering of its long-standing aura as a pure, universal, 
de-contextualized affect if we hope to do justice to those who cannot wait and cannot act 
on their own behalf. 
I submit that moral urgency indexes a suffering other, since we have to judge who 
requires relief with genuine urgency. It thus concerns individuals and singular, embodied 
others, insofar as its ‘job’ is to expose us to multiple cases of different types of suffering 
that have not yet passed through the gates of moral urgency and the assessment of my 
positionality, culminating in the question, “What can I do?” “What resources do I have?” 
“How do I shuffle my schedule?” “What do I have to offer?” The origin of these 
evaluative and irreducibly personal questions is moral urgency. Therefore, moral urgency 
is inseparable from the activity of judgment. Ethics without judgment is disingenuous, 
while judgment without ethics is potentially perilous or cruel.  
Furthermore, I submit that the subject of deferral is detached from the reality of 
concrete scenes of suffering and the irredeemable destitution of a particular person. 
Without using one’s abilities and judgment, without feeling responsible for the one 
suffering right in front of you, this subject is only partially human and it chooses to align 
itself with humanitarian organization, the state’s interventions, charities, activism, and 
intellectual projects, to free oneself from the essentially human activity of judgment. As a 
result, the experience of many victims is that of extreme loneliness, resentment, and 
neglect. Indeed, if the object of ethics is not one specific suffering other, if we agree to be 
bystanders to someone else’s suffering (after all, helping more people in the abstract, 
forever opaque future always seems like a better moral valuation), thus severing their 
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connection to the world and their fellow human beings, this is an ethics of imagined, 
deferred, depersonalized, indirect actions, an ethics of questionable efficacy. It is an 
ethics can never redeem and ought not to forget its initial betrayal of the singular weaker 
one.  
The thinking that accompanies urgent response is animated by a new 
understanding of time, which brings us back to the constellation of evil, production, and 
ongoing catastrophes. If disasters happen in the present time and they are produced (e.g., 
they are not halted or alleviated), one must learn to see the present as porous or plastic, 
as having minute spaces or holes into which human action can be injected, which, in turn, 
involves a particular kind of reflection. Furthermore, the affective nature of temporality 
means that the duration of affects become the normative measures of produced 
temporalities, since they signal the moral subject’s success or failure to alleviate someone 
else’s suffering. Think, for example, of the heartbreaking ‘too late’ when we failed to 
avert a catastrophe or a sigh of deep relief when we stopped something terrible from 
happening, in the nick of time. Think of the victim’s despair when she learns that the 
efforts to help her were futile and that she remains trapped in her experience of time as 
torment. 
Thus, I want to reiterate that the present is a kind of singular ‘element’ or medium 
in which evil has the face of superfluity and malleability, which means that to inhabit the 
present morally is to learn to discern even minute openings to undermine or halt the 
unfolding of evil. To look to the past is to endow evil with glacial immutability and to 
surrender human agency. To look to the future is to turn a blind eye to the concrete 
existence of evils in the present. Thinking and judging under the sign of moral urgency 
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makes visible the unequal distribution of recognition and remediation, thus further 
undermining the equivalence of the victims, for thinking-judging is bound to discover the 
most neglected one. Perhaps this is the hardest thinking of all, since it goes beyond the 
pathic cry for help in order to evaluate each victim’s particular circumstances. Should we 
choose to refuse this evaluation, we have to acknowledge that we are condemning some 
victims, the victims who cannot wait or endure in their suffering, to torment and possibly 
death.  
In what follows, I will approach this problematic from a different perspective. I 
will anchor my arguments in Jean Amery’s harrowing essay “Resentments,” which 
articulates the subjective experience of the victim. As I will argue, his account deepens 
and reinforces my claim that the victims are non-equivalent, that an event of suffering 
does not happen in a socio-political void, and that failing to recognize the singular 
circumstances of each victim, i.e., how their plight resonated or did not resonate in the 
world, amplifies their unnecessary suffering. Finally, I will outline a new conception of 
agency, the agency that neither gives up thinking nor evades the responsibility of 
disrupting someone’s suffering out of moral urgency. 
Finally, without learning to discern the many faces of suffering and to respond to 
this challenge accordingly, without learning to differentiate between the less urgent and 
the more urgent, and without cultivating the thinking of urgency, one is bound to 
approach future victims empty-handed, unable to bring together  the cries for help that 
seem to be coming from every direction and the particular circumstances of individual 
victims, their access to support channels, the people they can mobilize with someone’s 
help, and so on. Failing to learn to inhabit the present morally, with all that it entails, 
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means the inability to distinguish between brute suffering as an assault on the senses and 
the body of the sufferer and the circumstances surrounding it. Yet, it is precisely the latter 
that holds the promise of change, for those who have no resort left. 
Furthermore, the victims rejoin the world and their fellow human beings when 
they see that people can act otherwise in the face of their pain. This is the challenge of 
agency we must take up if we wish to respond to victims morally. If we choose to do 
nothing instead, we contribute to their experience of evil as a fundamentally meaningless 
surplus, the surplus of suffering stemming from indifference, from people’s stubborn 
unwillingness to differentiate between degrees of urgency, building an ethics of hollow 
efforts and half-measures. Refusing to help a specific suffering other in the present is to 
reassert the primacy of natural, apolitical, inexorable time, the same time that glosses 
over all evils and promises, ever so mockingly and incessantly, to heal all wounds. 
Chapter Three 
 
The Morality of Resentments & Truth-Haunted Affectivity 
 
The suspension of judgment is a form of torture. 
 
—Adi Ophir 
 
Why? …  Why Me? … Why—ultimately—Me? … Do you really imagine you 
can account for Me? Totally, infallibly, inevitably account for Me? 
 
—Samuel French 
 
The phenomenon we will be examining in this chapter is suffering itself, first 
conceptualized structurally, in terms of its defining characteristics, and then narrated 
from the victim’s perspective, followed by a discussion of the means to redress it and the 
role of moral agency in it. Let us recall that Ophir understood suffering as a type of evil 
and that I amplified his claim by arguing that, in suffering, evil as production appears at 
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its most visible and exerts the most power on the human psyche. Thus, the following 
analysis of suffering is also the deepening of the problem of evil, the two being 
inextricably yoked together. Each situation between the sufferer and the addressee is 
presented here, due to the emphasis on alleviating this scene of suffering, through the lens 
of the present as the domain where evils can be stopped or minimized, i.e., through the 
lens of the present and affectivity temporality. What I hope to accomplish here is both 
give voice to one of the most poignant, yet lesser-known intellectual figures of the 20th  
century, Jean Amery, and draw on his harrowing experiences of torture and 
abandonment, coupled with Ophir’s re-articulation of the problem of evil, to draw far-
reaching moral conclusions concerning the moral coexistence of victims and their fellow 
human being as well our freedom as such. The freedom that perhaps we first feel, 
achingly, when we encounter a suffering other, perhaps a distant friend who is currently 
in the dire straights, and we, for whatever reason, failed them, wishing that we had acted 
otherwise and knowing that we could have. 
My discussion begins with an explication of an event of trauma, the way Freud 
understands it, since this construal remains highly influential to this day, to the point 
where the Freudian traumatic temporality became synonymous with trauma itself. In 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud’s primary example is the soldiers returning from 
the First World War, returning with profound changes both in body and mind. These 
soldiers, previously enjoying good mental and physical health, were now suffering from 
repeated nightmares and flashbacks. Freud begins to formulate the hypothesis that the 
traumatic experiences in question are due to “excitations from outside which are powerful 
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enough to break through the protective shield.”279 As he goes on to say, “it seems to me 
that the concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in 
an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli.”280 In our daily life, we are protected 
from overwhelming external events both by our physical resources to minimize the 
assault on our bodies, but also by the psychic mechanisms that mitigate the energy caused 
by stimuli. The trauma, according to Freud, is thus the breach [Durchbruch] of our 
psychic and cognitive protective mechanisms. This breach of our protective barriers 
makes the traumatized subject relive the traumatic experience as an attempt to “master 
the stimulus retrospectively.”281 The victim’s mind is attempting to repeat the initial 
experience of the trauma so that it can be experienced as a less threatening and less 
overwhelming event and be integrated into the subject’s consciousness, thus de-fanging 
the traumatic scene through assimilation. Thus, in its lasting destructive influence, 
“trauma is somehow simultaneously recognized and unrecognized, or recognized as 
unrecognizable, and therefore cannot be confronted directly.”282 
In other words, since the original traumatic event is so alien to our mental 
capacities, it becomes lodged in our mind as a kind of foreign body, something that the 
mind tries to either expel or assimilate, in vain, through repetition. Which is to say, “the 
temporal peculiarity making an event or experience traumatic is the circumstance that 
trauma remains traumatizing in such a way that the pastness of trauma continues to 
                                                
279 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 
PDF pagination. 
280 Ibid., PDF pagination. 
281 Ibid., PDF pagination. 
282 Cathrine Bjørnholt Michaelsen, “Tracing a Traumatic Temporality: Levinas and 
Derrida on Trauma and Responsibility,” Levinas Studies, Volume 10, 2015, pp. 43-77, 
especially p. 45. 
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proceed as if from the future.”283 Traumatic temporality traps the sufferer between past 
and future, chaining them to the opaque, inaccessible moment of a deadly overwhelming, 
without the possibility of refuge. As Caruth explains in Unclaimed Experience, the 
mind’s attempts to master that which exceeds all its capacities through repetition is 
doomed to fail, for the wounds of the mind do not heal the way physical wounds do. 
Indeed, “the wound of the mind…. the breach in the mind's experience of time, self, and 
the world…. is not, like the wound of the body, a simple and healable event, but rather an 
event that…. imposes itself repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the 
survivor.”284 
Thus, according to this highly prominent view that continues to hold sway even to 
this day, trauma is an overwhelming event that continues to haunt the victim, for its 
residue cannot be assimilated into consciousness, the natural order of time, and one’s 
sense of the world. This foreign body splintering our mind makes us suffer precisely 
because we cannot integrate it, because it does not ‘belong’ with anything human, leading 
the mind to futile attempts to expel it through repeated nightmares. Consequently, the 
victim suffers because of a foreign, extra-linguistic trace. Indeed, beyond postulating the 
existence of an alien splinter in our psyche, the event of trauma remains empty, 
contentless, forever shrouded in ineffability. Thus, the event of trauma eludes our grasp 
and analysis, becoming impenetrable, inevitable, obscure, thereby precluding any 
intervention.  
                                                
283 Ibid., 46. 
284 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), PDF pagination. 
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Let me now turn to Ophir’s examination of suffering, often coinciding with the 
traumatic, which will prove to be distinctly and fruitfully different from the Freudian 
model, postulating the radical separation of thinking and suffering, since the kernel of 
trauma remains inaccessible to thought. Indeed, we will transition from trauma viewed as 
a foreign body that breaches our protective barriers and causes suffering due to its failure 
of integration to the structure and the experience of suffering, the structure and 
experience that can be articulated and examined. As we are about to see, Ophir describes 
the event of suffering from the standpoint of time, agency, and duration, drawing into its 
orbit the attempts to alleviate this particular torment. He thus strips the time of suffering 
of its quasi-mystical, ineffable aura, locating the unbearable in the very fabric of our 
articulable experience. 
What I will discuss now is the problem of suffering seen as a type of evil that is 
open, by virtue of its unfolding right now, in the present, to intervention, change, and 
alleviation. It is about suffering seen through the lens of social production and 
superfluity, where what is man-made can and ought to be unmade. Indeed, as we will see 
shortly, suffering will now become the very expression of this superfluity, the superfluity 
of evil as it is experienced by and given to human beings, i.e., the way it forever reshapes 
and mutilates the human psyche. Indeed, the evil of suffering in its irreducible superfluity 
will be addressed at length in the final chapter. 
For Ophir, “suffering is the duration of the encounter with the unbearable… the 
unbearable is precisely what one bears when suffering, what one suffers from.”285 Thus, 
suffering is construed as an intolerable excitation that is fundamentally temporal and 
                                                
285 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 257. 
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durational, the latter becoming its central feature. Contrary to Freud, it does not simply 
rupture the natural flow of time, causing a kind of enigmatic rift and twisting it into a 
kind of inevitable, frozen temporality intolerable to human beings. While suffering and 
time are forever twinned, we reiterate that temporalization is a practice. 
Furthermore, Ophir tells us, “suffering begins when a sharp sense of too much 
comes upon the one who is overcome by the feeling I have had enough, i.e., when 
something inside someone cries out, “No more, stop it!” The presence of intense 
excitation turns into the presence of surplus that cannot be disposed of,”286 at least not 
without someone’s intervention and an offer of relief. If evil is understood as superfluity 
or surplus that is socially produced and distributed, we see that suffering—more so than 
the other types of evil that Ophir discusses in his work287—is synonymous with the 
experience of this very surplus, precisely because it is the duration that ought not to be 
and that has no justifications, the duration defined by its overwhelming, irredeemable 
senselessness. Suffering is the too much in the face of which one is completely powerless, 
unable to alter their experience of time of their own volition, abandoned and forgotten by 
the world. In suffering and in its sense of too much, the human threshold of the tolerable 
comes to light. 
Suffering, Ophir goes on to say, is a communicative situation, in the sense that it 
is often visible to someone, that the sufferer addresses someone, thus creating the 
position of the addressee. The desperate plea ‘Do something about it!’ can be either 
involuntary (e.g., a cry of pain) or a deliberate attempt to make someone care. The 
emphasis on doing or practical intervention is not accidental here. In Ophir’s words, “the 
                                                
286 Ibid. 
287 Such as damage, loss, disappearance, etc. See Ophir, The Order of Evils. 
 141 
one who cries for help has no time to give meaning; she is interested in relief, not 
interpretation. The one who answers the cry for help must give a causal, immediate 
interpretation, has to answer questions such as…. ‘From what should the sufferer be 
disengaged in order to alleviate her suffering?’”288  
Put otherwise, Ophir refuses to see suffering as an occasion for an interpretation, 
for a story (‘All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story’) that would give it 
meaning, that would explain why someone is suffering. Here he agrees with Emmanuel 
Levinas who defines suffering as being fundamentally ‘for nothing.’289 Indeed, as 
Levinas succinctly puts it, “suffering is the impossibility of nothingness” or “an absence 
of all refuge.”290 The hermeneutics of suffering would justify the pain of the sufferer by 
telling them that their pain is part of a greater whole that needs to be affirmed (for 
instance, seen from the perspective of personal development, the pain one is currently 
undergoing could be interpreted as contributing to the future strength of the person’s 
character) or that there is an otherworldly reward awaiting them at the end of the journey. 
Ophir thus asserts that the hermeneutics of suffering is the birthplace of ideology. Here I 
understand ideology as a framework that naturalizes something, i.e., frames it as 
necessary and therefore beyond human control and beyond change. Ideology turns 
suffering into necessity, thus taking us as far as possible from understanding the evil of 
suffering as production. 
Let me, however, return to the question of the temporality of suffering before 
proceeding any further. As Ophir writes, “the content of suffering merges with the 
                                                
288 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 265. 
289 Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” Entre-Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, 93. 
290 Ibid., Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 69. 
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impossibility of detaching oneself from suffering…. and this impossibility is always a 
question of time….” He goes on to say that “in suffering this temporalization is 
intensified and presenced: the being of the one-who-suffers is experienced as time, a time 
of continuous suffering, an expectation for the moment it will cease.”291 Once again, this 
is to say that pain is experienced as pure duration, as something that refuses to go away or 
allow for any change.  
“Suffering as temporalization,” Ophir continues, “expels the sufferer from time’s 
ordinary imperceptible progress and bifurcates the flow of time.”292 What this means is 
that we rarely pay attention to or experience the flow of time in our ordinary engagement 
with the world. Time recedes into the background as we go on about our daily business 
and we often forget to keep track of it. Time invades our experience precisely through 
powerful affects, joys or sorrows, to name but a few, echoing the Spinozist passion of 
time discussed earlier. Time becomes properly human and acquires an experiential reality 
when it is given to us through affects. When we are not suffering, we are sheltered from 
experiencing the cruelty of pure agonizing duration by our habitual dwelling in the world. 
To sum this up, Ophir construes suffering, however brutal or intense, not as an obscure 
breach in the flow of time, but rather as intensifications, protrusions, and prickles of time, 
time that goes from a kind of neutral, unnoticeable background of our daily affairs to an 
unbearable duration.  
If evil is brought back into this world, if we are urged to study its concrete 
manifestations and modes of production and distribution, so is suffering and its 
temporality. This means that we all can disrupt someone’s suffering in concrete, even 
                                                
291 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 273. 
292 Ibid., 274. 
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mundane ways, by wedging a gap into the homogeneity of its duration, by giving a 
qualitatively different content to the succession of identical moments keeping you in the 
claws of agony. For example, if you know someone who is suffering from a serious 
illness, a heartache, or a terrible loss, taking that person for a walk on a nice day would 
be an interruption of their time of suffering, such that their sense of time becomes 
discontinuous, such that they are able to disengage from the unbearable, if only briefly. 
This taking-for-a-walk acquires a completely new meaning now vis-à-vis the intolerable 
excitation of suffering. In so doing, you are taking them away, however briefly, from the 
unbearable duration of suffering, thus rupturing their wounding sense of time. If only for 
a moment, it is no longer the experience of suffering alone that is flooding their senses. 
Through interruption, the senses are finally free enough to experience something else. 
Now it is also the voice of a friend, the leaves shivering gently in the summer breeze, 
conversation or compassionate and understanding silence that fill this person’s 
experience. Which means that you have brought the production of this particular instance 
of evil to a halt. 
Let us take seriously the fact that the one-who-suffers experiences time in a 
thoroughly different and unbearable way. I believe that the moral response demanded by 
continuous suffering is the practice of disruption. It is forcefully, purposefully 
fragmenting and fracturing temporality itself so as to interrupt someone’s suffering. 
Barring the complete removal of traumatic situation, the suffering is always there. 
Interrupting it as often as possible makes it a little closer to bearable. Thus, the new moral 
imperative, stemming from the conjunction of the radical here-and-now and an instance 
of suffering, assumes the form of disruption. 
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Taking stock of Ophir’s decisive insights into the role of time in the production of 
evil, I want to dedicate the rest of this chapter to the discussion of the particular victim’s 
subjective experience, emphasizing the role of time, affect, and fellow human beings vis-
à-vis the victim in question. In other words, I will let the victim himself speak, without 
ever minimizing the gut-wrenching harshness and poignancy of his words. I will examine 
this victim’s account through the lens of the present as the domain where evils can be 
stopped or minimized. Taking seriously the subjective victim’s experience and applying 
the theoretical tools Ophir offered us to the problematic in question, we will find that the 
experience in question hides uneasy truths in its aura of the supposedly irrational, 
pathological affectivity, the truths about the nature of suffering as its pain emanates far 
beyond the initial event of torment and about human agency, whose kernel lies not deep 
within one’s interiority, within the addressee’s heart, but rather as I will argue, in the 
experience of the victim him- or herself. 
However, I shall to begin this discussion by a detour, necessary for 
contextualizing the problem of victimhood and equivalence, thus giving it its proper 
specificity. Following the excellent work The Empire of Trauma by Didier Fassin, I 
would like to turn to the idea we have already seen, that of ‘the equivalence of victims,’ 
and its relation to the indifference to suffering. Fassin’s analysis centers on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the central question being, “Why is it that the difference between the 
Palestinian ‘stone-throwers,’ who turn out to be young kids, and the armed Israeli 
soldiers gets erased when seen through the humanitarian lens?” Indeed, the accounts 
given by the humanitarian organizations on this conflict, adamantly refuse to take sides, 
construing every party of the conflict as a victim in his own right, equally deserving of 
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remediation and therapeutic treatment, and sidestepping their particular circumstances 
entirely. However, what allows us to position the adult armed soldiers and the unarmed 
kids as equal victims, without considering the moral genesis of their current victimhood 
and their particular situations? What is it about the category of victimhood that dissolves 
the differences and the specificities surrounding each particular sufferer, such that they 
become essentially indistinguishable from one another?293  
As the organization Médecins du Monde asserts in their report Israeli and 
Palestinian Civilians: Victims of an Unending Conflict, “there are no good or bad 
victims.”294 In other words, moral evaluation and differentiation have no place when it 
comes to sufferers. One sufferer’s needs are no more important or special than the 
other’s. Victimhood thus becomes something abstract and universal, neither good nor 
bad, devoid of any specificity and differences. The problem is, as Didier points out, “with 
regard to the second Intifada, Médecins du Monde does not question the imbalance of 
power, the illegality of the Israeli state’s occupation, or the violent oppression of the 
Palestinian population….”295 It short-circuits such facts that some (unarmed) victims are 
much more prone to be traumatized, that some people simply happen to live in a warzone 
while others made the choice to there, that the radical imbalance of power defies justice, 
meaning that some victims stand on the side of justice, as those who, for instance, fight 
                                                
293 To approach this question from a clinical perspective, Malabou’s description of a 
victim outside of remediation, “a figure outside of time, without last wishes,” speaks to 
the key difference among victims. Pathological plasticity is “a plasticity that does not 
repair, a plasticity without recompense or scar, one that cuts the thread of life in two or 
more segments that no longer meet….” Catherine, Malabou, Ontology of the Accident: 
An Essay on Destructive Plasticity (Cambridge, Polity, 2016), pp. 2-3, 16. 
294 Didier Fassin, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry Into the Condition of Victimhood 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 206. 
295 Ibid., 206. 
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against the invasion of their own land.  
Once again, what is it then that allows one to assert the symmetry between these 
clearly different victims? The bigger problem, one I will keep revisiting throughout this 
chapter, is the view positing the universal vulnerability of all bodies. According to 
Cavarero, “the uniqueness that characterizes the ontological status of humans is also in 
fact a constitutive vulnerability, especially when understood in corporeal terms.”296 
Indeed, as MacIntyre puts, our entire history of philosophy attempted to disavow human 
vulnerability and “the connections between them and our dependence on others” to shore 
up the vision of a rational and independent subject.297 The more specific response 
suggested here by Fassin has to do with the clinical vocabulary of trauma, greatly 
popularized in our every world, which ties into the greater emphasis on vulnerability that 
gained a lot of traction in the contemporary academic circles. If a body is construed as 
universally fragile, the injury to this body is hardly anything more than a reminder of 
everyone’s shared mortality and affliction. To quote Fassin once more, “at the boundary 
between psychiatric diagnosis (the all-embracing clinical category of post-traumatic 
stress) and popular thinking (the experience of being traumatized by a serious incident), 
trauma ultimately becomes what testifies to the universality of suffering and thus to the 
equivalence of victims.”298 In other words, the mere existence of the trace of violence 
marks the point where we stop examining the conditions surrounding it, preceding it, and 
stemming from it. It is the trace alone that matters and becomes the center of therapeutic 
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and even political attention.299 The concrete, living who becomes the static, impersonal 
what: an essentially interchangeable, featureless organism impacted by ‘a serious 
incident.’ Which is to say, the equivalence of victims is solidified by our focus on the 
physiological, observable traces of injury, which is something that all human bodies 
could potentially be subject to. To go back to Didier’s example, both the Israeli soldiers 
and the Palestinian stone-throwers display the same post-traumatic symptoms, such as 
nightmares, hyper-vigilance, and even bed-wetting. They are, indeed, equal in their 
symptoms and, as long as we remain focused on the traces of violence potentially and, in 
some cases, actually shared by all universally vulnerable bodies, we neglect to examine 
the specific conditions surrounding each event of suffering. In encountering the victims 
of violence, it is the firmly established focus on post-traumatic sequelae that makes all of 
them essentially the same. 
Stepping aside from the realm of politics, yet remaining in its proximity, what I 
take to be at issue here is the radically equalizing force of suffering and human finitude. 
As many of us learned from the TV show Game of Thrones, the haunting words, spoken 
in the dead fantasy language, Valar morghulis, translate into the undeniable, even trivial 
fact that “All men must die.” Indeed, it stands to reason that a sudden confrontation with 
one’s finitude or going through the scorching intensity of pain initiates us into the human 
condition, at the heart of which lies the fundamental equality of each and every one of us, 
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the ultimate equality in the face of death. A sudden prick of a needle abundantly 
demonstrates the vulnerability and organic equivalence of our bodies. That being said, the 
essay we will be examining now, the essay describing the internal or subjective 
experience of the victim, demands something very different. It demands the recognition 
of the specificity of this particular suffering as it is received by others and the world itself, 
keeping in mind that the recognition in question cannot be abstracted from the socio-
political realm. It thus demands a more nuanced understanding of suffering as something 
concrete, social, and embodied. 
The testimony to suffering we will be discussing is Amery’s essay 
“Resentments.” Born in Vienna, of Jewish origin, Amery was studying literature and 
philosophy when the Nazis came to power in Germany. After the annexation of Austria 
into the Nazi Germany in 1938, Amery first fled to France and then to Belgium, where he 
joined the Resistance. It was there where he was arrested by the Gestapo for 
disseminating anti-Nazi literature. Even though Amery was well aware of what was 
transpiring in the concentration camps, no amount of information could prepare him for 
his own experience of torture during the interrogation, perhaps most poignantly 
encapsulated by his words, “Whoever was tortured, stays tortured.”300 Once the 
interrogators realized that he had no useful information, he was promptly sent off to 
Auschwitz. Having endured a year in Auschwitz III, the Buna-Monowitz labor camp, he 
was eventually liberated in 1945. In all of his subsequent texts, Amery remained steadfast 
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in his refusal to endow his singular suffering with any kind of meaning and to open the 
door to the possibility of an easy redemption.301 
The essay “Resentments” is thus both a testimony to and reflections of a survivor 
on what it means to do justice to one’s experiences, one’s past, and the immense 
difficulty it entails. Amery goes much further than simply stating that bearing a witness 
to one’s past suffering is a process of re-experiencing the loss or the harrowing difference 
between the (pre- and post-catastrophic) past and the present. As we will see, the 
radicality of his position amounts to positing and insisting on a kind of moral time, which 
we can preliminarily define as the temporality of injustice and irreparability. However, as 
I will argue later, moral time is not just about saving the event of suffering from the 
clutches of forgetting in order to commemorate its moral truth, but also about holding on 
to a particular vision of agency or, more precisely, to a specific relationship between the 
victim and others in the proximity to the former. As Sebald elucidates, Amery’s writings 
are markedly different from the prevailing accounts of the horrors during the Nazi 
Germany in several important ways, 
rather than being abstract accounts of the victims of National Socialism, accounts 
which only too easily acknowledged a monstrous liability, the essays written by 
Améry at this time about his personal past and present contain insights, based on 
the most direct experience, into the irreparable condition of those victims, and it is 
from such insights alone that the true nature of the terror visited on them can be 
extrapolated with some precision. It is part of the psychic and social condition of 
the victim that he cannot receive compensation for what was done to him.302 
 
In other words, the directness of Amery’s experience with the terror of the Holocaust 
allowed him to single out and capitalize on one fundamental feature of the victim’s 
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predicament, i.e., the sense of the irreparable, of the wounding rupture of one’s life-
trajectory, a tear in, and an aberration of, life-time. Thus far, we are reminded of Freud’s 
theory of trauma construed as a foreign object that pierces our protective barriers and 
continues to cause suffering precisely because we cannot assimilate it and thus return to 
our pre-traumatic past, paralyzed by the feeling of loss and the irremediable.  
However, I want to complicate this account that sees an event of suffering as an 
irreparable break between past and future (note that taking this structure formally, the 
same can be said about the experience of love, such that the world appears transformed 
after we meet our special other) in the following way. It is undoubtedly true that the 
experience of the wound singularizes or distances the victim from the rest of the world 
that is only too eager to forget someone’s unseemly pain, while the sufferer is haunted by 
a terrible splinter fracturing their mind and preventing them from resuming the life as 
they once knew it. Indeed, “the surviving victim cannot move on in/with a society that 
has not recognized the moral horror of the crime committed in its name and which has 
been tolerated by the masses.”303 Yet, it is important to note that even when the world is 
not allowed to forget about someone’s suffering, it tries to equalize and dissolves one’s 
suffering into the fundamental feature of the human condition, into something that 
everyone, at least potentially, is subject to, for the sake of moving forward without any 
hindrances. In other words, while the victim suffers from their bodily and psychic 
wounds, he or she feels estranged from the world precisely because the world uses these 
very wounds, these seemingly neutral traces of violence, to place the sufferer in the 
relation of equivalence with all other victims, thus robbing them of their specificity. It is 
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as though the world admonishes the victim, “If you think your suffering is special, think 
again. Vulnerability lives in all of us, so play nice and stop being a pest to the rest of 
us.”304 Thus, while suffering grows roots in and preys on the body,305 there is still 
something about it that resists equalization. Something deep and visceral within us 
revolts when we attempt to place fully armed Israeli soldiers and stone-throwing kids on 
the same moral continuum, erasing all context in the name of fairly identical post-
traumatic symptoms. 
Returning to the specificity of Amery’s own torture, trapped in the death 
machinery of the Holocaust, he goes on to assert that “the persecution and extermination 
of a largely assimilated minority, as planned and put into practice in the German Reich, is 
singular and irreducible…. in the last resort the question is not so much one of 
constructing a plausible etiology of terror as of achieving some ultimate understanding of 
what it means to be marked out as a victim….”306 Thus, we encounter the question of 
inhabiting the world after one’s basic sense of normalcy, continuity, and justice has been 
shattered. Furthermore, Amery tells us that his goal is to understand and thus make 
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intelligible what it means to be a victim, the task that elevates the inner experience of 
victimhood from something purely affective, thought-defying, and ineffable to a 
discursive event. 
These reflections on what it means to be a victim center around the question of 
temporality. While most people tend to inhabit the present and the future, the victim’s 
gaze is fixed on the past, rejecting the march of the present. As Ben-Shai writes, “the 
experience of the passage of time therefore becomes torturous, like being stretched on the 
wheel. The split in his personality, between survivor and victim, grows steadily like an 
unbeatable tumor.”307 Indeed, the lives of the victims of terror are essentially defined by 
the memory of their torment, substantially severing their connection to the present. As 
Amery states, “the fact that memory can hardly be endured—memory not only of 
moments of terror but also of a more or less untroubled time before them—is a problem 
which to a high degree determines the mental state of victims of persecution.”308 Thus, 
both the moments of terror and the impossibility of returning to the pre-traumatic past are 
identified as the sources of one’s torment. As e will see, there is more to this source of 
lasting pain. The traumatic event that Amery is describing is no longer seen as that which 
eludes consciousness, thinking, and memory. But we will go back to the question of 
temporality shortly. 
The essay begins with a description of the author’s occasional travels through the 
thriving land of the postwar Germany. The postwar country is the land of economic 
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prosperity, democratic stability, and political moderation, in stark contrast to its recent 
regime of terror and its monstrously grotesque excesses. However, Amery admits that he 
feels uncomfortable in this deceptively peaceful land, as he belongs to the ever-
decreasing number of the victims of National Socialism. He remembers the crimes of 
Germany only too well to be reassured by its current peace and prosperity. Thus, 
“Ameryean ressentiments resemble resentment proper because they are fired by a sense 
of the intolerable or injurious character of the way in which the post-war world, the 
German society in particular, allowed or facilitated an active forgetting of and 
reconciliation with the Nazi past.”309 He remains a victim, unwelcome in his memories 
and his resentments, in the country that attempts to overcome its infamous, exceedingly 
disastrous past. Indeed, Amery writes, “I speak as a victim and examine my 
resentments.”310 The resentments that contain important moral truths. 
It is worth noting that Amery wants to distance himself from the realm of political 
polemics. Instead, he says, 
what matters to me is the description of the subjective state of the victim. What I 
can contribute is the analysis of the resentments, gained from introspection. My 
personal task is to justify a psychic condition that has been condemned by 
moralists and psychologists alike. The former regard it as a taint, the latter as a 
kind of sickness. I must acknowledge it, bear the social taint, and first accept the 
sickness as an integrating part of my personality and then legitimize it.311 
 
His endeavor will thus concern rescuing affects from their aura of ineffability and 
irrationality, where thinking is pitted against emotions, in the hopes of providing a kind 
of affective logic. Which is to say, affects hide the truth that runs counter to what is 
established and uncontested, to the order of the world as we know it, the world where 
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time heals all wounds and any victim that thinks that their suffering is more urgent or 
special is swiftly accused of arrogance. It harbors the truth that is too harsh and 
uncomfortable to be ‘allowed’ to shed its guise of irrational affectivity and admitted as 
intellectual currency into the proper rational discourse. In short, the truths of affects 
remain pariahs. 
His resentments,312 Amery goes on to tell us, did not originate within him 
overnight. However, we remember that his overwhelming feeling of injustice did not 
begin with the first shattering blow of Amery’s torturer either. Paradoxically, it did not 
fully originate in the moment of physical agony, contrary to what one might think. His 
resentments did not come to be on the day he left the last of his concentration camps nor 
did he sense their emergence during the time when Germany, due to its unimaginable 
crimes, was  regarded by other nations with hatred and contempt. At first, Amery felt at 
home in the world where Germany was rendered powerless, treated with contempt by 
other nations, and where the category of collective guilt has struck roots. Germany’s 
unquestionable guilt was neither minimized nor was the country absolved of its 
responsibility. 
However, this relatively peaceful state of affairs did not last. As Amery points 
out, “in the following years there was less and less talk of remorse. First, the pariah 
Germany was accepted into the community of nations, after that it was courted, finally it 
had to be dispassionately reckoned with in the power game.”313 The general mindset of 
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the Germans changed as well. Amery was struck by the pervasive desire on the part of 
the Germans to ‘overcome’ their unfortunate past, abide by the policy of reparations, and 
wipe the slate clean. He could not help but see, “peering through the conciliatory wave, 
the same conformist and quietist indifference of the society that only yesterday joined 
ranks around, or at least submissively complied with, the goal of expelling him and other 
vermin of his sort.”314 When guilt disappears, so does atonement. Furthermore, the 
absence of guilt meant the absence of sin, at least in the current state of affairs. The 
minority of the people who were still holding on to the past and to their singular wounds, 
such as Amery himself, were seen as acting purely out of “morally condemnable hate.”315 
In other words, “relentless, backward-looking resentment must be the sign of some kind 
of moral failure or irrationality on behalf of its holder.”316 
It is this minority that Amery found himself in alliance with and it was the birth of 
his overwhelming resentments and his rebellion against absolving Germany of its crimes. 
Indeed, “since I neither can nor want to get rid of them, I must live with them and am 
obliged to clarify them for those against whom they are directed.”317 Amery’s 
resentments began to raise their fierce, stubborn, indecorous heads. Resentment, as Butler 
poignantly tells us, is closely linked to a sense of good and evil, functioning as “a 
weapon, put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice, and cruelty.”318 In so 
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doing, he wanted to explain the inner life of the sufferers to the world that refused to 
accept and properly recognize victims as victims, as those who felt themselves to be at 
odds with the universal human condition resistive to any differentiation and asymmetry.  
To be sure, the last, famously scathing word on resentment belongs to Friedrich 
Nietzsche, 
resentment defines such creatures who are denied genuine reaction, that of the 
deed, and who compensate for it through an imaginary revenge…. The resentful 
person is neither sincere, nor naïve, nor honest and forthright with himself. His 
soul squints; his mind loves hiding places and back doors; everything concealed 
gives him the feeling that it is his world, his security, his balm…319  
  
According to Nietzsche, resentment is the ultimate sign of feebleness, dishonesty, and 
psychically arrested humanity, which amounts to the difference between the strong and 
the weak. Resentment is the affect of the slave, which is, admittedly, one of the worst 
things Nietzsche could have said. To be sure, it is something to be resisted and overcome, 
since the only emotion that ought to accompany resentment is shame. As Ben-Shai 
explains,  
Nietzsche used the term ressentiment to characterize what he called ‘slave 
morality.’ Slave morality is a moral ideology that was first developed by Jesus 
and his disciples under conditions of slavery, and later, following the overturning 
of the Roman Empire by the Catholic Church, became the dominant ideology of 
the Western world. For Nietzsche, slave-morality, like every other value-system, 
is in fact a power-mechanism which employs ideals and values as weapons.320 
 
Indeed, “for Nietzsche… the resentful victim would then be someone who, due to an 
innate weakness, is unable to act upon the injuries he has suffered,”321 as if the sufferer’s 
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will and self-mastery have not been already shattered. In setting out to delineate the 
victim’s rejoinder to the Nietzschean condemnation of resentment as the ultimate 
expression of powerlessness by asserting the moral truth of this affect, Amery is 
confronted by yet another accusation. According to modern psychology, the victims of 
political persecution as sick and ‘warped,’ their perspective woefully distorted, they are 
too backwards for the rest of the world. Indeed, according to Minow, there is “striking 
prevalence of therapeutic language in contemporary discussions of mass atrocities.”322 As 
psychologists would have us believe, the inner state of the victim harbors no truths, since 
only the healthy mind is capable of perceiving things clearly. The traumatized are not 
allowed into the community of truth because they are allegedly too concerned with 
themselves, too involved with their sickness, and certainly unreliable in their moral 
vision. Indeed, 
this means that the moral emotions or emotions responding to perceived moral 
wrongs are sometimes seen only as evidence of trauma or as “health effects.” 
When victims voicing their anger (for example with a certain amnesty policy or as 
a result of societal expectations that they will forgive or forget) are treated as 
victims of an illness, a new offense may be added on top of the original injury. 
The pathologization of anger facilitates “blindness” to the moral demands and 
critiques that may be inherent to victims’ anger after mass atrocity.323 
 
Yet, Amery does not shy away from taking up the position of the warped state in 
question, affirming his ‘warped state’ “as a form of the human condition that morally as 
well as historically is of a higher order than that of healthy straightness.”324 Thus, he 
admits that his position is indeed distorted and askew, yet it is also fundamentally moral. 
He goes on to say, “I…. am not traumatized, but rather my spiritual and psychic 
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condition corresponds completely to reality.”325 Contra Nietzsche and contemporary 
psychologists, Amery rejects the equation of health with truth and morality. Indeed, given 
the coincidence of his psychic condition and reality, “Amery wants to address the 
Germans. Being labeled as ‘traumatized’ or ‘mentally deranged’ would of course all too 
easily exempt them from any responsibility to listen.”326 
How does Amery see resentment in its moral dimension? The first feature that he 
points out is that resentment is a “logically inconsistent condition.” It is a kind of affect 
that “nails every one of us onto the cross of his ruined past. Absurdly, it demands that the 
irreversible be turned around, that the event be undone. Resentment blocks the exit to the 
genuine human dimension, the future.”327 In other words, resentment demands that time 
itself be reversed, reordered, and showed mercy. It demands, relentlessly, yet in vain, to 
challenge the very structure of irreversibility. As Rosen puts it, “resentment is a form of 
moral refusal that opposes both historical injustice and the processes that attempt to 
assimilate, obfuscate, or neutralize these injustices.”328 This affect, while arising out of 
the human condition, rebels against it by fracturing it into necessarily singular, non-
integrable experiences of suffering, the experiences that refuse to be equalized. Indeed, 
suffering assaults the seeming universality of the human condition affectively from 
within, the way auto-immune disorders turn the organism against itself by slowly 
destabilizing it. 
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As a victim of persecution, Amery refuses to look peacefully to the future and to 
bear his suffering in stoic silence, in the facile parallelism to his torturers presumably 
bearing their guilt. His wish is not to become an accomplice of his persecutors by way of 
sharing the imaginary weight of guilt, which would indeed be unthinkable, but rather to 
have his persecutors negated in a very particular way. Amery is only too painfully aware 
that his resentment is likely to be mistaken for a “barbaric, primitive lust for revenge.” In 
his words, “it is not easy to reject the reproach that so simplifies the problem, and it is 
entirely impossible for me to refute the suspicion that I am drowning the ugly reality of a 
malicious instinct in the verbal torrent of an unverifiable thesis,”329 i.e., revenge. It is not 
easy to demonstrate that the affect in question is in fact moral. Yet, this is the challenge 
that needs to be taken up in order to make visible what Amery calls “the moral truth of 
the conflict.”330 Indeed, 
Améry believes as little in the possibility of revenge as in the idea of atonement, 
which he describes as dubious from the outset: at the most, he considers it of 
theological significance and therefore irrelevant to him. The issue, then, is not to 
resolve but to reveal the conflict. The spur of resentment which Améry conveys to 
us in his polemic demands recognition of the right to resentment, entailing no less 
than a programmatic attempt to sensitize the consciousness of a people “already 
rehabilitated by time.”331 
 
As Amery further points out, objectivity is out of place in the matters that concern 
political persecution, violence, and suffering. We could say that objectivity cannot reveal 
these phenomena as they really are, in the way they are given to human beings, just as it 
cannot make visible the subjective experience of the victim. As Amery explains, “the 
atrocity as atrocity has no objective character. Mass murder, torture, injury of every kind 
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are objectively nothing but chains of physical events…. they are facts within a physical 
system, not deeds within a moral system.”332 The perpetrators see their actions only as 
expressions of their will, not as moral events. The function of Amery’s resentments is to 
establish a moral reality for the criminal and, I would argue, witnesses to suffering as 
well.  
In other words, it is subjectivity or internality that is tasked with assigning moral 
values to objective events. It is subjectivity that is given the last word here, the 
subjectivity of the victim that can never experience its own suffering as comparable to the 
suffering of others. It is worth emphasizing here that it is not my intention to frame the 
different experiences of suffering as isolated, completely non-relational entities, akin to 
Leibniz’s windowless monads. Rather, I am proposing that it is the internal experience of 
the specific, singular circumstances surrounding this or that instance of suffering that 
refuses neutralization, comparability, and the drive to universalize it into an abstraction. 
We might say that painful stimuli do in fact affect humans and animals alike, equally and 
invariably. Yet, we rise in moral revolt precisely when the specificity undergirding one’s 
encounter with the unbearable nature of suffering falls into oblivion. For instance, 
someone who has been repeatedly traumatized in the past is likely to experience the new 
trauma very differently from someone who has been enjoying a fairly untroubled 
existence and good health up until this moment of personal wounding. The experience of 
someone whose suffering failed to gain proper recognition, whose suffering simply went 
unnoticed, is necessarily and qualitatively different from someone whose pain occasioned 
an increased level of support and subsequent mitigation. 
                                                
332 Ibid., 70. 
 161 
This is what might be called the interior truth of the matter, the truth that there is a 
decisive variation and difference in every instance of suffering. The exterior truth of it 
(‘exterior’ as ‘worldly’), as I will attempt to show later, is that the world itself is ill-
equipped to recognize someone’s suffering on its own terms, without subsuming it under 
the rubric of universality and equivalence. The bigger claim here is that the suffering that 
feels singular subjectively reflects the fact that some people are more vulnerable than 
others, that some get relief much faster than others. This truth is expressed internally 
because it has no voice in the outside world, with its sovereignty of the biological time of 
healing. While the victim is chained to the past, “the natural time-sense is ultimately 
future oriented… it is oriented towards continued survival, self-betterment and self-
empowerment,”333 which is also to say, forgetting.  
As Amery explains, what is at stake in holding on to one’s suffering is neither the 
blind thirst for revenge nor atonement. Poignantly, “the experience of persecution was, at 
the very bottom, that of an extreme loneliness. At stake for me is the release from the 
abandonment that has persisted from that time until today.”334 When the repeated 
murderer and torturer Wajs faced execution as the final punishment for his crimes, he, 
Amery believes, experienced the moral truth of his crimes, if only for a second. Perhaps 
what he hoped sounds something like this, 
in the 20th century, when denunciation, abandonment, and horror ravaged the 
world, and when the evil-doers did not tremble at their misdeeds, is it truly the 
moral law in oneself that elicits a feeling of shame, sometimes at least, and only 
for a moment? Or, as the terrible story of V. Grossman suggests, is it not the 
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experience of the infinite in the form of the innocent condemned man looking at 
him, that, momentarily, troubles the guilty man? Ivan Grigoryevich, in Leningrad 
after twenty years in the Gulag, meets his denouncer, who, during that time, has 
prospered. With alert and sad curiosity Ivan Grigoryevich looked unreproachfully 
into Penegin eyes. And Pinegin for one second only, just for one second or 
perhaps two, felt he would gladly sacrifice his country house, his government 
decorations and honors, his authority and his power, his strength, his beautiful 
wife, his successful sons engaged in studying the nucleus of the atom—that he 
would gladly give up every last bit of it, just so as not to feel those eyes resting 
upon him.335 
 
This is about one’s sincere, passionate willingness to sacrifice everything to not be 
plagued by the innocence of the man this person irreparably, terribly wronged. At this 
admittedly imagined moment of Wajs’s desire to undo his own actions, Amery’s 
loneliness was lifted and he was no longer alone in the sheer physical brutality of his 
torture. Therefore, Amery’s desperate fantasy is that the executioner joins the victim in 
the overwhelming regret concerning what has happened. This, indeed, is the peculiar way 
in which the reality of the criminal is negated. Put otherwise, this negation is not the 
death penalty, but remorse and a desire for a radically different agency. 
However, the imagined regret of one individual cannot drown out the din of those 
who talk excitedly about reconciliation and the break from the unfortunate past. What 
kind of person would want reconciliation? As Amery explains,  
whoever submerges his individuality in society and is able to comprehend himself 
only as a function of the social, that is, the insensitive and indifferent person, 
really does forgive. He calmly allows what happened to remain what it was. As 
the popular saying goes, he lets time heal his wounds. His time-sense is not dis-
ordered, that is to say, it has not moved out of the biological and social sphere into 
the moral sphere.336 
 
Here the full force and originality of his contribution to the question of resentment start 
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coming to the fore. The refusal to forgive is the refusal of the biological time, i.e., the 
time that is nothing more than a linear, indifferent succession of events. Within the logic 
of the biological or natural time, the punishment that is temporally distant from the crime 
loses any meaning. Indeed, “one cannot demand in relation to the past; the irreversible is 
what cannot be turned around; the events of the past are what cannot be undone.”337 Yet, 
this logic is irrelevant for “the person who perceives himself to be morally unique.”338 To 
become and remain moral is to inhabit a different, relentlessly isolating order of affective 
temporality and it is in this sense that resentment “arises to the status of ethical 
protest.”339  
By contrast, “natural consciousness of time actually is rooted in the physiological 
process of wound-healing and became part of the social conception of reality. But 
precisely for this reason it is not only extramoral, but also antimoral in character.”340 
Thus, what Amery is claiming here is that following the natural course of natural time, 
idly and effortlessly, runs counter to morality itself. “Man has the right and the 
privilege,” he goes on to say, “to declare himself to be in disagreement with every natural 
occurrence, including the biological healing that time brings about.”341 Once again, what 
is at stake here is the refusal to become unchained from the past and to forget its 
horrendous injustices. It is the refusal to make past suffering meaningful so as to move 
forward, to turn it into a story, to integrate it into the continuity of one’s life narrative. As 
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Amery submits, “the moral power to resist contains the protest, the revolt against reality, 
which is rational only as long as it is moral.”342  
 To return to Ophir for a moment, we could say that Amery is rebelling against the 
time that congeals all that happens into necessity, the time that is homogenous or non-
porous, foreclosing the possibility of any intervention. This is not the affective 
temporality that can be made to last in order to prolong the person’s joy or fractured in 
order to introduce an element of difference in the person’s experience of suffering as 
homogenous duration, but the time that always marches onward. I thus submit that 
Amery is revolting against the idea that things could not have been otherwise, that there 
was a necessity to them, that the time of the world unfolds in a way that is inherently 
amoral, since it never tarries in the face of violence and injustice. The crime of biological 
time is that it threatens to sweep us away from what defined our inner reality. In other 
words, he protests against the naturalization of evils and their forgetting in the name of 
progress. 
It is worth noting that those against whom Amery wields the force of his 
resentment are not the specific individuals who personally inflicted torture upon him.343 
Had this been the case, the weight of the past could have been lifted once the individuals 
directly responsible for his suffering received their due punishment. The true object of his 
resentment is the German nation itself, which brings us to the question of collective guilt. 
The notion of collective guilt is meaningless if it is grounded in the idea that the German 
people possessed a common consciousness and a common will, which moved them to 
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commit their crimes. As Arendt succinctly puts it, “where all are guilty, nobody is.”344 
The total guilt of a people finds its origin in individual guilty conduct, when it is 
experienced summarily, such as “guilt of deed, guilt of omission, guilt of utterance, guilt 
of silence.”345 More precisely, “knowing, without acting, grants acceptable to the 
action.”346 Indeed, it remains puzzling how millions of people claimed to be blind to the 
events that surround them. Many German did, in fact, claimed with an utmost sincerity 
that they had no idea whatsoever of what was going on, but one is justifiably skeptical of 
such claims. In a word, collective guilt is specific and statistical, comprised of individual 
decisions and a million of individual acts.  
However, statistical guilt can be only vague and uncertain, since “precise figures 
are lacking, and no one can determine how many Germans recognized, approved, or 
themselves committed the crimes of National Socialism, or in helpless revulsion allowed 
them to pass in their name.” The true number of the participants in the murderous 
political regime is bound to remain vague, but this is beside the point. As Amery claims, 
“every one of us victims had his own statistical experience, even if it was only 
approximate and cannot be expressed in numbers.”347 In other words, every victim 
acutely felt the general number of those who attempted to come to their aid and those 
who tormented them. The people who revolted in the face of terror and violence were 
undeniably, tragically fewer than those who did not. 
The individuals who did attempt to help were, however, nothing more than a 
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minority amidst the majority who actively participated or at least condoned the 
totalitarian regime with its rampant murders and atrocities. Crucially, these benevolent, 
moral individuals did not tip the scale. The decency displayed by a small group of people 
could not overshadow the vast majority who participated in torture and murder. What 
might, prima facie, seem like a facile, even anti-intellectual quantification on Amery’s 
part is nothing, however, other than a mundane act of judgment. The democratic 
statesman has to deal with quantities just as much as the surgeon who must assess a 
malignant tumor.348 “I, too,” Amery writes, “had to determine the quantity of good 
comrades on the one hand and of the scoundrels and indifferent ones on the other when, 
in the midst of the German people, I had to reckon every moment with falling victim to 
ritual mass murder.”349  
What I want to suggest and even insist on is that Amery’s suffering pointed 
beyond itself in that it referenced those who exercised their agency to help and those who 
did not.350 This was not a neutral observation that happened to ‘accompany’ his 
experience of suffering, not by a long shot. Rather, it was woven into that very 
experience, becoming its very tissue and the passionate judgment concerning the other’s 
agency that either failed or came to life. If suffering is the duration of the encounter with 
the unbearable, each instance of it becomes synonymous with one’s absence or failure to 
offer relief and to exercise judgment about the acceptability of this instance of 
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suffering.351 Describing his experience of torture, Amery speaks of the trust in the world 
that had been irrevocably broken.352 Indeed, “the expectation of help, the certainty of 
help, is indeed one of the fundamental experiences of human beings, and probably also of 
animals…. The expectation of help is as much a constitutional psychic element as is the 
struggle for existence.”353 However, he goes on to say, “with the first blow from a 
policeman's fist, against which there can be no defense and which no helping hand will 
ward off, a part of our life ends and it can never again be revived.”354 Torture means the 
end of the belief in an other’s benevolent agency, that someone will come to your rescue. 
It means that “with the experience of torture… trust is lost, never to be regained, even if 
the victim can regain some sense of his intrinsic self-worth, he will no longer have the 
confidence that it will matter to others….”355 Instead, the act of physical violence shatters 
one’s sense of agency, by pinning the individual against his or her physicality, or 
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highlights the agency that remains passive in the face of suffering, forever dividing 
human beings into those who allow evil to happen and those who revolt against it, even if 
it means the smallest act of kindness. (Incidentally, in Hannah Arendt’s words, “it is as 
though mankind had divided itself between those who believe in human omnipotence…. 
and those for whom powerlessness has become the major experience in their lives.”)356 
There is no middle ground, not after the experience of tremendous evil inflicted on one 
human being by another. While there is a number of discussions surrounding Amery’s 
notion of “losing trust in the world,”357 I am concerned that the problematic is not 
formulated clearly and concretely enough. Instead, I interpret this notion as losing 
fundamental trust in the moral agency and judgment of others. 
Thus, I argue that the subjective experience of the victim is also crucially 
characterized by the razor-sharp affect directed at those who could have helped but did 
not. The victim sees other human beings first and foremost as agents, as those who could 
have tipped the scale, who could have made the world livable for the victim in the wake 
of suffering, but failed to. Which is to say that the sufferer sees others primarily as 
radically free, since it is precisely the exercise of their freedom that condemns the victim 
to abandonment and extreme loneliness or offers them a glimpse of humanity and 
decency. The experience of the victim reveals to us the raw and lucid moment of 
freedom, the freedom of acting otherwise, the moment that social, political, and 
theoretical forces, conjoined with the existing power relations, want us to forget.  
In other words, 
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of all the inmates who struggled with whether the Holocaust was evil, only Mr. 
Smith said, “Sure it was evil. Even if most Germans didn’t do anything bad. It’s 
evil if you just don’t care about others.” It was a simple statement, but few 
informants, inmate or free, uttered its like. The tone was new. He was not talking 
only about responsibility. He was talking about regret, about how sad and tough it 
is to live in a world where people just don’t care.358 
 
Despite the strangeness of calling the evil nature of the Holocaust into question, or, more 
precisely, posing it as a question, the investigation into the recurring coupling of evil and 
indifference is, nevertheless, yet to be undertaken, together with a rigorous study of its 
effects on the victims of indifference in the face of evil or indifference as evil.  
However, it is Amery himself who ends up being burdened with the weight of 
collective guilt, not those responsible for what was inflicted on him and millions of others 
and not those who failed to rise in protest against ritual mass murder. “The world,” he 
writes, “which forgives and forgets, has sentenced me, not those who murdered or 
allowed the murder to occur.”359 More precisely, the world now takes the side of the 
young generation of Germans who, strictly speaking, have indeed very little to do with 
the crimes of their fathers. Unlike Amery, the world is not chained to the cross of its past 
crimes, no matter their monstrosity or magnitude. Put otherwise, the past is “not of our 
doing, not within our power to change or control (except by means of interpretation and 
appropriation), and does not directly touch on us. This attitude sanctions the growing 
indifference of younger generations to the past.”360 
The inevitable succession of generations, not in the more abstract sense of the 
arrow of time flying forever forward, but in the specific sense of Germany’s young 
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people wanting to live their lives, is perhaps the most difficult challenge Amery has to 
take up. His experience of torture is quickly disappearing into the impenetrable, blackest 
depth of the immovable past. How can Amery defend his stance in the face of those who, 
in the universally shared predicament of irreversibility and mortality, cannot possibly 
undo the deeds and sins of their fathers? How can he hold the younger generation 
accountable for the events that are receding into the temporal distance? Indeed, how can 
the past itself be put on trial? Amery’s task is to defend his resentments in the face of the 
future that is incessantly and irrevocably neutralizing the events of the past. 
It is at this point that the question Amery addresses becomes that of history itself. 
To his mind, the rejection of healing that the natural or biological time (the time, we 
recall, whose nature is antimoral) brings about has a particular historical function, the 
possibility of imagining history otherwise. More precisely, if the refusal to heal were to 
fulfill its task, “it could historically represent, as a stage of the world’s moral dynamics of 
progress, the German revolution that did not take place.”361 The resistance to natural 
forgetting and the rebellion against biological time would allow for a re-imagining of 
history from a moral standpoint.362 Amery’s demand does indeed appear impossible, for 
his demand is to change the immutable past. 
As he proceeds to state, the German people are to become “sensitive to the fact 
that they cannot allow a piece of their national history to be neutralized by time, but must 
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integrate it.”363 What remains to be examined here is the nature of this integration, i.e., 
the becoming-moral of history, the way Amery sees it. What has to be altered, if the 
world is to acknowledge the predicament of the victims of political persecution and of 
other calamities, is the people’s relation to history. According to Amery, “on the field of 
history there would occur what I hypothetically described earlier for the limited, 
individual circle: two groups of people, the overpowered and those who overpowered 
them, would be joined in the desire that time be turned back and, with it, that history 
become moral.”364 The relation to history he is articulating here is the desire to undo its 
catastrophes and to reverse its crimes. In other words, he’s calling for the vision of 
history as what ought not to have happened, as a moral failure of innumerable 
individuals. These individuals were not simply swept up by monstrous events. They made 
decisions and choices, the choices for which Amery is now holding them accountable. If 
history is to become moral, it is to resurrect the agency of each and every individual, to 
see every one of them as capable of judgment and action. Indeed, the way in which I am 
interpreting the notion of history here is the totality of human actors and their choices. To 
rewrite history is to envision human being assuming their radical freedom, not as a 
handful of ‘decent individuals,’ but as a majority and as a nation.  
What we thus put on trial is the sweeping failure of agency. 
In other words, what Amery is calling for is the desire for a different and 
impossible temporal order, the order where human beings would have acted under the 
sign of moral urgency. The duration of his torment could have been disrupted, fractured, 
alleviated, thus demonstrating the moral agency of others. As human beings, we cannot 
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transcend what is impossible, but we become human and, according to Amery, moral, in 
desiring to. As Zolkos puts it, Amery’s “catastrophic testimony accentuates the 
asymmetrical and ‘infinitely demanding’ claims of wounded subjectivity, rather than the 
possibilities of ever achieving dyadic symmetry between self and Other.”365 The 
possibility of symmetry is forced into crisis because what Amery demands is the 
impossible reversal of time and radically different agency. However, it is worth noting 
that Amery’s moral desires are exactly the opposite of being ‘infinitely demanding.’ His 
demand for radical agency is inseparable from the helping person’s brutally honest 
assessment of his or her capacity to offer relief, so that Amery’s vision of ethics is rooted 
in a viable notion of agency, in what one specific person can do. To put it bluntly, infinite 
demands call for an ethical subject that can never exist, for he or she is stripped of human 
limitations.366 
However, let me say more about Amery’s demand for the impossible, so as to 
give it more specificity and situate it in the world. The problem with the prevailing 
accounts, as I see it, is that the affective call for the impossible is evocative and yet 
ultimately empty. To speak fast and loose, this wishful thinking, this thinking oriented 
toward the impossible, however courageous and defiant it may be, tells us nothing about 
the ways to halt or prevent the production of suffering or about the moral agency of 
others in the position to offer relief. Furthermore, it is equally difficult to imagine a moral 
response to the one who remains chained to the cross of the past if ‘all’ they are asking is 
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the impossible reversal of time. After all, the past cannot be the source of change for the 
victim or anyone at all for that matter. What I want to do here is to shift our attention 
even further from the problem of history to that of agency.  
In other words, I want to interpret the desire for the impossible, a reversal of time, 
as demanding the recognition of contingency (the idea that the past could have been 
otherwise) and agency. In short, it is about seeing others, first and foremost, as agents. If 
one’s suffering is to be addressed adequately, if it is to recognize and brought back into 
the worldly community in a meaningful way, it is to reject any excuse not to be an agent. 
The affective reality of the victim is that everyone is an agent, to a greater or lesser 
degree, that they are not chained to the moment of agony or being reduced to their 
tortured body, that they are capable of acting freely. This affective reality draws a stark 
distinction between those who are crucified by their torment, reduced to their sheer 
physicality, deprived of any agency whatsoever, and those who have at least a minimal 
degree of freedom, including the freedom to recognize and hear a suffering other’s cry 
for help.  
To put it still otherwise, the sufferer’s reality becomes the devastating dichotomy 
between their own cruel, meaningless powerlessness and the capacity to act on the part of 
others that is not crushed by senseless violence. We could say that the sufferer has the 
keenest, sharpest insight into the possibility and impossibility of action, the pure 
possibility or impossibility twisted free of social habits, one’s disposition, and a veil of 
justifications. Thus, the victim sees others as having the basic choice, simply by virtue of 
not being incapacitated or annihilated by violence, of helping or not helping, of acting or 
failing to act. The sufferer has the unique perspective on the agency of others precisely 
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because he or she viscerally knows what it means to not have any agency whatsoever.  
Indeed, addressing the question of violence and its destruction of subjectivity or 
inner life, Weil sublimely speaks of 
the other force, the force that does not kill, i.e., that does not kill just yet. It will 
surely kill, it will possibly kill, or perhaps it merely hangs, poised and ready, over 
the head of the creature it can kill, at any moment, which is to say at every 
moment. In whatever aspect, its effect is the same: it turns a man into a stone. 
From its first property (the ability to turn a human being into a thing by the simple 
method of killing him) flows another, quite prodigious too in its own way, the 
ability to turn a human being into a thing while he is still alive.367 
 
This is the true work of suffering and violence and this is what it means to have no 
agency of any kind. Its deadliest assault on human existence is to turn a living being into 
a stone, with no interiority. 
I submit that the radical agency in question, the agency that may well have been 
born in the victim’s imagination or perhaps even hallucination under the yoke of 
unbearable torment, must be taken up as a moral challenge, it must be learned, practiced, 
and internalized, since otherwise the sufferer is condemned to feeling forever distanced 
from the world, as long as human beings evade their agency, sometimes out of 
indifference, sometimes out of malice, sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes out of not 
knowing what it is like to be stripped of any agency at all.368 In other words, our 
understanding of agency and responsibility must be cultivated on the basis of the victim’s 
affective reality. The sufferer will remain forever lonely if individuals transfer their 
responsibility to ‘the system’ or ignorance. This agency is rooted not in some objective 
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freedom, not in the illusion of a self-sufficient individual, but in the moral demand and 
the tormented reality of the sufferer. To do justice to it and to bring the victim back into 
the shared world is to respond to the victim’s demand for radical agency and 
responsibility.  
Crucially, “perhaps this is one of the most important experiences known to man 
and beast. The need to seek someone’s help and receive it, out of sheer generosity and 
understanding. Perhaps it is worth being born in order to make a silent plea and be 
heard.”369 We owe this fundamentally central experience of moral agency to multiple 
suffering others. To hear your call for relief find a compassionate, practically inflected 
answer is to have the kind of moral experience that greatly determines the affective 
‘afterlife’ of an event of suffering. 
Thus, Amery’s desire for the impossible is the desire that the human beings had 
acted otherwise. It is the desire that others had attempted to alleviate his agony and that 
the scale had been tipped. What we learn from Amery’s affective reality is that while we 
cannot change our past actions, we can inhabit the present in the way Amery would want 
us to, as those who are not mere bystanders to suffering, as agents. This assumption of 
radical agency (the agency that refuses any facile excuses and will not be duped into 
docility and compliance) is inherently moral, for we come into our freedom for the sake 
of the victims and for the sake of lifting their deep loneliness by recognizing their 
experience. Thus, I believe the question here is not one of lamenting one’s past moral 
failures, not only wishing to have acted otherwise, but relating to one’s past failures 
morally by exercising one’s agency in response to ongoing suffering, not later, not 
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tomorrow, but now. 
Finally, I would like to venture the idea, which I believe is the silent crux of 
Amery’s resentments, that what truly hurts and what binds the victim to the past is not so 
much brute physical pain, i.e., the moment of torture itself. Rather, it is the pain that 
comes from knowing, knowing deeply, viscerally, and inescapably, deep in your bones, 
that others could have done something about your suffering, but did not. It is the victim’s 
futile, desperate, tormenting question, “Why didn’t you?” It is this realization that rips 
you to shreds, that causes the deepest resentments, that confines you to the greatest 
solitude. It is the gnawing suspicion that the others who were absent, chose to be absent, 
either out of cowardice, indifference, or fear. To return to Ophir for a moment, we can 
say that “someone who is blind to the presence of evils does not stop being involved in 
the production of injustice and wrong because of that.”370 In other words, the presence or 
absence of others during one’s suffering has far-reaching consequences for how the 
sufferer will inhabit in the world after the initial time of agony.371  
Thus, the least we can do in response to the victim’s torment is to become the 
agents the victims want us to be, the agents who relate to their past failure not through the 
solemnity and passivity of mourning, but through exercising their ability to intervene in 
ongoing evils, i.e., recognizing the superfluity of evils and the contingency of time, such 
that it is not a mere succession of moments, unidirectional and identical in their form, but 
affectively plastic and open to human intervention. Insofar as human beings assume their 
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freedom to act otherwise in the face of suffering, it is possible that the victim’s access to 
the future will be restored. In other words, if human beings begin to act in accordance 
with the victim’s affective reality, the victim may begin to believe that others will act 
otherwise precisely as a response to their past sins of inaction and complicity, thus 
joining the victim in a moral protest against indifference and changing the moral fabric 
both of the present and the future. Similar to Ophir’s demand, we learn to inhabit the 
present in such a way as to prevent or minimize ongoing evils, i.e., to see the evils 
transpiring in the present from the standpoint of superfluity and moral urgency. 
Amery’s powerful and deeply disconsoling essay concludes with the poignant 
admission that “all recognizable signs suggest that natural time will reject the moral 
demands of our resentment and finally extinguish them.”372 The atrocities committed in 
the Nazi Germany are bound to lose their singular character and to be forced under a 
general category of the “Century of Barbarism.” The victims will dissolve “into 
homogenous neutrality of the universal survival and the ability of the social whole to 
critically hold the past to account.”373 Furthermore, the singular fate of a multitude of 
victims will be lost in the figure of the universal victim. Amery is prescient in his 
resignation that the people will not be truly shaken by their failure to halt ongoing evil 
before it was too late, before the plasticity of the present, i.e., its ability to go either way, 
either toward reducing ongoing evils or increasing them. In short, the world will forget 
and Amery has no illusions about that. The immensity and monstrosity of the biological 
                                                
372 Amery, “Resentments,” At the Mind’s Limits, 79. 
373 Philipa Rothfield, “The Singular Case of Jean Amery,” On Amery, 223. 
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time-sense is, Amery concludes, insurmountable and his voice will soon appear.374  
Indeed, Amery “was not unsure about the moral legitimacy of his rebellion 
against appeals to forgive or forget, but he did become resigned with regard to the hope 
that his protest and call for accountability would be heard. In 1978, at age sixty-six, 
Amery took his own life in a hotel room in Salzburg.”375 In his words, the resentments of 
the victims, which he powerfully and unflinchingly calls the “emotional source of every 
genuine morality,” a morality for the losers, have “little or no chance at all to make the 
evil work of the overwhelmers bitter for them.”376 The efforts to make history and the 
countless individuals comprising it moral are bound to be futile, and yet, they are morally 
necessary.377 It is undeniable that there is stark “evidence of grief in Amery’s essay,” the 
grief that is “surely visible and especially apparent his preoccupation with, indeed 
valorization of, the dark emotions of pain and resentment as well as in his sense of 
hopelessness reflected in what he believed was the collapse of the social contract and in 
his final resignation.”378 In other words, Amery essentially abandons any hope that 
                                                
374 While Minkkinen writes that “ressentiment is… an expression of the death instinct 
and, consequently, a symptom of the victim’s original trauma,” I disagree with this 
clearly Freudian reading. I believe that Amery refused to distance himself from his 
‘unseemly’ resentments because he was attempting to communicate his predicament as 
lucidly as possible, in order to be heard. See Minkkinen, “Ressentiment as Suffering,” 
Law & Literature, 527. 
375 Brudholm, “Revisiting Resentments,” Journal of Human Rights, 8. 
376 Amery, “Resentments,” At the Mind’s Limits, 81. 
377 Perhaps we can restate this as follows, to pry into Amery’s affective logic a bit 
further: it is the world that sees healing as inevitable, not the victim him- or herself. For 
Amery, healing was nothing short of impossible. We could thus say that it is forcing the 
form of inevitability-as-healing on one’s suffering that Amery is rebelling against. After 
all, is this inevitability not illusory when it is a simple fact that some victims do not 
recover or heal at all? 
378 Dennis Klein, “Resentment and Recognition: Toward A New Conception of Amery At 
the Mind Limits,” On Jean Amery, 98. 
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human beings will never take up radical agency the way it is experienced by the sufferer, 
by recognizing the moral truth of the victim’s predicament, just as he rejects the belief 
that the biological time can ever be destabilized by malleable, affective temporality. He 
gives up the hope that others will realize that simply extending a helping hand to a 
suffering other can give rise to an affectively different experience of time for the victim, 
i.e., the hope that we can become participants in the production of affective temporality, 
thus de-naturalizing and politicizing it. 
While Amery locates the problem in the seemingly inevitable conflict between the 
moral time of the sufferer and the biological time that promises healing to all, I want to 
suggest that the affect of resentment signals not only a failure of agency on behalf of 
those who could have helped the victim, i.e., misrecognition of time as an inexorable, 
unalterable, non-human or inhuman force, forever resistant to any human intervention, 
but also, crucially, a chasm between the experience of the victim and the socio-political 
forms of its recognition or lack thereof. Put otherwise, the work of resentment is to make 
visible the insufficiency and the inadequacy of the existing forms of recognition when it 
comes to grasping and bearing witness to individual, singular suffering. The world ought 
to differentiate and respond differently to those sufferers who were fortunate enough to 
make their predicament visible, evoke offers of relief from their addresses, and those who 
continue suffering from neglect even after their initial event of torment, whatever form it 
may have taken. For instance, one person’s event of suffering may be the onset of an 
incurable illness and there is, at least as far as we know at the present, nothing man-made 
about it. In this case, the time between the initial event and relief (e.g., medical attention, 
pain management, and social support) is fortunately short. However, imagine a situation 
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where an incurably ill person is denied both medical care and social support. The evil that 
accumulates in the gap between their first moment of suffering and the significantly 
deferred relief is entirely superfluous. I thus submit that Amery’s demand for the 
impossible is an invitation to study the worldly expressions of suffering and its 
situatedness as specifically and concretely as we can.  
What this means is that resentment, far from being an irrational, thoughtless 
affect, one in need of clinical intervention, draws our attention to the gap between a more 
or less physical, brute instance of suffering, the suffering whose possibility undergirds all 
human bodies, and the singular, specific resonances it causes in the world. We can further 
speculate if the very split into moral and biological time is not itself socially produced or, 
at the very least, exacerbated by the existing socio-political conditions. When a society, 
comprised of concrete human beings, subsumes its agency under the rubric of progress 
and healing, such that there is no moral need to act otherwise (after all, the victims will 
‘recover’ on their own, thanks to the healing of natural time), the view of time as 
universal and a-political becomes entrenched even deeper into the social and experiential 
fabric, making affective time into something idiosyncratic and stripped of any moral 
significance. However, the society that recognizes time as the element where we have the 
chance to stop evils from happening, where we become moral participants in the weaving 
of affective time, holds the promise of approximating and alleviating the affective reality 
of the victims.  
I also want to add that a chasm between the experience of the victim and the 
worldly forms of its recognition is due to our current inability and lack of an appropriate 
sensibility when it comes to responding to moral urgency and to differentiate between its 
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intensities. We will learn to recognize the specificity of every instance of suffering once 
we begin to evaluate it from the standpoint of urgency, acknowledging the fact that some 
people need relief right now, that telling them that their suffering is no more special or 
urgent than that of others is essentially letting them die. Thus, Amery’s steadfast refusal 
to let go of his resentments also calls forth for a different vision of the suffering one. 
According to this vision, victims are not equalized in their suffering and the harsh truth of 
resentment is that some victims are in a far more urgent situation than others. Treating the 
victims as if there were a universal imprint of violence on their minds and bodies means 
the estrangement of victims both from the world and from each other. 
To say more about the alleged equivalence of victims, I submit that suffering is 
never ‘only’ suffering, like some kind of experiential island, forever suspended in a 
socio-political vacuum, divorced from the specificity of its occurrence and context. The 
‘dumb’ pain that comes from a treacherous knife wound does not allow any 
differentiation between sufferers nor does it draw the socio-political dimension into its 
orbit. Thus, we move away the language of universal vulnerability, construed as follows, 
what is it in the experience of vulnerability that might lead us to treat the other, 
indeed any Other wherever and whoever they are, as deserving an ethical 
response from us, moreover, a response that reveals our own potential 
vulnerability at their hands?” As experience of injury can be an opportunity for 
self-reflection about our fundamental dependency on and primary vulnerability to 
others, so can it generate “an apprehension of common human vulnerability….379 
 
What this is saying is that an experience of suffering initiates us into the universal 
vulnerability that we all share, i.e., an event of injury intrudes into our illusion of relative 
safety. In other words, Butler’s thesis is that “vulnerability, understood in physical and 
                                                
379 George Shulman, “On Vulnerability as Judith Butler’s Language of Politics: From 
Excitable Speech to Precarious Life,” Women's Studies Quarterly 39 (1–2): pp. 227- 235.  
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corporeal terms, configures a human condition in which it is the relation to the other that 
counts, that allows an ontology of linkage and dependence to come to the fore.”380 
According to this logic, recognizing our own vulnerability creates an important ethical 
bond between ourselves and others, as if the immediacy of the experience of our well-
being were not much more powerful than the prospect of the loss of health. However, 
instead of mobilizing our cognitive and affective forces to make visible the 
precariousness that presumably erases the difference between a neighbor and a stranger, a 
friend and an enemy, a lawful citizen and a pariah, to humanize those who are otherwise 
seen as subhuman or inferior, I suggest a transition to responses to and contextualizations 
of that vulnerability and its worldly differentiation. It is to transition from a trace of 
violence or even the universal predicament of our bodily fragility to the circumstances 
surrounding it. Some circumstances demand moral urgency and an affective 
reorganization of time, while others allow for a degree of deferral. This is something we 
cannot know in advance, but only after a careful assessment and our best judgment 
concerning every situation.  
Let me briefly discuss how the notion of vulnerability applies to the disabled. The 
argument goes that the disabled remind us of the transience of our health, of the universal 
horizon of decline and death that we, healthy or not so much, are all facing. After all, 
“death is the law-the ordinance of our existence.”381 The work of this reminder is to 
minimize the social and interpersonal gap between the able-bodied and the disabled, such 
that the latter become welcomed in the human community. However, according to the 
disability scholar Sue Halpern, 
                                                
380 Cavarero, Horrorism, 21. 
381 Lingis, Deathbound Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1989), 109. 
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physical health is contingent and often short-lived. But this truth eludes us as long 
as we are able to walk by simply putting one foot in front of the other. As a 
consequence, empathy for the disabled is unavailable to most able-bodied 
persons. Sympathy, yes, empathy, no, for every attempt to project oneself into 
that condition, to feel what it is like not to be ambulatory, for instance, is 
mediated by an ability to walk.382 
 
The very possibility of losing one’s health is erased by the lived, immediate experience of 
one’s current bodily integrity. Similarly, recognizing that one will at some point face 
decline and poor health will always be negated by the immediacy of one’s current well-
being. As such, this recognition remains formal and fails to incite moral conduct. Put 
otherwise, our knowledge that we are all subject to eventual decline is empty, without an 
experiential confirmation. 
Returning to the social and interpersonal reception of suffering (indeed, we may 
say that society, and not only a clinical setting, is the only true receptacle of suffering and 
the awakening of agency is the only true response to it) we can say that while suffering is 
a physical, even neutral, impersonal occurrence, its ripples are inherently social, 
fortuitous, and singular. The very experience of suffering, the psychic wound, is thus 
inseparable from the efforts to prevent it and the actions taken in its aftermath. An event 
of suffering can become an occasion for a lot of different things, e.g., heightened support, 
compensation, visibility, attention, abandonment, even social or actual death, all of which 
are related to the distribution of privileges and modes of recognition, to the way society 
recognizes some victims but not others. Indeed, some victims become visible in their 
suffering and some slip into deadly obscurity. As long as we focus on the moment of 
agony or trauma alone, we allow for the inequality of recognition and remediation vis-à-
                                                
382 Susan Wendell, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability,” ed. Lennard Davis, The 
Disability Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 247.  
 184 
vis the victims. 
Stated more provocatively, suffering, taken in isolation, does not make you a 
victim and it does not always warrant acting under the sign of urgency. The bearers of 
moral resentment rise in protest against the assertion that suffering automatically equals 
victimhood. The jolt of suffering is fundamentally equalizing, for joy and pain have been 
part and parcel of human existence since time immemorial. Indeed, “feelings of pain or 
pleasure or some quality in between are the bedrock of our minds.”383 If being human 
means embracing the universality of suffering and the predicament of any human being 
out of our initiation into our finitude, if being human means placing hope for morality in 
our vulnerability, being more than human means de-naturalizing both ourselves and 
temporality, it means seeing beyond what is universal to all of us in order to recognize 
the superfluous, unnecessary, human-made suffering. Thus, it is also embracing radically 
different responses to this suffering. Which is to say that we must examine what comes 
before and after an event of injury, since it does not become equally visible or 
recognizable for everyone and it is only some people who have access to support 
channels and mechanisms of alleviation. We must see through the overwhelming chaos 
of suffering others, indistinguishable in the din of their pleas for help, in order to discern 
and judge (as Ophir puts it, “the suspension of judgment is a form of torture”384) those 
singular others who cannot wait and whose incite of moral urgency in their addresses.385 
We must examine one’s life before and one’s life after, in its constitutive embededness in 
                                                
383 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 3. 
384 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 393. 
385 Note that while Amery’s agony originates in his torture, it ultimately becomes the 
experience of profound loneliness, a kind of forced detachment from the world that lacks 
the vocabulary and the means to recognize and mitigate his suffering. 
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the social fabric and the coexistence of multiple others.386 Furthermore, we must judge 
where deferral is merited, to a degree, and where it is morally unacceptable. 
We can draw several key lessons from this examination of the affect of 
resentment. First, I am interpreting Amery’s moral revolt against the natural course of 
time as the revolt against the idea that human beings are not free to act otherwise, that 
failing to exercise one’s agency in the face of evil is a matter of the immutable past and is 
thus best forgotten. In short, it is the revolt against the weak agency that simply goes 
along with the flow of biological time, oblivious to the idea that the desire to undo the 
past means inhabiting the present in such a way that one both experiences and discerns 
moral urgency and responds to it accordingly. In inhabiting the world morally, one relates 
to their tragic failings of the past by de-naturalizing the evils of the present and 
attempting to halt them, keenly aware of their failures and determined not to repeat them 
if at all possible. It is to take up the agency that the victim would have wanted, for failing 
to do so condemns the sufferer and future sufferers you will have a chance to offer relief 
to continued suffering and isolation from their fellow human beings. To expel the victim 
from the community of their fellow human beings is to hide behind the justifications, 
excuses, and reasons not to respond to ongoing evil. It is to de-prioritize the present 
where evils are still unfolding in favor of the fundamentally unchangeable past or abstract 
future others. Here I am amplifying the idea of fracturing one’s duration of suffering by 
arguing that it must be followed by the recognition on the part of others that they can act 
otherwise, i.e., a taking up of their agency. 
                                                
386 I also would like to suggest that framing events of suffering as an initiation into the 
equally shared human condition contributes to the indifference to someone’s pain. After 
all, it is easier to dismiss something overwhelmingly undifferentiated and faceless as 
opposed to shivering limbs, starving bodies, and desperate eyes. 
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I thus submit that only a concrete, embodied suffering other in the present has the 
crucial potential for activating our sense of agency, such that we are forced to evaluate 
what we can and cannot do in order to halt this particular event of evil. In other words, 
only a specific other, not a multitude of others so often seen as the true worthy object of 
heroic actions, becomes paramount to forging the subjectivity that experiences moral 
urgency and that chooses to act so as to not abandon the victims facing what’s further 
than death. (Parenthetically, I would argue that the sense of radical loneliness and 
abandonment continue to grow when you experience your fellow beings hiding under the 
guises of justifications, indifference, their perceived powerlessness vis-à-vis ‘the system,’ 
who remain oblivious to the idea that you are truly deprived of any moral considerations 
and agency,387 if only while the torture lasts.) Furthermore, instead of treating the 
experience of the victims as pathological and irrational, we are to recognize that it is the 
victim him- or herself who has the keenest grasp of the conditions of our agency and we 
are to acknowledge that to not try to live up the victim’s experience (again, in the time of 
suffering, the victim viscerally and irrevocably experiences others as present or absent, as 
moral or anti-moral) of our agency is to propagate further evils. Put otherwise, only a 
concrete suffering other allows us to tap into our agency and to become acting subjects. 
                                                
387 It is worth noting that Rorty defines human being as having a breaking point. In 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty expounds George Orwell’s view of what it 
means to be human. As he puts it, “there is nothing deep inside each of us, no common 
human nature, no built-in human solidarity, to use as a moral reference point.”387 In fact, 
“there is nothing to people except what has been socialized into them….” The only thing 
that we do share with other people as well as with animals is the ability to feel pain. 
Rorty goes on to say, “the worst thing you can do to somebody is not to make her scream 
in agony but to use that agony in such away that even when the agony is over, she cannot 
reconstitute herself.” This is the meaning of humiliation: one is forced to denounce 
oneself, i.e., to denounce one’s fundamental beliefs and uses of language, after which 
there is no return. See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 177. 
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To bypass and ignore a singular suffering, i.e., your friend, your neighbor, a stranger the 
street, is to forego a keen glimpse into our agency and our particular capacities that the 
response to this singular other affords.388 Responding to a concrete other coincides with 
the awakening of moral agency.389 
Thus, Amery’s resentment undermines the equivalence of the victims when we 
continuously fail to take into account the fact that the world can either amplifies one’s 
suffering or redress it. The moral truth of resentment is the blindness that prevents us 
from recognizing that the predicament of some victims is far more urgent than that of 
others. It is calling for a more nuanced optics of suffering. Amery’s resentment thus 
signals our stubborn blindness and unwillingness to differentiate between victims, to strip 
them of the illusion of universality, and to address each victim’s predicament on its own 
terms, in accordance with the degree of its urgency.  
The moral time that Amery feels condemned to, in his solitude, is the time we can 
all share as long as we embrace the Ophirian idea that the time of the present can be 
                                                
388 I would also argue that the thinking that embraces the practice on moral urgency and 
stands on the side of a singular suffering other goes hand in hand with the feeling of an 
almost unbearable weight, for committing to one single person, however great their need 
is, is to knowingly abandon other victims, whose suffering may indeed be more 
efficiently alleviated, but remains suffering nevertheless. However, it is my hope that the 
more we practice moral urgency, the more the importance of saving even one person will 
mitigate the feeling of ‘not doing enough.’ 
389 An unlikely voice echoes a similar idea, presented in religious terms: “it is 
characteristic that Christian terminology knows no “love of mankind.” Its prime concept 
is ‘love of one’s neighbor.’ It is primarily directed at the person and at certain spiritually 
valuable acts… and at ‘man’ only to the degree that he is a person and accomplishes 
these acts, i.e., to the degree to which he realizes the order of the ‘kingdom of God.’ It is 
directed at the ‘neighbors," the "nearest’ visible beings who are alone capable 
of. that deeper penetration into the layer of spiritual personality which is the highest form 
of love. Modern humanitarian love, on the other hand, is only interested in the' sum total 
of human individuals.” Max Scheler, Ressentiment (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette 
University Press), 92. 
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affected, altered, and fractured through the exercise of moral sensibility and the revolt 
against the intolerable. While Amery remains harrowingly lonely in his conviction that 
time ought to be otherwise, Ophir gives us the tools for relating to time morally and 
making it otherwise. Recall that he evaluates catastrophes from the standpoint of moral 
time when he asserts that while the disasters of the past may be more serious, the ongoing 
catastrophes are more important because they can still be halted or reduced. Thus, I 
submit that what Ophir invites us to do is to turn Amery’s time into a sensibility and 
morality.  
In short, the heart of Amery’s resentment (a) calls for differentiating victims 
according to their specific, worldly circumstances, (b) it alerts us to the devastating 
discrepancy between the victim’s poignant, sharp vision of our agency and our habitual 
flight from our capacity to respond to ongoing evil, and (c) it suggests that the truth 
shrouded in affectivity is the truth that has not welcomed in the common thinking of the 
world, the truth that has been exiled because we believe that we are not equipped to 
respond to the victims morally and to evaluate their circumstances. While the victim’s 
experience of our agency may indeed be feverish and hallucinated in their agony, 
refusing to take it up amounts to leaving this victim locked in the futility of their revolt 
against the indifference of others.390 After all, delirium and hallucinations are another 
domain where uncomfortable truths can be exiled to.391 
                                                
390 This is another way of saying that we owe the exercise of our agency to the victims, 
that agency is our moral responsibility. Furthermore, positing its source in the sufferer’s 
delirium or hallucination unmoors this agency what the constraints of what is acceptable, 
reasonable, feasible. 
391 See an excellent discussion in History Beyond Trauma of the ways in which real-life 
tragedies find their expression in the seemingly senseless, delirious words of psychiatric 
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All men must die… but we are not men. If we want to respond to victims justly, 
we must become more than finite beings subject to the same physical predicament such 
as the sensation of pain, aging, and decay, precisely because we have the possibility to be 
moral and therefore to refuse to convert suffering into something abstract and 
neutralized, i.e., into an essentially equalizing occurrence, into the universal bodily 
condition. We have the power and the right to refuse to dissolves suffering without a 
trace into the physical wound or the psychic injury in order to hold on to the surplus of 
suffering stemming from the social inequality of the victims. We have the possibility of 
rejecting the idea of time as universal and inhuman, recognizing that the experience of 
time., i.e., whether it is joyful, unbearable, or imperceptible, is shaped by multiple man-
made factors and is thus open to intervention.  
If we are to take up Amery’s challenge, we need to learn to see ourselves as 
agents, capable of judgment and intervention into the uneven distribution of privileges, 
support mechanisms, and injustices, capable of questioning and redressing the ways in 
which suffering is recognized and alleviated unequally. Our attention is no longer 
centered solely on the initial time of suffering, but on also its subsequent ‘fate.’ This task 
remains impossible as long as we fail to properly situate concrete others in their suffering 
and in their differing worldly circumstances. It remains impossible as long as our 
attention is diverted from a singular suffering other, either toward the opacity of the 
future or society at large. To become more than human is to beyond the universal human 
vulnerability and our shared horizon of death, so as to study the social dimension of each 
instance of suffering and, furthermore, to stop upholding the view that we all partake in 
                                                                                                                                            
patients. Francoise Davoine, and Jean-Max Gaudillière. History Beyond Trauma (Albany: 
Other Press, 2004), Parts I-II. 
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the universal suffering by virtue of being human, at the expense of overlooking socially 
produced suffering, and to put different moral valences on the universally vulnerable 
flesh and the specific circumstances that are causing unnecessary harm.  
To become more than human is to not tap into our universal condition of 
precariousness, in the hope of immediacy of sharing it with all other human beings, but to 
politicize different types of suffering that befall concrete others. Finally, to become more 
than human is resist the temptation to turn finitude into an ethics, just like it is to drive a 
moral wedge between our freedom and our finitude, so that the latter is no longer an 
excuse of doing ‘too little,’ exactly as our finite capacities allow, as if any kind of 
comparison between the mortal and immortal moral subjects were in fact possible or even 
desirable. We are more than human because we refuse to use our finitude either as an 
illusory bond that we all share or as an excuse to do nothing. 
In other words, we cannot become moral agents without positioning a concrete 
suffering other, the person next to us who needs our help, the one before us in pain392  is 
the center of our moral endeavors.393 As Derrida starkly put it, “there is no common 
measure able to persuade me that a personal mourning is less grave than a nuclear 
                                                
392 Cf. Derrida’s provocatively haunting statement, the world ends with each singular 
death. Indeed, “each time, and each time singularly, each time irreplaceably, each time 
infinitely, death is nothing less than the end of the world.” See Jacques Derrida, 
Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, eds. Thomas Dutoit and Outi 
Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 140. 
393 Recalling Ophir’s words that his theory is a kind of “negative utilitarianism,” I want to 
suggest that while utilitarianism correctly focuses on the concrete results and the 
reduction of harms, its aim is to cast its saving net over as many people as possible. This 
makes utilitarianism incompatible with an emphasis on one particular person. As Singer 
argues, we ought to satisfy the greatest number of interests of conscious beings, 
emphasizing the idea that sacrificing our self-interests even minimally can indeed 
significantly maximize the interests of many people. See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 191 
war.”394 Failing to do so means reaffirming the status quo where some victims become 
more visible and others sink into oblivion, rising in a futile revolt against the world that 
failed to recognize the specificity of their suffering, subsuming it under the universally 
shareable wound, i.e., the univocity of the actual or possible injury. Which is to say, 
seeing ourselves simply as fundamentally equal in the face of death or in the throes of 
physical, value-free suffering, such that the singular, worldly circumstances no longer 
truly matter, such that the question of subsequent forgetting or remembering seems 
irrelevant, such that all specificity disintegrates into the ever-receding, universal horizon 
of finitude, is not enough.  
Jean Amery expects more from us.  
Victims expect more from us. 
To take a step back, let us recall that, according to both Spinoza and Ophir, there 
are different types of temporality and that they go hand in hand with particular affects, 
i.e., joy, sorrow, grief, and so on. Amery linked his overwhelming feeling of resentment 
to his peculiar sense of moral time, which set him forever apart from the biological time 
of the world, yet, as we saw, he abandoned the hope that the world would ever recognize 
the existence of multiple temporalities, the moral and the antimoral one. Ophir went 
much further in asserting that it is our moral duty to make space in our thinking and 
practice for understanding possibly lesser evils insofar as they are happening in the 
present. If the superfluity of evils is expressed most sharply and poignantly in the 
                                                
394 Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not Now: Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven 
Missives,” tr. Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Psyche 1: Inventions of the Other, eds. 
Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 
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sufferer’s experience, structurally (the duration of an unbearable excitation) and 
experientially (‘Why won’t you stop this?’), this superfluity speaks in the language of 
intolerable, wounding affects. If the production of damaging superfluity can be stopped 
or altered, we can transform the injurious affects either by changing the circumstances of 
the sufferer or at least by introducing difference into the relentless flow of equally 
tormenting moments. Furthermore, if we reject the idea of suffering as a pure scorching 
intensity, and begin to see it also as a visceral, truly life-changing experience of others as 
either morally absent or present. Taking seriously what might be the fundamental feature 
of the victim’s experience, we are invited to take up the moral challenge of becoming the 
agents the victims hoped us to be. We could say that Amery’s affective truths became 
moral practices in Ophir. 
Finally, affects have as a twofold role to play in the idea of evil as production and 
the role of temporality in it. What I mean here is that most of us who have experienced 
any kind of pain knows that it undoes our mastery and we are overcome with the 
unbearable feeling of “No more!” That gives us the ability to recognize the tormenting, 
saturated temporality of grief, for example, and to make this situation the center of 
intervention or disruption for the sake of the sufferer caught in the seemingly endless 
‘now,’ the incessant return of the same thoughts, feelings, and stabs of pain. Similarly, 
when we manage to alter the feeling of grief even temporally, briefly, fleetingly, we 
reassert the efficacy of our actions vis-à-vis ongoing produced evils, making the equation 
of evil and production into a viable moral model. 
Ophir disintegrates a scene of evil by urging us to study its structure, how it is 
made and produced, so that we know how to abolish it. In other words, he disintegrates it 
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both practically and theoretically. Furthermore, he introduces the idea of moral urgency 
to draw our attention to ongoing evils and this idea becomes the means of articulating the 
irredeemable specificity of others and the circumstances indispensable for understanding 
their singular suffering. Without caring for the suffering other next to you, the concern 
for multiple distant others is hardly capable of offering a viable ethical theory. Only a 
singular suffering other can give you a glimpse into your own agency, stripping your 
interiority of any excuses, since acting without a stark sense of one’s agency, even with 
the best of intentions, is either hypocritical or futile. 
Chapter Four 
 
Levinas After Ophir: Alterity Reconsidered 
 
I contemplate the moment in the garden. The idea of allowing your own 
crucifixion. 
 
—Unknown  
 
Thus far, the work in question has been focused on aligning the understanding of 
evil as social production, affective temporality, markedly different from the biological 
clock-time, and the problem of suffering. In so doing, I have capitalized on the potential 
this specific view on evil has for halting ongoing suffering understood as a type of 
superfluous evil and for activating our sense of moral urgency. In other words, I have 
been examining various problems (such as the victim’s subjective experience, the vision 
of urgency as a thoughtless, knee-jerk reaction, the non-equivalence of victims, and the 
question of freedom or agency) from the standpoint of the present that is still open to 
alteration because it has not yet congealed into the cruelly unchangeable past, thus 
articulating the theoretical and practical consequences of Ophir’s central insights.  
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The last chapter of this work will focus on the selected strands of the philosophy 
of Emmanuel Levinas, who is rightly considered the central ethical thinker of the 20th 
century Continental philosophy. My engagement with Levinas, who is known for, among 
other things, for his insistence on the ethical value of absolute otherness and 
transcendence, will be twofold. First, I want to hold on to some of his key concepts, 
employing them in the tentative ethical theory I have been outlining. Second, I will 
discuss and rearticulate some Levinasian notions from the prospective of evil as 
production, thus reshaping and casting a new light on them.  I will thus situate his central 
ideas in the world as we know it, as concretely as possible, moving away from the realm 
of transcendence, roughly understood as a kind of experience that cannot take place in 
our world or a rupture of the familiar. Overall, my general approach to Levinas’s thought 
here will be probing, risky, at times musically repetitive, at times serpentine, always fully 
aware of the complexity of its task. 
Why Levinas and his pathos of transcendence though? Have we not affirmed our 
commitment to our world in all of its specificity? In Ophir’s theoretical space, we are 
speaking of studying the patterns of production and distribution of evils like we study 
physics, of concrete multiple others, and of affective temporality, which signals the 
presence of superfluous evil as suffering and the potential for de-structuring this sense of 
time, transitioning from one affect to another. We are rooted firmly in the world, oriented 
toward the abolition or reduction of socially, humanly created evils. However, Levinas 
speaks of a decisive break from immanence or the world construed as the totality of 
relations and equivalences when I encounter the absolute other, who is ‘otherwise than 
being’ [autrement qu’être]. For Levinas, “the primal scene of morality is the realm of the 
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face-to-face [le face à face], of the tremendous encounter with the Other as a Face.”395 
While Ophir speaks of concrete, finite, embodied others and moral sensibility 
characterized by its fluctuations,396 Levinas uses the terms such as infinity, surrendering 
to the other qua ‘substitution,’ overcoming ontology or twisting free of being itself, and 
my inescapable, infinite397 responsibility for the destitute absolute other398 [Autrui] in 
need.399 Furthermore, if Ophir begins with a recoil from the evils in the world, Levinas 
begins with the primacy of the face-to-face relation that takes place in the extra-worldly 
register, turning the initial ethical encounter into that which antecedes knowledge, the 
grasp of the world, and even subjectivity itself. Thus, it would seem that while Ophir is 
the thinker of concrete others and the evils that befall them, i.e., the thinker of 
immanence and the superfluous being of evils, Levinas promises to take us to a place 
outside the world where an encounter with absolute otherness or singularity is possible, to 
instigate our ethical comportment. 
                                                
395 Bauman, “The World Inhospitable To Levinas,” Philosophy Today 4(2): pp. 151–67. 
396 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 16. 
397 Even though I cannot go into this discussion in the present work, the idea of infinity 
plays an important role in Levinas’s thinking. Suffice to say that the gist of it aligns 
easily with the Cartesian model. That is, “the reflective I discovers itself to have 
understood after the fact, to the way in which the infinite is contained in the finite, or the 
idea of God's existence as somehow exceeding the I who has the idea. One can see that 
the infinite is there before the path of contemplation or meditation is undertaken by the I 
who already has access to the idea of the infinite, even if it has not fully comprehended 
what this means. In this sense, the idea of God precedes the I that thinks it, and overflows 
the very thought that tries to contain it.” See Tina Chanter, “Ontological difference, 
sexual difference, and time,” eds. Claire Katz, and Lara Trout, Emmanuel Levinas: 
Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2005), 127. 
398 While ‘Other’ is usually written with the capital O, as is “Autrui” in the original, I 
chose to use a lower-case variation.  
399 See Derrida’s influential essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” where he problematizes 
the Levinasian radical alterity. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” Writing and 
Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
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Thus, to repeat the question, “Why juxtapose the suffering of multiple singular 
others with the height of absolute otherness and why infect immanence and worldliness 
with the specter of transcendence?” I am bringing these two figures together because, 
while I believe that Levinas’s radical alterity, his notion of the world, and transcendence 
need to be substantially re-articulated, often contra Levinas himself, I think that these two 
ways of thinking about morality can enter in a creative synthesis. More specifically, it is 
certainly true that Levinas sees absolute human alterity as necessarily morally relevant, 
i.e., he imbues it with the highest moral value, but, beyond the argument that we first 
must recognize another human being as singular, that we must twist free of egoist 
sameness before we can even open up the possibility of an ethical relation, it is unclear 
how radical alterity is morally relevant for multiple suffering others in the world. Indeed, 
to be blunt about it, it is relevant only insofar as Levinas posits egotism (the primacy of 
the self) as his starting point. 
What I would like to do then is to re-describe otherness as an event of human 
suffering whose shards are visible in and inseparable from concrete others, i.e., arguing 
that to present suffering in its alterity and to articulate its relation with subjectivity will 
put Ophir’s point about the scandal of superfluity of man-made evil into sharper relief.400 
That is, I hope to intensify the moral significance of alterity understood as human 
suffering by articulating its catastrophic work of senselessness and the cruel 
overwhelming of what is human. To be more precise, alterity is morally relevant for 
                                                
400 “Imagine morality as a domain or a social sphere with stakes, concerns, and interests 
of its own. The stakes would be the distress, humiliation, suffering, and, more generally, 
the mal-being of others, the concern would be how to reduce them, and the interest in the 
wellbeing of others.” Ophir, “Disaster As A Place Of Morality: The Sovereign, The 
Humanitarian, And The Terrorist,” Qui Parle, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 95-
116. 
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Levinas because it coincides both with the singularity of another human being and 
suffering.401 An encounter with the absolute other is, at the same time, an encounter with 
suffering, since Levinas is always insistent that the other is in distress, hungry, destitute. 
This encounter is yoked to transcendence, which I take to mean that it signals the primacy 
of the other over me, insofar as the other precedes all worldly relations and our cognitive 
mastery of the things around. I submit that alterity is to be rearticulated as an event of 
suffering, meaning that we need a key shift of emphasis from understanding it as a kind 
of oversaturated human singularity to the predicament that befalls some others. It is no 
longer the absolute other, implicative of all worldly others, takes the center stage here, 
but the radical alterity of suffering itself. It is morally relevant because it is the distress of 
others that forms the core of any moral inquiry and because it is our task to present 
suffering in its superfluity in order to de-naturalize it. If suffering is not simply one type 
of evil, but emblematic of its key structural elements, then situating it within human 
existence in its radical alterity will only further our understanding of the problem and 
deepen our sense of revolt against the slowly unfurling, almost death-like foreignness of 
suffering. To suffer is to stand in perpetuity, in one’s radical passivity, on the threshold of 
death, before its heavy, ruby-studded door into the ultimate cessation. In short, I will go 
on to argue that alterity is a central characteristic of suffering and not of pure human 
singularity.  
Let us now turn to Levinas proper, to examine why he is led to posit the absolute 
other as the center of his ethical vision. While his work encompasses a wide range of 
                                                
401 While I posit the existence of moral desire as one of my starting points and Ophir 
suggests that there is nothing terribly extraordinary about a sense of revolt vis-à-vis an 
evil, Levinas seems to think that only the jolt of naked humanity can transform us into 
moral subjects. 
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worldly phenomena, such as enjoyment, fatigue, insomnia, caress, hunger, femininity, 
effort, mortality,402 all of his depictions can be subsumed under one overarching claim, 
which is to say, that ethics is first philosophy, with the absolute other at its heart. I will 
begin by briefly discussing the intellectual tradition he is steeped in and his particular 
method, before attempting to elucidate this idea of the primacy of ethics. Levinas was a 
rigorous reader of the German philosopher Edmund Husserl who is traditionally seen as 
the founder of phenomenology. The question is then, What is phenomenology or 
intentional analysis, as Levinas understands and employs it? As we read in the preface to 
his work Totality and Infinity, “intentional analysis is the search for the concrete. Notions 
held under the direct gaze of the thought that defines them are nevertheless, unbeknown 
to this naïve thought, revealed to be implanted in horizons unsuspected by this thought…. 
these horizons endow them with a meaning.”403 In short, we could say that intentional 
analysis is the search for the structures of things, the structures that remain hidden in our 
everyday commerce in the world. 
The naiveté Levinas speaks about is the natural attitude, the way we go through 
our daily life. In our everyday life, we engage with various things in the world, habitually 
and without much reflection, considering them a matter of course. We have emotional 
responses in particular, predictable situations, we encounter and correctly identify 
material things, we talk to each other, go to work, eat our lunch. However, our world also 
goes beyond what immediately presents itself to us insofar as we have dreams, we 
imagine, we remember our past experiences, and anticipate future ones. In this model, the 
                                                
402 See Levinas, Existence and Existents (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 2001) 
and Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2013). 
403 Ibid., Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1979), 28. 
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world is to be understood as the ultimate background, context, or setting for ourselves 
and everything we ever experience. As such, it forecloses the thought of infinity, i.e., the 
thought that radically exceeds our mind. The self or the I, in its turn, is a kind of center 
around which everything experiential revolves. The self is the dative or the to whom all 
worldly things manifest themselves.  
The natural attitude is one of different, non-philosophical beliefs, where we 
essentially take things at their face-value, without pausing to reflect upon them. More 
precisely, “the natural attitude is properly the home of all of our activities with the sole 
exception of philosophy, which can understand the natural attitude only by leaving it.”404 
This naïve attitude is contrasted with the phenomenological one, which is known as 
reduction. What do we then mean by reduction? In undertaking it, “the phenomenologist 
detaches himself from the plane of ordinary life in the world, and, so to speak, rises with 
his reflective eye to a transcendental perch.”405 The phenomenologist does not negate the 
existence of worldly things, but rather suspends any assumptions about them.406 For 
instance, “the phenomenologist is no longer focused on the work of art as an object ‘in 
itself,’ but on how the work of art presents itself as a work of art in experience (as 
opposed, say, to something that presents itself as a perceptual object only, or as an object 
                                                
404 Robert Sokolowski, Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition: Essays In 
Phenomenology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 31. 
405 Ibid., 30. 
406 According to Edmund Husserl, “we direct our seizing and theoretically inquiring 
regard to pure consciousness in its own absolute being. That, then, is what is left as the 
sought-for “phenomenological residuum ” though we have “excluded” the whole world 
with all physical things, living beings, and humans, ourselves included.” Edmund 
Husserl, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First 
Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2014), 113. 
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within the realm of physical science).”407 In other words, we step back or withdraw from 
the world in order to suspend our beliefs about it and the things in it, so as to come to a 
deeper understanding of them. What Levinas wants to do via the phenomenological 
reduction, broadly speaking, is to define the hidden structures of our life that give 
meaning to it. These important structures of the phenomena we encounter in the world 
and in our inner life are invisible in the naiveté or the natural attitude of our lives. Indeed, 
“it was only by removing all traces of the natural attitude in regard to our cognitive 
achievements that their true essences can come into view in an undistorted manner.”408 
“The search for the concrete” is then the search precisely for these fundamental structures 
of meaning. In a sense, phenomenology is a philosophy of reminders, i.e., of what is 
otherwise forgotten or overlooked. 
Now, the fundamental principle of phenomenology is that all thinking is of or 
about something, which is where Levinas becomes to problematize this line of 
thinking.409 In other words, thinking is always and necessarily directed to its objects, i.e., 
it is inherently relational. Whatever comes into contact with our consciousness, it 
accessible to it, in one way or another. For instance, we can say that all sound is always 
the sound of something and imagining ‘pure sound in itself’ is futile.410 With this in mind, 
                                                
407 Ibid. 
408 Introduction to Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge, 2001), 
xxxix. 
409 Indeed, “taking off from… Husserl’s descriptions of transcendental intersubjectivity 
in Cartesian Meditations, Lévinas began…. identifying and describing, in painstaking 
detail, irreducible differences between the intentional relation to objects, on the one hand, 
and the “ethical relation” to other human beings, on the other.” Tarek R. Dika, Quiet 
Powers of the Possible: Interviews in Contemporary French Phenomenology (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2016), 8. 
410 Heidegger uses this example in his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Martin 
Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8. 
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we can start unpacking Levinas’s claim that our ethical relation with the other  is non- or 
pre-phenomenological. What this means is that the other does not present itself to us for 
reflection, knowledge, recognition, or identification. The other does not come to us from 
the world, understood as the totality of exchanges and the deadly web of similarities. It 
thus runs counter to intentionality and understanding, for true otherness rejects being 
subsumed under any familiarity. Indeed, there is nothing to be known in advance about 
the other that I encounter. It is, as Drabinski puts it, “an experience without concept.”411 
Understanding the world as the closed, barely escapable totality amounts to war,412 for 
every individual is stripped of his or her singularity, reduced to identity and sameness, 
and as such exists in the relation of struggle with others. We put our survival first 
because, Levinas would argue, we are not fully aware of the pure singularity of otherness, 
due to the totalizing nature of the world. As Moati puts it,  
totalization entails a requisitioning of absolutes, a process through which it strips 
individuals of their own identities in order to transform them into instruments of 
the historical process. In the participation in history, being signifies nothing more 
than being a link, a tiny part of a totality which aims to relentlessly mobilize 
individuals in spite of themselves.413 
 
Let us then go back to the idea that ethics or, more precisely, the encounter with absolute 
otherness,414 is first philosophy, which is to say, first ethics. In other words, an encounter 
                                                
411 John Drabinski, Sensibility and Singularity: The Problem of Phenomenology in 
Levinas (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 47.  
412 “Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we 
are not duped by morality. Does not lucidity, the mind's openness upon the true, consist 
in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war? The state of war suspends 
morality….” Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21. 
413 Raoul Moati, Levinas and the Night Of Being: A Guide To Totality And Infinity (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 11. 
414 It is important not to understand this alterity negatively, for “the Other is not for 
Levinas a negative figure of the I, but a figure of excess that breaks up our thinking.” 
Bernasconi, “The Alterity of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien” in The Face of 
 202 
with suffering precedes our conceptual mastery of the world. What Levinas is seeking to 
accomplish is to describe a kind of relation with the other that is outside understanding 
(whose ‘crime,’ we recall, is the erasure of the other’s pure alterity by subsuming it under 
the familiar categories of thinking) and the world, the world that traps otherness in its 
web of relation and equivalences, thus foreclosing the possibility of its appearance. Why 
the talk of first philosophy though?  Here we must position Levinas vis-à-vis Martin 
Heidegger. In his 1927 magnum opus Being and Time, Heidegger set out to investigate 
the problem of being through the lens of one who takes up being as their own issue, i.e., 
the human being. In the early Heidegger, ontology is construed as fundamental and, 
importantly, the human being becomes its enabling condition, since it is the human 
individual who first raises the question of being. We read further on, “the whole of 
humanity is ontology. An individual’s scientific work, his or her affective life, the 
satisfaction of his or her needs and labour, his or her social life and death…. all these 
moments articulate, with a rigour which reserves to each a determinate function, the 
comprehension of being or truth.”415 “Our entire civilization,” Levinas adds, “follows 
from this comprehension.”416  
 It is the precedence of comprehension and ontology, the reign of what is open to 
cognitive grasp, that precludes otherness for Levinas. He goes on to say that 
“comprehension, as construed by Heidegger, rejoins the great tradition of Western 
philosophy wherein to comprehend the particular being is already to place oneself beyond 
                                                                                                                                            
the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 82. 
415 Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?” in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical 
Writings (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008), PDF pagination. 
416 Ibid. 
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the particular. It is to relate to the particular, which alone exists, by knowledge which is 
always knowledge of the universal.”417 Thus, the possibility of alterity is annihilated 
because the work of comprehension is to subsume the individualities or particularities 
under the universals, to render them faceless and generic, i.e., expendable. The ethical 
encounter must take place outside of comprehension and ontology “because in our 
relation with the Other, he or she does not affect us in terms of a concept.”418 It is in this 
sense that we encounter otherness prior to comprehension and being, which, according to 
Levinas, are inextricably yoked together.  
Let us examine the idea of the absolute other in a greater detail, given its pivotal 
role in Levinas’s thinking. The other presents itself to us as a jolt, as the pure alterity that 
cannot be subsumed under any categories of our understanding and that we cannot intend 
because we know nothing of it. We can only experience it. The event of the other is pure 
immediacy, a decisive rupture in the habituality of our life. Indeed, “Levinas’s 
immediacy breaks through all kinds of mediations, be it laws, rules, codes, rituals, social 
roles or any other kind of order.” “The otherness or strangeness of the other,” we read 
further, “manifests itself as the extraordinary par excellence….. not as something given 
or intended, but as a certain disquietude… which puts us out of our common tracks.”419 
The other ruptures the totality and familiarity of the world, since its radical alterity 
forecloses the possibility of putting it into any worldly relation and thus of integrating it 
                                                
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Bernhard Waldenfels, “Levinas and the Face of the Other” The Cambridge 
Companion to Levinas, 63. 
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into the world. As Drabinski succinctly puts it, “the Other as foreign produces a 
traumatism.”420  
Furthermore, the other presents itself in its proper ethical intensity when it 
addresses us as the face.421 Levinas seems to agree with one of the basic insights of 
phenomenology that things appear to us on a horizon, on the cusp of the world 
understood as the vast, complex network of multiple phenomena. Which is to say, as we 
saw a moment ago, that things stand out vis-à-vis the background of the visible or the 
sensible. Conversely, the face calls out to us as an outside of the visible, as something we 
by definition cannot point to. Musing on the category of the face, Levinas writes, “to 
manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and beyond the manifested and 
purely phenomenal form, to present oneself in a mode irreducible to manifestation…. 
without the intermediary of any image, in one’s nudity, that is, in one’s destitution and 
hunger.”422 Thus, according to Levinas, what truly jolts us is the nakedness and the 
foreignness of the human, a kind of other-than-me. 
For Levinas, the face must be understood first of all as an epiphany, i.e., as a 
revelation of the extra-worldly, a rupture in the fabric of all our knowledge and 
expectations, not to mention the horizon of the visible. It thus inaugurates the visible, it 
sheds light on what was previously obscured, as opposed to unfolding within it, which 
echoes the idea that no matter how fast light travels, darkness or obscurity is always 
already there. The epiphany of the face, we recall, necessarily precedes comprehension, 
                                                
420 Drabinski, Sensibility and Singularity, 122. 
421 It is worth noting that “the otherness does not lie behind the surface of somebody we 
see, hear, touch and violate. It is just his or her otherness. It is the other as such and not 
some aspect of him or her that is condensed in the face.” Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 
65. 
422 Ibid. 
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understanding, or thought as such. In this way, the face is not an image, concept, or idea, 
since to trap it in any of those categories would be to rob it of its infinite, incalculable 
strangeness. It is more like a trace, a jolt into the strangeness of the non-I. The face 
appears “in the nudity of the absolute openness of the transcendent.”423 We could say that 
the face enters the realm of the visible as vulnerable precisely because it is not enmeshed 
in the network of things, images, or ideas, because it lacks any horizonal or material 
support, and it is stripped of any possible protection. But I will return to this notion of 
vulnerability later. 
Since the face of the other does not partake of the world as totality, it shows itself 
precisely as transcendence. Indeed, “the relation with the Other alone introduces a 
dimension of transcendence, and leads us to a relation totally different from experience in 
the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist.”424 We can say that the face enters into 
the visible as an interruption, a disturbance of totality, and as transcendence, which I am 
interpreting as a particular kind of experience. It is an event that happens in the fissures 
between our comprehension, the mind’s synthetic activity, and the inevitable 
subsumption of the particular under the universal. It falls through the cracks of being and 
its totalization.425 
Thus, Levinas argues that the other is fundamentally irreducible to any concept or 
knowledge we might have of him or her, which is also why, roughly speaking, alterity 
has been exiled from being understood as cognitive transparency and familiarity. Why is 
                                                
423 Ibid., 199. 
424 Ibid., 191. 
425 Moati raises an interesting possibility of “the nocturnal productivity of being.” He 
asks, “Must we go beyond ontology or expose a transcendence hitherto unnoticed within 
the fully developed work of being and without which the ontological question loses all 
intelligibility?’ Raoul Moati, Levinas and the Night of Being, xvi. 
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it so important to insist on the radical non-coincidence of the self and the other though, 
i.e., why insist on pure alterity? If we think of the other in terms of reciprocity, symmetry 
(‘she is so much like me!’), or equality, the obvious risk, the risk Levinas has been 
painstakingly attempting to neutralize, is that otherness will dissolve into the familiar. 
Which is to say, difference will be engulfed by the same, reasserting the primacy of self-
interest and egoist pursuits. Thus, “height is the relation in which the face of the Other 
expresses his or her eminence.”426 Which is another way of asserting that otherness 
comes first. 
As I already pointed out, the other that addresses me by virtue of her elusive 
presence is, according to Levinas, radically fragile in her fundamental humanity. It is the 
other as sheer uniqueness, irreducible to any social roles she might later play. The 
vulnerable humanity of the other stirs a kind of primary care within me, it stops me in my 
tracks, which is what makes this relation intrinsically asymmetrical. According to 
Levinas, “the nakedness of the face extends into the nakedness of the body that is cold 
and that is ashamed of its nakedness.”427 He goes on to say, “the face in its nakedness as a 
face presents to me the destitution of the poor one and the stranger.”428 Thus, in 
encountering the other, I encounter the utmost destitution, which elicits a response from 
me, yet this response, Levinas argues, cannot happen in the totalized world of commerce 
and exchange relations. To put it slightly differently, I am compelled to show care toward 
the other not because she owes me some favor or because I hope to gain something in 
return, which would strongly resemble the circulation of economic exchanges and 
                                                
426 Drabinski, Sensibility and Singularity, 119. 
427 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 69. 
428 Ibid. 
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therefore sameness and replaceability, but because I no longer see my interests as 
primary. The otherness can thus be maintained only if the self surrenders itself to the 
other without expecting anything in return.  
Let me now further examine the conjunction of the other with destitution or 
suffering, since it is precisely the suffering of the other that will bring us back to the 
questions of evil, superfluity and moral urgency. As Levinas poignantly writes, “the 
nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. 
To recognize the Other is to give.”429 Insofar as the other does not manifest him- or 
herself in the world, he or she is radically deprived of any protections or guarantees the 
world might offer. In other words, alterity cannot subsist in the world without moral 
giving. If, according to Levinas, the essence of inhabiting the world amounts to the 
totality of relatively indistinguishable individuals who struggle for their own survival 
against all others, the absolute other appears to us beyond this perpetual struggle, 
defenseless, unable or refusing to defend him- or herself. The other is thus the antithesis 
of war and egocentric struggle, since it appears before good and evil and before peace 
and violence,430 i.e., as precisely other to all distinctions.431 Levinas goes on to say, “the 
transcendence of the Other, which is his eminence, his height, his lordship, in its concrete 
meaning includes his destitution, his exile…”432 The other’s arising above the world, 
insofar as it must be disengaged from every relation in order to maintain its absolute 
otherness, paradoxically goes hand in hand with the concrete manifestation of the other 
                                                
429 Ibid., 75. 
430 In other words, the other appears prior to the choice between good or evil and between 
peace or violence. 
431 This is problematic because the distinction between suffering and well-being is clearly 
at play in Levinas’s construal of otherness. 
432 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
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as hungry and destitute. The epiphany of the face, Levinas continues, “consists in 
soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the stranger, the widow, and the orphan.”433 
The figure of absolute otherness that falls through the fissures of being makes a quiet 
entrance into the world insofar as our concrete, embodied life is haunted by the 
incomprehensible, the senseless, the foreign, and the mysterious, i.e., the traces of 
otherness.  
One major difference here from Ophir and Amery is that we are exempt from 
judging whether a concrete other in front of us is in dire need of relief, is able to provide 
help to someone else, or is suffering, but their circumstances are fortunate enough to 
allow them to wait for relief. The Levinasian other suspends all judgments and 
distinction, since the absolute other is always condemned to suffering. Simply put, 
Levinas remains silent on the possibility that there is an other who is not destitute or 
suffering. The other appears univocally destitute, suffering, hungry, before any 
distinctions or determinations, demanding our response. Absolute otherness and suffering 
fundamentally coincide, which is an enigmatic and provocative idea I will be exploring 
here. Let us note that one’s responsibility to the other is presented as inescapable and 
infinite, such that no measure will ever be enough.434 What I will attempt to do later is to 
allow for the possibility of alterity and judgment, thereby conjoining the two. 
Let me now turn to the Levinasian supposition that the other appears in and 
creates affective time, already implicit in the language of jolts, ruptures, and traumatisms, 
as distinct from the representational or biological ticking of the clock, which introduces 
                                                
433 Ibid., 78. 
434 See Michael Morgan, Discovering Levinas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 15. 
 209 
the idea that the encounter with the other creates a different sense of time in the 
addressee, to expand on the link between time and morality.435 In experiencing the jolt of 
the other, the subject feels “taken hostage.”436 Levinas goes on to say that, in coming 
face-to-face with the other, “I am… already late and guilty for being late,”437 which could 
be interpreted as suggesting that my responsibility for the other originates in the past I 
can never remember, that the other ruptures my sense of chronological time and shows 
the limit to my recollection and, in fact, my life-history and my subjectivity.438 According 
to Levinas, the command of the other comes “as though from an immemorial past, which 
was never present.”439 The responsibility that was always within me now becomes fully 
activated. The jolt of the other has its own temporality and it indexes the feeling of being 
taken hostage, which, using contemporary parlance, is the kind of traumatic blow to 
subjectivity and something that inaugurates a new temporality and a new beginning. As 
we read,  
the time of the Other and my time, or the times of mineness, ecstatic 
temporalities, do not occur at the same time. Veritable time, in Levinas’s sense, is 
the effect or event of the disjointed conjunction of these two different times: the 
time of the Other disrupts or interrupts my temporality. It is this upset, this 
insertion of the Other’s time into mine, that establishes the alterity of veritable 
time, which is neither the Other’s time nor mine.440 
 
                                                
435 According to Severson, time is a gift of the other to me. See Eric Severson, Levinas’s 
Philosophy of Time: Gift, Responsibility, Diachrony, Hope (New York: Duquesne 
University Press, 2013), 103. 
436 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 11. 
437 Ibid., 87. 
438 I take this to mean that the addressee feels obligated to respond to the other’s suffering 
without discerning a particular reason to do so in one’s lifetime. The immemorial past 
that I cannot recall stands for the groundlessness for my visceral desire to offer help to 
the other. 
439 Ibid., 88. 
440 Introduction to Levinas, Time and the Other and Additional Essays, 12. 
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Thus, the temporalities of the subject and the other fracture and mingle. They are out of 
joint with the world and its innumerable clocks. The subject wounded by the absolute 
poverty and the demand of the other is allowed “neither to substitute a more acceptable 
demand for a measureless one, nor to put forward the impossibility of an adequate 
response in order to not respond or to transfer my responsibility to someone supposedly 
more qualified.”441 This is “a traumatism of astonishment.”442 The language of trauma, I 
believe, signals a shift from conceptual thinking to what is affective and visceral. The self 
is intensified to the highest possible degree by encountering the pure other such that the 
self, in giving up his or her autonomy, becomes synonymous with giving, sacrifice, and 
suffering. Indeed, “the subject is traumatized, loses its balance, its moderation, its 
recuperative powers, its autonomy, its principle and principles, is shaken out of its 
contemporaneousness with the world and others, owing to the impact of a moral force: 
the asymmetrical height and destitution of the Other.”443 Thus, encountering suffering in 
its pure alterity already implies the unbearable time that crushes and overwhelms us, 
given its ‘work’ of shattering. Experiencing suffering as alterity ruptures and mutilates 
the time-sense both of the addressee and the sufferer, locking both in a shared 
temporality. 
Levinas calls the temporality of the subject vis-à-vis what I am calling the 
otherness of suffering “diachrony” [diachronie], i.e., that which fractures the continuous 
duration of the subjective life into ‘lapses’ and tiny needles of time that have no common 
                                                
441 Rudolph Bernet, “The Traumatized Subject,” Research in Phenomenology 30 (2000): 
pp. 160-179. 
442 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 73. 
443 Introduction to Levinas, Time and the Other, 15. 
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measure among them.”444 The opposite of this is synchrony, which is a kind of synthesis, 
an easy flow where the past and the future create the present.445 The rupture of the 
subjective consciousness with its sense of time is irreversible, “since all efforts at 
recuperation on the part of the traumatized subject are doomed to failure.”446 Diachrony 
is thus the time-sense of the subject that has been forever separated from its habitual 
sameness after encountering alterity.447  
While the other may be understood as a ‘placeholder’ for all concrete others, the 
others marred by the false familiarity imposed on them, or a trace of otherness found in 
all human beings, I want to return to the coincidence of disaster and alterity now 
understood as an event of affectivity qua suffering. It is no longer otherwise than being or 
otherwise than me and my survival, but otherwise than human life worthy of its name. 
                                                
444 Bernet, “The Traumatized Subject,” Research in Phenomenology, 174. 
445 To my mind, this notion of synchrony also helps us understand the Levinasian 
rejection of aesthetics, expressed most vividly in his essay “Reality and its shadow.” In 
our fascination with an artwork’s own rhythm and temporality, we become indifferent to 
the fact that someone else’s experience of time is pure agony and that someone else’s 
anguished enduring can be altered. As Levinas writes, “there is something wicked and 
egoist and cowardly in artistic enjoyment. There are times when one can be ashamed of 
it, as of feasting during a plague.” It seems that both thinkers would agree that at least 
some of those who have undergone deep suffering know how insignificant, easy, and 
altogether trivial the solace of aesthetic experience really is. In short, I would like to take 
seriously the idea that aesthetic experience is foreclosed for those whose lives have been 
shattered, as well as the idea that the fascination and the ease of temporal flow it harbors 
within it can be a source of shame for those who witnessed the shattering. See Levinas, 
“Reality and its Shadow,” The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 142. 
446 Ibid., 174. 
447 Once again, going against the traditional accounts of time, Levinas opens up the 
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relationship or connection that’s called into question by what Levinas describes as the jolt 
of the face-to-face encounter. See Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active 
Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2013), pp. 260-61. 
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Importantly, I am not suggesting that an event of suffering replaces “Heidegger’s focus 
on anguish with some other experience,” as Bernasconi elucidates.448 We are not 
transitioning from one psychological register to the next. Rather, to encounter pure 
otherness is to experience and be traumatized by the highest intensity of suffering that 
lurks in multiple embodied others. This is to say, to confront otherness is to confront the 
brutality of suffering, the unbearable suffering that negates all our worldly relations and 
all our cognitive attempts to master it, that mutilates our time-sense, our mind, and our 
body.  
In other words, I am interpreting the other not as the pure, grandiose, eminent 
alterity, understood as the apotheosis of individuality, that incites our moral impulses and 
responsibility, but rather as a confrontation with and a glimpse into intolerable suffering. 
My argument is that the eidetic description of suffering gleaned from Ophir and Amery 
strongly resembles the Levinasian traumatic, overpowering alterity, as well as the belief 
that the category of suffering does more practical work in ethics than saturated 
singularity. Indeed, I would argue that Levinas powerfully and astutely delineates the 
conditions under which it is possible to encounter naked suffering, such that the 
encounter in question no longer belongs to the domain of sentimental imagination or the 
idiosyncrasies of one’s character and the degrees of moral sensibility. Furthermore, it is 
possible to encounter suffering qua suffering precisely when we refuse to subsume it 
under equivalences and empty generalities, reinstating the universal human condition of 
withering and mortality, where, if everyone suffers, no one truly is. To be sure, this is a 
significant interpretative difference from Levinas’s word, if not the difference. Instead of 
                                                
448 Bernasconi, “No Exit: Levinas’ Aporetic Account of Transcendence,” Research in 
Phenomenology, Volume 35, Issue 1, pp. 101-117, especially 103. 
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reinstituting absolute otherness as the conceptual saturation of forever elusive, 
unknowable humanity, an encounter with which seeks to undermine the sameness of 
being, I am appropriating the term to suggest the same otherness, except it is the pure 
otherness of suffering. 
What’s more, we interpret alterity as the core of suffering because the other is 
always destitute, which is the same as reasserting the equivalence of the victims, i.e., 
something I have been attempting to dismantle. Simply put, not every other is suffering 
and it stands to reason that we encounter concrete others in distress and concrete others in 
their well-being. Separating otherness qua humanity and suffering, noting that the shift in 
question is strictly moral, as we never encounter suffering as an abstraction and in 
isolation, allows us to re-introduce judgment into our comportment in the world. This is 
not possible as long as the absolute suffering remains uniquely singular.  
If the other pins us to our subjectivity, the interiority we cannot escape and the 
responsibility we cannot transfer, Levinas argues that it “signifies not to be able to get out 
from under responsibility.”449 This reading of responsibility, as we are about to see, is 
markedly different from the one we are traditionally used to, wherein it is inseparable 
from the question of freedom and agency. Indeed, as Burggraeve points out, “since the 
Enlightenment, anyone viewing the world through Western lens has become used to 
thinking of responsibility as the extension of, and even the synonym for, autonomy and 
freedom.”450 For the other undoes our habitual mastery, we, paradoxically, do not take up 
responsibility by choice, but by necessity. Thus, “the origin that precedes freedom comes 
                                                
449 Levinas, “On the Trail of the Other,” Philosophy Today, 10:1 (1966: Spring), 41. 
450 Roger Burggraeve, “Violence and the vulnerable face of the other: the vision of 
Emmanuel Levinas on moral evil and our responsibility,” Critical Assessments, 66. 
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from the outside. The origin of ethical subjectivity precedes the boundaries within which 
the origin may be recuperated. Therefore this conditioning from the outside, this 
origination, gives birth to the subject.”451 This is something we saw in our brief 
discussion of immemorial past. 
Blanchot gives us a few illuminating hints for deciphering the meaning of the 
Levinasian responsibility, in a passage that is worth citing in its entirety:  
responsible: this word generally qualifies – in a prosaic, bourgeois manner – a 
mature, lucid, conscientious man, who acts with circumspection, who takes into 
account all elements of a given situation, calculates and decides. The word 
‘responsible’ qualifies the successful man of action. But now responsibility – my 
responsibility for the other, for everyone without reciprocity – is displaced. No 
longer does it belong to consciousness; it is not an activating thought process put 
into practice, nor is it even a duty that would impose itself from without and from 
within… Responsibility which withdraws me from my order – perhaps from all 
orders and order itself – responsibility which separates me from myself (from the 
‘me’ that is mastery and power, from the free speaking subject) and reveals the 
other in place of me, requires that I answer for absence, for passivity.452 
 
Thus, the responsibility at stake here is not one that reinforces one’s sense of agency, but 
rather dissolves it, puts it out of work. The encounter with pure otherness weakens us, as 
it were. The word “responsibility,” Blanchot goes on to say, with a superb poignancy, is 
“summoning us to turn toward the disaster.”453 To embrace one’s responsibility for the 
other is to give up agency and to accept the moral summon from the outside. It is to turn 
toward the disaster of a suffering other. The suffering already exists by the time the 
subject arrives on the scene, if only because otherwise it could and would have been 
prevented. 
                                                
451 Drabinski, Sensibility and Singularity, 121. 
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Nebraska Press, 1995), 25. 
453 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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As Levinas himself writes, “I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary and 
fundamental structure of subjectivity…. I understand responsibility as responsibility for 
the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my deed…”454 Thus, responsibility and 
the other are inextricably tied, i.e., to be responsible is to face up to the destitution of the 
other and be at his or her command, which is also to say that the other awakens my 
responsibility for the first time. The way I propose to interpret this as the idea that our 
sense of responsibility acquires a piercing acuity once I clash with the pure affectivity of 
suffering. Nothing short of the senselessness and the brutality of suffering can jolt us into 
being responsible and into recoiling in the face of absolute distress.455  
What continuously draws the self to the other is desire, which Levinas 
distinguishes from need. The latter, he writes, is “the return itself, the anxiety of me for 
myself, the original form of identification which we have called egoism.”456 Which is to 
say, need is about identification, about returning to myself to fulfill my needs, i.e., it is 
antithetical to otherness. Desire, on the other hand, is something very different, for it is 
what animates the movement from the self to the other. Indeed, desire “proceeds from a 
being already full and independent.”457 It is not concerned with satisfying any needs of 
the self, making the well-being of the other its primary goal. As such, desire is not an 
appetite, implying the aim of satiating yourself, but rather a generosity.458 According to 
Jobling, “desire goes to the Other not in order for the self to fulfill itself, to find its own 
                                                
454 Levinas, “Ethics and Infinity,” Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2011), 95. 
455 To be sure, recognizing suffering is not enough. At best, it will generate a moral desire 
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456 Ibid., “On the Trail of The Other,” Philosophy Today, pp. 38-39. 
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identity, or to facilitate its self-totalization.”459 Importantly, what is desirable never quite 
fulfills the desire, deepening and intensifying it itself, creating the hunger anew. This is to 
ensure that the desirous movement from the self to the other never depletes itself, never 
grows bored and satisfied, thus threatening to destabilize the key link between the subject 
and the other. Indeed, “the Subject is perpetually striving towards the Other in a 
movement that never comes to rest because the desired does not satisfy the hunger.”460 
We can understand this as a visceral desire to alleviate someone else’s suffering. 
To reiterate, I submit that the subject’s responsibility binds him- or herself not to 
the absolute other, which can be easily mistaken for the sum-total of all (universally finite 
and thus equally vulnerable) victims and even for ‘the perfect victim’ that we are to see in 
every concrete other, but rather to the alterity of suffering, since experiencing its deadly 
force is tied to the desire to do something about it. In other words, I am affectively and 
fatefully drawn to the distress of a concrete other not because of the Kantian idea of 
dignity that summons us to moral action as the form of the law, as tempting an appeal to 
the Kantian moral law may be,461 but because brute suffering stops us in our tracks and 
we experience its superfluity, that it ought not to be. The fundamental relation between 
                                                
459 D. Jobling, 1991. “Levinas on desire, dialogue and the Other,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 65: 419. 
460 Ezekiel Mkhwanazi, “To be human is to be responsible for the Other: a critical 
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the subject and pure suffering tears a hole in the fabric of subjectivity, such that the 
subject can no longer be at peace as long as this suffering is continuing.  
Let me illustrate my point with a reference to my personal experience. When my 
late fiancé started his aggressive treatment for the advanced form of cancer, I knew, 
heartbreakingly and yet lucidly, that the dehumanizing procedures would change him (I 
dutifully studied medical literature, read the accounts of the significant others of the 
deceased ones, listened to the stories of the few survivors) and that things would be 
rough, to say the least. Very, very rough. But when I saw his stone-still posture, 
immovable in his silent brute suffering, the living statue of intolerable pain and fear, as 
he was sitting on my bed, I felt like I was punched in my stomach and I knew this act of 
witnessing claimed me cruelly and wholly. I knew what was coming, but, in the 
Levinasian fashion, my cognitive faculties could not prepare for encountering his pure 
suffering. My mind knew, but my body and the affective kernel of my psyche did not. 
This runs counter to Scarry’s claim that “for the person in pain, so incontestably and 
unnegotiably present is it that ‘having pain’ may come to be thought of as the most 
vibrant example of what it is to ‘have certainty,’ while for the other person it is so elusive 
that ‘hearing about pain’ may exist as the primary model of what it is ‘to have doubt.’”462 
Experiencing the suffering of the other outside of any relations, without any protective 
mediation, to the point where you are undone by its force and surrender your agency, 
understood as the concern for your own needs and existence, undermines the traditional 
dichotomy between the iron certainty of pain and its alleged incommunicability, where 
pain is fully accessible only to the sufferer and remains at best as a faint affective trace in 
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the witness, usually something the witness has to be convinced of. Of course, the alleged 
incomprehensibility of pain has the social function of furthering our indifference to it, as 
if comprehension were truly at stake here. Furthermore, I want to suggest that what is 
central about equating human otherness with suffering is that we begin to see the shards 
of this acute suffering in concrete others, catching the glimpses of alterity in them, just 
like I was devastated by the suffering I saw in the corporeality of my late fiancé, the 
suffering that, temporarily, stripped him of all familiarity.  
This is a key insight that I would like us to hold on to, since pain or suffering has 
been twinned with unspeakability almost unfailingly, as I alluded to earlier, forcing this 
experience even deeper into silence and isolating the sufferers from the rest of 
humanity.463 For instance, as Felman writes, in response to Claude Lanzmann film Shoah, 
claimed that the victims of traumatic events are essentially voiceless, by arguing that “the 
inside is unintelligible.”464 The major problem here is that victims are denied any truths 
to their unbearable, fractured experience ‘in turmoil,’ condemning them ever further to 
deep loneliness and the absence of meaningful dialogue, and deepening the gap between 
those who have experienced suffering and those who have not. 
For instance, in writing about the incurable illness and the subsequent loss of his 
little daughter, Hemon states, in an unbearable lucidity, that  
one of the most common platitudes we heard was that words failed. But words 
were not failing Teri and me at all. It was not true that there was no way to 
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describe our experience. Teri and I had plenty of language with which to talk to 
each other about the horror of what was happening, and talk we did. The words of 
Dr. Fangusaro and Dr. Lulla, always painfully pertinent, were not failing, either. 
If there was a communication problem, it was that there were too many words, 
and they were far too heavy and too specific to be inflicted on others. […] We 
instinctively protected our friends from the knowledge we possessed; we let them 
think that words had failed, because we knew that they didn’t want to learn the 
vocabulary we used daily. We were sure that they didn’t want to know what we 
knew; we didn’t want to know it, either.465 
 
Words do not fail us when we suffer. We fail to speak or to listen. The thing is, we, the 
listeners, are too afraid to know and to imagine. 
Amery himself affirms the idea that there is something in the experience of 
suffering that fundamentally resists language:  
the pain was what it was. Beyond that there is nothing to say. Qualities of feeling 
are as incomparable as they are indescribable. They mark the limit of the capacity 
of language to communicate. If someone wanted to impart (mit-teilen) his 
physical pain, he would be forced to inflict it and thereby become a torturer 
himself.”466 
 
On the face of it, little, if anything, can be known about suffering, for to 
understand pain is to inflict it. This radical incommunicability often marks the limit of 
moral concern, for how can I truly take up an other’s predicament as my own if I cannot 
relate to it either experientially, cognitively, or affectively? In other words, how do we 
bridge the abyss between someone who has undergone torment and someone, to speak 
poetically for a moment, who has seen this torment on the other’s face and in their eyes? 
Needless to say, the more we condemn suffering to incommunicability, the less chance 
we have of understanding how to dissipate it.  
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Just listen to Blanchot once again, who muses, “I was going to write that she was 
like a statue, because she was motionless and turned towards the window, and she really 
did have the look of a statue; but stone was not part of her element; rather, her nature was 
composed of fear—not an insane or monstrous fear, but one expressed by these words: 
for her, something irremediable had happened.”467 We are taken hostage by absolute 
suffering when we discern the traces of the irredeemable even in those individuals we 
considered thoroughly familiar. In other words, the event of pure suffering is linked to 
experiencing the wounding and alien shards of torment in concrete, embodied others, as 
if the original purity of suffering dissipated into a million burning needles, lodged in 
particular minds and bodies.  
It is worth noting that, despite the Levinasian hyperbolic extra-worldly language, 
he does attempt to understand responsibility in very concrete terms, i.e., to reconcile the 
moral summon from above with the moral need to respond to specific individuals, in 
specific circumstances, and with specific measures to reduce their pain. The drama of 
transcendence cannot solve the problems that are causing damage to concrete people. In 
Levinas’s own words, “the duty to give to the Other even the bread out of one’s own 
mouth and the coat from one’s shoulders.”468 We should emphasize that the giving in 
question does not take place because the subject has an excess of goods to give. Should 
this be the case, the subject would still remain aligned with his or her own interests and 
needs, within its egoist world. Rather, in the movement of sacrifice and the surrender of 
one’s agency, the subject gives what he or she needs him- or herself.469 Indeed, “in 
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Levinasian responsibility we venture outside the permissible limits of exteriority’s 
obligating force, for instance, in the form of the Kantian duty, to find ourselves far more 
obligated than we imagined, subjects suddenly not to obligations of our choosing but, 
rather, to what lies beyond our culturally self-limiting constructs of obligation.”470 The 
call of responsibility is made possible by exteriority, which highlights its arresting, 
irresistible force, the force of subsuming the ego. 
Let us note that in Otherwise Than Being, Levinas uses the term “the-one-for-the-
other” [l’un pour l’autre] to designate the relation of responsibility between the self and 
the other, as opposed to “Being-for-itself,” which is a mode of being where the subject is 
concerned only with him- or herself, oblivious to the other. This is known as the vexing 
Levinasian notion of ‘substitution,’ which is the process “whereby identity is inverted, a 
passivity more passive still than all passivity, beyond the passivity of the identical, the 
self is freed from itself.”471 As cryptic as this may sound, what Levinas seems to have in 
mind here is the breaking free from the sickening familiarity and circularity of our 
thoughts (the circularity we are exposed to in the throes of insomnia), our interiority to 
which we are chained and with which we are nauseatingly familiar, and orient ourselves 
toward the radically non-I. In a conversation with Jill Robbins, Levinas elucidates more 
what substitution may look like, 
for me, the notion of substitution is tied to the notion of responsibility. To 
substitute oneself does not amount to putting oneself in the place of the other man 
in order to feel what he feels; it does not involve becoming the other nor, if he be 
destitute and desperate, the courage of such a trial. Rather, substitution entails 
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bringing comfort by associating ourselves with the essential weakness and 
finitude of the other; it is to bear his weight while sacrificing one’s interestedness 
and complacency-in-being, which then turn into responsibility for the other. In 
human existence, there is, as it were, interrupting or surpassing the vocation of 
being, another vocation: that of the other… All of the culture of the humans 
seems to me to be oriented by this new “plot,” in which the in-itself of a being 
persisting in its being is surpassed in the gratuity of being outside-of-oneself, for 
the other, in the act of sacrifice or the possibility of sacrifice, in holiness.472 
 
It is thus about entering into the ethical relation par excellence, one where the subject is 
summoned into existence, at least morally, by an encounter with the other’s weakness 
and vulnerability. Following Bernasconi, however, we ask, “What kind of subject is 
needed to fulfill Levinas’s moral demands?”473 As I suggested a moment ago, the passage 
from the self to the other in substitution allows for acting without self-interest in a kind of 
moral obsession with radical alterity. In other words, “substitution means: to put myself 
in the other’s place, not to appropriate him or her according to my wishes, but to offer to 
the other what he or she needs, starting with basic material needs. To be an I is to 
substitute for the other.”474  
Paradoxically then, the subject exists only in departing from itself and from 
giving up its needs. Levinas writes, “it is through the condition of being a hostage that 
there can be pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity in the world.”475 Which is to say, 
that compassion is directly tied into the surrender of one’s agency and freedom or 
overturning the primacy of the self. In short, “this suggests that Levinas is asking what 
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underlies that behaviour which is sometimes called superogatory, gratuitous or, as he 
prefers to say, ethical.”476 Levinas thus rejects the idea that at the heart of subjectivity lies 
a concern with one’s self or, more precisely, that it has any place in morality. Rather, he 
posits an encounter with absolute suffering as the ‘exterior,’ strange, even uncanny center 
of ethical subjectivity. Furthermore, we read, “substitution of the one for the Other is not 
the psychological event of compassion, but a putting oneself in the place of the Other…. 
it is the asymmetry of responsibility.”477  
Let me say a bit more about the subject who assumes its responsibility through 
passivity and the work of substitution, so as to return to the question of suffering. To do 
so, I will turn to Levinas’s essay “Useless Suffering” where he addresses the way in 
which suffering destroys all our cognitive mastery, will, and agency, i.e., all our 
interiority. He opens the essay as follows: “Suffering is, of course, a datum in 
consciousness, a certain ‘psychological content,’ similar to the lived experience of color, 
sound, contact, or any other sensation. But in this very ‘content’ it is an in-spite-of-
consciousness, the unassumable.” This is to say, while, in accordance with the practice of 
phenomenology, it is possible to examine every object as it is given to us when we step 
back from the world, there is something about the phenomenon of suffering that resists 
this appropriation. This is also going against the Kantian drama of consciousness. As he 
puts it, “for Kant, an imperative weighs on the understanding. Understanding is 
understanding according to principles. Understanding is under an imperative to 
synthesize disparate data according to the universal and the necessary.” “As soon as there 
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is understanding,” Levinas continues, “understanding understands that it is under an 
imperative that there he law.”478 Again, to frame otherness conceptually is to erase it. 
“Facts,” he goes on to say, “can be represented as facts only by an understanding that 
apprehends them in universal and necessary forms of judgment. The imperative is the a 
priori fact that precedes and makes possible the a priori forms with which understanding 
understands empirical facts.”479 However, we experience suffering in a fundamentally 
different, singular way, light years away from the way we experience all other things in 
the world. 
Suffering eludes the grasp of our mind, even though the synthetic activity of 
consciousness “is capable of reuniting and embracing the most heterogeneous and 
disparate data into order and meaning in its a priori forms.”480 To put it yet differently, 
for Husserl, the life of consciousness resides ultimately in synthesis, i.e., making sense of 
what presents itself to consciousness. For Levinas, suffering is the insertion of a refusal 
of signification into consciousness whose life or drama otherwise consists in unification. 
It is what violently tears apart consciousness and its primeval thirst for meaning. It is the 
unbearable that cannot be integrated into our consciousness. Finally, it is the unassumable 
due to its excess over our ordinary forms of intelligibility.  
As Levinas goes on to say, “suffering, in its woe, in its in-spite-of-consciousness, 
is passivity.” Passivity has traditionally been understood as the opposite of activity, but 
here he proposes both a more basic and more radical conception of passivity, the 
passivity that is not a simple opposition to activity. The way we are passive in relation to 
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our own suffering is different from the passivity of our sensibility in relation to the things 
we perceive. To perceive is to be receptive to what presents itself to us, but this passivity 
of reception is also active in that it contains and arranges concepts by which we recognize 
and make sense of things. We subsume the things we encounter under the categories of 
our mind so as to make sense of them, which means that passivity runs deeper than 
receptivity. Indeed, Levinas sees Husserl as “a proponent of the primacy of cognitive, 
perceptual subjectivity.”481 Thus, “in suffering, sensibility is a vulnerability, more passive 
than receptivity; an encounter more passive than experience. It is precisely an evil.”482 
According to Jules Simon’s elucidation, “playing on the double sense of the French word 
mal, which means either ‘pain’ or ‘evil,’ Levinas claims that suffering is not merely a 
restriction of one’s freedom, constricting possible spontaneous movements, but an 
overwhelming of one’s humanity so concretely violent and cruel that we can only 
describe such pain as evil or absurd.”483 This overwhelming, i.e., suffering, is evil, 
unbearable, and absurd precisely because it is fundamentally useless. It serves no 
purpose, it has no meaning or justification, it has no story to tell and no promises to 
make, and is thus ‘for nothing.’ This suffering is the primeval scandal of human 
existence. 
It is important to note that I do not see the encounter with the suffering other, 
interpreted here as the event of pure suffering, and the recognition of the shards of pain in 
concrete others chronologically, as if we first confronted the intensity of disembodied 
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suffering and then discerned its dissemination in singular individuals. The two are 
simultaneous, but they belong to different orders. One is the order of affectivity, seeping 
through and surging above all relations, cognitive events, and our everyday dealings with 
each other, sometimes becoming a painfully tight affective knot binding our subjectivities 
together. The other order has to do with our way of inhabiting the world that is colored or 
darkened by this wounding affectivity and with what actions we undertake once it 
becomes part of our interiority. The latter is thus about the practical measures we take up 
in the face of suffering. 
But what of the subject that comes before or prior to this encounter? How do we 
articulate the subjectivity that comes before the event of suffering, such that there is a 
subject capable of hearing the cry for help? Following Levinas, the primary subject’s way 
of emerging and living in the world is through the enjoyment of the senses. Therefore, 
“Levinas seeks in sensibility what is anterior to the work of the constituting subject on 
the world.”484 As Peperzak helpfully elucidates, “the enjoyment of a corporeal and 
terrestrial existence is constitutive for any ego: the I establishes itself as a self through the 
absorption of elements, things, and events or by submitting them to the I’s domination 
and possession.”485 I grow into my agency through everything the world lets me enjoy, as 
if the world were for me and for me alone. The world gives me sustenance, which allows 
me to become independent. As he goes on to say, “without this appropriating and hedonic 
egocentrism, there would be no relationship to other persons because this relation 
presupposes a basic level of individual independence, even if further analysis will show 
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the relativity of this independence.”486 The role of enjoyment is thus to articulate a 
subject that is irreducible to its cogito, mastery, or pure physical needs, i.e., the subject of 
enjoyment. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes,  
We live from ‘good soup,’ air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc… These 
are not objects of representations. We live from them. Nor is what we live from a 
‘means of life,’ as the pen is a means with respect to the letter it permits us to 
write-nor a goal of life, as communication is the goal of the letter. The things we 
live from are not tools, nor even implements, in the Heideggerian sense of the 
term. Their existence is not exhausted by the utilitarian schematism that delineates 
them as having the existence of hammers, needles, or machines.487 
 
In other words, we live from the things we are surrounded by, oscillating between 
interiority and exteriority, even before we find uses for them and enter into an 
instrumental relation with the world. Indeed, we inhabit the enjoyment that various things 
afford us before we situate them within the worldly horizon. The self,488 however, enjoys 
the world insofar as it experiences the world as existing for the sole benefit of the object: 
the world, offers the bountifulness of terrestrial nourishment to our intentions — 
including those of Rabelais; the world where youth is happy and restless with 
desire is the world itself. It takes form not in an additional quality inhering in 
objects, but in a destination inscribed in its revelation, in the revelation itself, in 
the light Objects are destined for me; they are for me. Desire as a relationship 
with the world involves both a distance between me and the desirable, and 
consequently a time ahead of me, and also a possession of the desirable which is 
prior to the desire. This position of the desirable, before and after the desire, is the 
fact that it is given. And the fact of being given is the world.489 
 
This experience of the world as existing for the enjoyment of the creates the subject born 
out of affectivity, such that cognition comes only at its wake. Indeed, “enjoyment of the 
element does not belong to the order of thought but to that of sentiment, that is, the 
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affectivity wherein the egoism of the I pulsates.”490 Thus, the self is bound to the world 
first and foremost through sensibility and affectivity. 
Only the subject that knows enjoyment, Levinas will later say, is able to sacrifice 
it. However, to enjoy what the world offers is also to assimilate difference into sameness, 
the other into the identical. Thus,  
nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the 
same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as 
other, recognized, we will see, as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, 
becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is in this 
sense alimentation. Hunger is need, is privation in the primal sense of the word, 
and thus precisely living from . . . is not a simple becoming conscious of what 
fills life. These contents are lived: they feed life. One lives one’s life: to live is a 
sort of transitive verb, and the contents of life are its direct objects.491 
 
This vision of enjoyment, wherein we convert what is alien to us into what is identical, 
buttresses the autonomy of the subject, but, to be sure, not the self-sufficient subject of 
traditional philosophy, suspicious of any affects. I take this to mean that to present 
enjoyment as a mode of life as preceding intellect and rational mastery, utilitarian 
approach to the world, and the relation to others governed by the logic of exchange, 
Levinas grants the real force to the affective, since it undergirds and shores up our 
subjectivity. Indeed, “the subject of Enjoyment does not return to itself in the satisfaction 
of representation or consumption. In the case of Enjoyment, we cannot conceive 
affectivity as a faculty situated within the constellation of consciousness. The I is, rather, 
supported by affectivity and thus cannot be said to contain affection.”492 Thus, affectivity 
precedes the subject and its ethical endeavors.  
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Indeed, “to enjoy is to be immersed in an ambiance of elements, to breath the air, 
to bathe in water and sun, to be established on the earth. Elements are not things, because 
they are too indeterminate for that, too formless, and too elusive.”493 While still more 
specific than the sheer indeterminacy of being, the elements lack form or delineation, 
which makes them both interiority and exteriority. We convert the fruits of exteriority 
into interiority by consuming them for our sustenance. Indeed, “to hold on to exteriority 
is not simply equivalent to affirming the world, but is to posit oneself in it 
corporeally.”494 As Wyschogrod points out, Levinas is wedging a gap between the 
category of sensation and representation, such that the former is possible without the 
latter.495 Indeed, “against the traditional conception of the senses as the means through 
which we are able to know things, Levinas shows that the basic sensibility….. is a naive 
and spontaneous feeling at home in a world.”496  
This joyous sensibility is troubled when we realize that the things that guarantee 
our enjoyment are not infinite. Furthermore, “our enjoyment is threatened therefore not 
only by the anonymous exteriority of the elemental, but…. by the personal exteriority of 
the face of the other…. it is enough that others appear as a subject, and not as an object of 
consumption, for my solitary enjoyment to collapse.”497 As I encounter the suffering 
other amidst my enjoyment, I feel deep shame, as Levinas would have it, that comes from 
my recognition of the torment, weakness, and destitution of the other while I am enjoying 
myself. 
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However, our enjoyment collapses even further during the times of meaningless 
toil and the scarcity of nourishment. During the time of the disaster and suffering, the 
world no longer presents itself as existing solely for the subject of enjoyment, the subject 
immersed in the fecundity of the sensible. As Levinas writes, “it is in times of misery and 
privation that the shadow of an ulterior finality which darkens the world is cast behind 
the object of desire.” He goes on to state, “when one has to eat, drink and warm oneself 
in order not to die, when nourishment becomes fuel, as in certain kinds of hard labor, the 
world also seems to be at an end, turned upside down and absurd, needing to be renewed. 
Time becomes unhinged.”498 Thus, being exposed to the event of disaster signals that 
time is out of joint and unhinged, that the subject is no longer in step with the clock time 
of the world. I no longer recognize the world that has no place for me and whose flow of 
time is now unavailable to me, which also means the shadow of suffering, the broken 
time of the catastrophe. As Chanter helpfully points out, “this dislocated I, out of step 
with itself, worn out with the effort of trying to be itself, might anticipate the sense in 
which Levinas will speak of the restlessness of substitution.”499  
Thus, moving from an altered time-sense brought about by an event of misery, 
where the otherwise carefree subject wishes for a reprieve from the temporality that 
equates suffering into the slowing down of the clock, to the rupture of the elemental, first 
by the worry about tomorrow and then by an encounter with the hungry other that 
initiates a new point of time for the subject. In this way, the fractured temporalities of the 
sufferer and the addressee finally come together. All these threads can be pulled into 
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what Chanter calls ‘the otherness of time.’500 Thus, describing the subject in the throes of 
insomnia and the subject of enjoyment ‘prepares’ the subject for hearing the call of the 
other or to be shell-shocked by suffering. 
To recognize the other as suffering is to acknowledge that the mutilated sense of 
time plays a constitutive role in their torment. To go through suffering oneself is to know, 
sharply and viscerally, how it draws time into its orbit, making it an accomplice of evil, 
and it is to make it one’s task to abolish or at least fracture this agonizing temporality. I 
highlight this point because what is made possible here is not only the moral face-to-face 
relation or the jolt of suffering that comes from outside, that speaks in the voice of 
exteriority, but also a kind of sharing of broken temporalities, the coming together of the 
victim and the addressee, which is the moral relation Levinas set out to establish in the 
first place.501 Rather than being characterized primarily as something inherently ineffable, 
now pain is expressed in the experience of time, the experience open to expression and 
analysis, which means that suffering can be shared and not in a mystical, sentimental, and 
usually vacuous way, but in a nuanced understanding of concrete structures of 
temporality. More importantly, to share the suffering of the other, by way of a broken 
temporality, is to solidify the moral bond between the two. 
Under the reading I offered, we are moving away from the Levinasian view that 
ethics is possible only if we extract the otherness of the human from any worldly 
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determinations and being itself. In so doing, I am attempting to undermine the Levinasian 
dichotomy, according to which you can either engage with concrete others in the world, 
yet remain in the realm of sameness, or you can encounter absolute otherness where 
being itself is on the brink of disappearance. Otherness, the way I read it, ushers in brute 
suffering and its grievous impact on its witness into the world, such that multiple 
embodied others are now inextricably linked to alterity through suffering, inhabiting a 
senseless realm ablaze with pain. Thus understood, the moral relation between the one in 
need of help and the addressee is being jolted by the suffering of a concrete other and 
refusing to accept their torment. 
Now I would like to revisit and rearticulate even further key Levinasian ideas, i.e., 
my response to the suffering other, the role of the world and the senses, and the 
specificity and inescapability of my moral responsibility, from the Ophirian perspective 
on evil and its social production. What I hope to accomplish is to suggest a tentative 
approach to a new moral model, one utilizing the thinking of Ophir, Amery, and Levinas, 
or at least arrive at a set of theoretical tools for relating to concrete, embodied, suffering 
others in the world that we find ourselves in. In other words, my goal is, as it were, to put 
alterity to work in the very world where the socio-political production of evils is taking 
place.  
Before doing so, it is important to point out two central problems in Levinas’s 
thinking. The first one is that, in attempting to subsume every concrete under the figure 
of the absolute other, it becomes difficult to find our way back to concrete others 
embedded in the world. As Jackson writes, while “Levinas insists on the immediate, 
materiality of the ethical relation, but at the same time insists that the subject has this 
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immediate relation to each and every other, equally, universally, without qualitative 
distinction.” In other words, infinite responsibility to everyone leaves no tangible 
imprints in the world. As much as Levinas himself attempted to think the radically 
transcendent other and their predicament in its worldly, tangible specificity, the success 
of it is uncertain. Infinite responsibility is a concept without materiality and without the 
promise of efficacy, since it lacks a viable moral subject. As we recall, every ought must 
imply can. Jackson goes on to argue that, “keeping in mind Husserl’s analysis of the 
finite subject’s necessary embeddedness within particular social constellations, the 
question arises as to how one could possibly be ethically answerable to everyone…. 
except in abstraction.”502 Which is to say, encountering suffering without the ability to 
differentiate and to judge is of little moral use, since it disallows evaluating the concrete 
circumstances of specific, embodied others and acting in the name of moral urgency.  
In Bernasconi’s words, “Levinas gives no indication that my responsibility is in 
any way limited either by my objective condition or by that of the Other, who may be 
better off than I am.”503 The problem here is the irreconcilable tension between the 
uniqueness of the absolute other and the many concrete others, waiting for their suffering 
to be recognized and alleviated by the potential addressees of their cries for help, the 
tension that cannot be resolved on the Levinasian terms alone. Indeed, 
if I am taken hostage by this other, or these others, it necessarily follows that I 
cannot be responsible to other others. There would thus be no separated, enjoying 
ego, but rather a suffering subject who is constitutively burdened with 
contradictory responsibilities. Such conflicts would thus mark the necessity which 
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binds the concrete subject, who suffers conflicts between, for example, a 
responsibility to country and a responsibility to the foreigner; a responsibility to 
the family and a responsibility to the poor; a responsibility to the mother and a 
responsibility to the father, etc.504 
 
This is, in turn, related to Levinas’s emphasis on the infinity of responsibility and the one-
to-one relation he insists on. However, following my reading of pure otherness as an 
event of suffering and the idea that we encounter this otherness of distress in concrete 
others, we are no longer talking about the grandeur of one absolute other for whom there 
is no measure. We move from the personhood of suffering to suffering ‘itself’ if we are to 
maintain the specificity of victims and the distinction between victims, their socio-
political condition, and non-victims. If ought is to be rooted in can, if obligation has to go 
hand in hand with viable agency for that obligation to ever be meaningful and have 
efficacy, relating to concrete others morally has to be, by necessity, both finite and 
feasible.  
 As Ophir reminds us, 
evils take place between two types of possibilities: what could have been done to 
avoid their production or their distribution; what could have been done to ease the 
suffering or harm of the one who was injured by them or to annul the injury itself, 
through compensation or disengagement. One possibility is a desired state that 
will not be realized, a missed opportunity, a lost possibility buried in the past…. 
the other possibility is a desired state that has not yet been realized, an open 
future.505  
 
Once we are confronted with the alterity of suffering, i.e., once we are jolted out of 
complacency and indifference, we must revisit the notion of evil as production. In other 
words, when the contagious affectivity of human suffering binds us to the predicament of 
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others, when it fractures our time-sense, the next step is to study and analyze the 
conditions under which this suffering has been produced. Ophir goes on to say, 
the denaturalization of evils has a crucial part in representing the possibilities of 
prevention, which in turn has a crucial part in the preventive action itself. In other 
words. the social ideology that represents the differential distribution of evils as 
natural, as God’s will or the hand of fate, and as necessary and unpreventable, and 
the radical social critique that reconstructs the condition for the production and 
distribution of evils and exposes their contingency are among the factors that 
determine the modes and relations of producing and distributing evils.506 
 
Thus, what is initially given to us affectively and viscerally must be situated in its social 
circumstances in accordance with the logic of the denaturalization of evils. Here 
affectivity and practice-oriented intelligibility must come together. While the affective 
event of suffering happens in disengagement from all relations, such that pain is flooding 
all our senses, the response to it must focus on embedding it into the particular socio-
political circumstances and assessing one’s situatedness and its potential for alleviating 
suffering. In other words, we must make a transition from the devastating immediacy of 
the shattering affectivity of agony to the study of the production of evils concretely and 
practically, like we study geology.507 
 The purity of the Levinasian responsibility, the responsibility instigated by one’s 
encounter with absolute suffering, must be supplemented by de-naturalizing the 
production of this suffering and evaluating one’s proximity to the suffering other, which 
requires a switch of registers. If Levinas’s encounter with otherness takes place at the 
level of affectivity, that which bypasses and disengages from every relation, refusing to 
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be trapped in any form or phenomenon, the study of the production of this evil and the 
possibilities of its reduction must happen in the world in all of its concreteness and 
specificity. It must happen in the world of urgency-oriented thinking and judgment, the 
world of the socially astute cogito that assesses the possibilities of reducing suffering. 
The affectivity of otherness qua suffering has less to do with transcendence and much 
more with the dimension of being that refuses any categorization, knowledge, or mastery, 
as if undermining all our habitual certainties and the entire enterprise of seemingly self-
sufficient subjectivity from within.  
In other words, I submit that suffering as a purely affective event does the same 
work in our world as the category of otherness in Levinas proper, yet this otherness has 
to be radically re-situated for it to acquire a true moral relevance. It takes us out of 
sameness and binds us to concrete suffering others when we are confronted with the 
scandal of pure, meaningless suffering. Indeed, affects are often seen as an ‘intensity that 
emerges via the “in-between” spaces of singular encounters, signaling the potential to 
“become otherwise.”508 Furthermore, “the term ‘affect’ describes the vital forces that 
influence our behaviour but which remain outside, or prior to, conscious awareness; 
affect is that which operates beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious 
knowing.”509 Thus, affects are unruly “tiny firefly intensities that flicker faintly in the 
night,”510 swarming in the messy obscurity that lurks behind every rational cogito.511 
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While affects are other than conscious knowing, we should be reminded of Amery’s 
affective reality and the idea that affectivity as such can also be used as a repository for 
inconvenient truths. Indeed, examining the affectivity of suffering led us to seeing the 
possibilities of disengagement from it, thus undermining the dichotomy between affect 
and intelligibility.   
 Let me return to the problem of transcendence for a moment. Indeed, while I 
believe that Levinas is Ophir’s main interlocutor, he is adamant in his rejection of the 
Levinasian transcendence or, more precisely, the possibility of transcendence and the 
reduction of evils, as we see in the following passage cited in its entirety: 
Transcendence is unfailingly finite, from one form of existence to another, from 
one system of relations to another, from a certain regularity of superfluous evils to 
another. Levinas might view the other possibility as exactly what is beyond being, 
or at least as what might lead us there or prepare us for it, or open us to it, or 
perhaps, and more precisely, he might argue that another possibility cannot be 
really different without presupposing and being open to that ultimate 
transcendence of an infinite other.512 
 
For Levinas, we recall, the possibility of abolishing suffering is foreclosed in the world 
we live in because he reduces it to the domain of sameness, where alterity cannot appear 
at all and even a glimpse of it is swiftly subsumed under the relation of symmetry with 
others. As Badiou succinctly puts it, “Levinas maintains that metaphysics, imprisoned by 
its Greek origins, has subordinated thought to the logic of the Same, to the primacy of 
substance and identity, but…. it is impossible to arrive at an authentic thought of the 
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Other (and thus an ethics of the relation to the Other) from the despotism of the Same, 
which is incapable of recognizing this Other.”513 Thus, simply put, Levinas insists on the 
dichotomy between the world qua foreclosure of any singularity and the transcendence 
qua the possibility of genuine morality. Ophir goes on to say, 
I wish to insist that the other possibility is completely down-to-earth, sometimes 
trivial, sometimes heroic, sometimes self-evident, sometimes clarified only after a 
long journey of the critical mind. The other possibility is that of sabotaging the 
serialization of the production of this particular “line” of superfluous evils, of 
interrupting the repetition, stopping the machine that reproduces Evil. Moral 
theory should teach how to cut the fine cords of the serial repetition that Evil is 
made of. It should also teach that only some, if any, are ever cut, and always at 
the risk that new ones may appear in their place, that is, without waiting for a 
Messiah and without hoping for salvation.514 
 
Thus, Levinas construes the world as the totality of sameness and the source of the self’s 
enjoyment, where human singularity has no chance of making itself known. However, 
Ophir’s possibility of the reduction of evils in their superfluous being already introduces 
a rupture in this totality, which means that evils can be addressed morally without 
introducing transcendence as an unhinging of ontology. Indeed, “it is not Being as such, 
either its (imagined) totality or its (impossible) closure, that should be equated with Evil, 
but only the superfluity in Being.”515 The differentiation of being into multiple modalities 
allows Ophir to salvage the category of being from the Levinasian accusations without 
compromising his assertion that evil has a being of its own. Following this logic, the 
world cannot be the selfsame, static totality of beings if a particular modality of being and 
the totality of evils in the world are open to oscillation, i.e., increase or decrease. Indeed, 
the world is home both to the passions of joy and the passions of sorrow, to moral 
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heroism and indifference, to the erasure of singularity and an encounter with a specific 
human being. Furthermore, I believe that encountering a human being as a unique 
individual is not a possibility that is so remote that we must painstakingly look for ways 
to ease the grip of being in order to bring it about. We encounter individuality every 
day.516 As Didion hauntingly writes, following the death of her husband and the life-
threatening illness of her beloved daughter, 
I am a writer. Imagining what someone would say or do comes to me as naturally 
as breathing. Yet on each occasion these pleas for his presence served only to 
reinforce my awareness of the final silence that separated us. Any answer he gave 
could exist only in my imagination, my edit. For me to imagine what he could say 
only in my edit would seem obscene, a violation. I could no more know what he 
would say about UCLA and the trach than I could know whether he meant to 
leave the “to” out of the sentence about J.J. McClure and Teresa Kean and the 
tornado. We imagined we knew everything the other thought, even when we did 
not necessarily want to know it, but in fact, I have come to see, we knew not the 
smallest fraction of what there was to know.517 
 
We encounter a singular human being in our ordinary life because, as we ultimately and 
harrowingly find out one way or another, we do not know even the tiniest fraction of 
what there is to know. I submit that we do not need a catastrophe to disclose to us the 
singularity of someone we know, since there is nothing preventing us from recognizing 
that in the first place. 
 However, I want to amplify the problematization of transcendence and extra-
worldly otherness even furthermore, by elucidating their key features. More precisely, I 
will continue arguing that Levinas’s emphasis on the other in intolerable distress allows 
us to catch a glimpse into the ‘who’ of suffering, the other that haunts and persecutes me,  
not the ‘how,’ i.e., not the way in which human suffering presents itself, which is 
                                                
516 This is an important part of Badiou’s critique of the concept of radical alterity. 
Badiou, Ethics, 17. 
517 Joan Didion, The Year of Magical Thinking (London: Fourth Estate, 2012), 127. 
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fundamentally meaningless and superfluous. The task is thus not to conjoin human 
singularity and the scandal of suffering, but to strip suffering of its guise of necessity. 
While many thinkers have understandably equated death with the ultimate limit of human 
existence, Levinas equates suffering with this radical absurdity and the ‘other than’ of 
being.  
As we recall, the famous Heideggerian being-toward-death, which is an absolute 
lucidity insofar as I catch a glimpse of the horizon of finitude and its possibilities that are 
inescapably mine. This becomes my vantage that allows me to take up my possibilities as 
a finite being, which, in turn, means that being toward death singularizes and 
individualizes.518 It is the human being’s source of freedom and the absolute otherness, 
for there is nothing more other than nothingness. In other words, encountering the 
otherness of being, understood as death, paradoxically heightens and sharpens my sense 
of being and the fact that it is irredeemably mine. However, according to Levinas, it not 
death, but suffering that constitutes absolute otherness. Levinas claims that suffering is 
not merely a restriction of one’s freedom, constricting possible spontaneous movements, 
but an overwhelming of one’s humanity. This overwhelming, i.e., suffering, is evil, 
unbearable, and absurd precisely because it is fundamentally useless and without 
justifications. He further writes, “death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for 
me the subject seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering. It finds itself 
enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive.519 Suffering or pain is precisely what 
strips us of our agency and crucifies us on the imperative to it. Indeed, “all evil relates 
back to suffering,” Levinas asserts powerfully and succinctly, in the sense that both are 
                                                
518 See Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 294, 307. 
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fundamentally useless. “It is the impasse of life and of being,” he goes on to say, “in 
which pain does not just somehow innocently happen to color consciousness with 
affectivity. The evil of pain, the deleterious per se, is the outburst and deepest expression, 
so to speak, of absurdity.”520  
Suffering is thus not an added affectivity, but affectivity that ought not to be, 
affectivity as a scandal. Its irremediable meaningless surges against all possible 
signification and undoes the world for the sufferer.521 Thus, suffering, understood as the 
fundamental absence of meaning, is indeed what breaks the immanence of subjectivity.522 
As I understand it, while Levinas equates being as such with evil,523 he neglects to 
consider that the very superfluity of suffering and its mode of being ‘for nothing,’ and its 
true scandal, is only one modality of being and that the modality in question is produced 
and socially distributed.524 In other words, Levinas’s critique of ontology, the way he 
understands it, seems to preclude the study of socio-political circumstances surrounding 
each event of suffering. However, while Levinas does not consider the possibility that 
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being can very well be human-made, which makes all the difference for Ophir and the 
present moral inquiry, his account of suffering as the otherness of all human signification, 
human endeavors, and life itself is indispensable to us.  
Excursus 
Allow me to say a few more words about the Levinasian transcendence. As 
Bernasconi elucidates, “my desire to escape myself arises from my identity with myself, 
that is to say, from the impossibility of my escaping from myself.” He goes on to say, 
“this experience of being reduced to an identity, an identity that is nevertheless marked 
by a refusal to be reduced to itself because it is inherently not at home in the world, not 
only marked Levinas’ sense of his own social identity, it also led him to challenge 
traditional philosophical conceptions of identity and so rethink identity in general.”525 
Thus, what Bernasconi is telling us is that the Levinasian concern with transcendence 
arose out of the experience of being chained to oneself, most pronounced in suffering. He 
began searching for “the point where there is a shattering of the enchainment of 
matter.”526 However, Levinas was not looking for transcendence or rupture enfolded in 
immanence. His goal was to find “an exit from Being while at the same time retaining a 
foothold in Being.”527 I understand this as saying that his concern was not to discover 
transcendence within immanence, but to approach the latter from the standpoint of the 
former, infecting immanence with something radically other than it. He asks, “How, in 
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the alterity of a you, can I remain I, without being absorbed or losing myself in that 
you?”528 That is, “How can the ego become other to itself?”529  
While the explication of Levinas’s admittedly complex and controversial answer, 
falling along the lines of gender, such as fecundity, the feminine, the paternal, goes far 
beyond the scope of this work, I want to suggest that the ego is radically transformed in 
an encounter with suffering, here and now, in this world. In an exposure to suffering, the 
ego becomes other to itself by obsessively taking on the predicament of the other, 
exemplified by such remarks as “I just can’t stop thinking about what happened to her.” 
However, it is not the shards of transcendence that introduce exteriority into the stifling 
interiority of the self, that make the self foreign to itself, but the shards of the superfluous 
evil that should have been abolished, but was not. We have no need for transcendence, if 
we understand the superfluity of evil as exteriority, as what touches us with torment, yet 
can never be internalized. 
What remains to be noted is that Levinas is completely right to place alterity at 
the center of his moral reflections. He is right to yoke together genuine morality and 
otherness, as long as we resist understanding the otherness in question as the human form 
of the Kantian law that summons us from above to act morally530 or the idea that to 
experience human uniqueness is to become captive to the other’s ethical demands. The 
otherness of suffering is not the royal road to an over-saturation of human uniqueness, 
which then turns out to have the force to draw us into its moral orbit and to comport 
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ourselves ethically. It is, rather, the royal road to de-naturalizing suffering by presenting 
it in its superfluity and in its potential to make us dead even before our biological 
death.531  
I therefore further submit that it is not about the hounded individuality that fails to 
break through the suffocating grid of equivalences and exchanges snapped on the 
complexity and recalcitrant singularities of the world. It is about the otherness of 
suffering, the otherness so eminently powerful and so alien to everything human that 
sometimes it renders death itself trivial. Put otherwise, alterity is no longer seen as a 
moral container of human singularity. Rather, alterity is how suffering presents itself to 
us, where ‘presents’ means ‘shreds’ and ‘devours.’ 
What confers centrality to the otherness of suffering is its work and its well-kept 
secrets: it hides under the guise of necessity and nature, justifications and theodicies, it 
dupes us into believing it has the potential for becoming meaningful, for being for the 
sake of something, it pretends to be ineffable, such that you are trapped in isolation,532 
and it mutilates our sense of time. It initiates us into the senselessness that undoes us and 
the world we used to inhabit, and it chains us to the duration of the unbearable, while 
making us think that a passion-laden temporality is a psychological aberration. We 
choose to hold on to the otherness of suffering in order to give an expression to its true 
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nature, to study its exteriority qua superfluity, and to exile it, however partially and 
locally, from being. 
 If what I have outlined above allows us to bring together Levinas’s insights into 
the absolute otherness of suffering and the finite responsibility for it and social 
production of evil qua meaninglessness and distress, which I believe it does, we are now 
in a position to reevaluate another central theme of his thought, which is sacrifice unto 
death for the sake of the other, which is something he unexpectedly shares with Ophir. In 
other words, I want to re-situate this sacrificial orientation in light absolute otherness 
understood as superfluous socially produced suffering. No longer will we be looking up 
high to discern the source of genuine ethics and the traces of otherness. Rather, we will 
be holding on to the equation of suffering with social production, remaining worldly, 
finite, rooted in the web of familiarities and differences.  
 Let us return to the Levinasian questions of responsibility and substitution. 
According to Levinas, there is no measure to what the subject can give to the other and 
there is no holding back. In substitution, the subject exists solely for the other, divested of 
its freedom and will. In the infinite demand of the destitute other, i.e., naked suffering, I 
am summoned to give everything I have, e.g., to offer the loaf of bread when I am 
starving, to take off my coat when I am freezing, to walk that extra mile, which is another 
way of saying that the subject is summoned to sacrifice, possibly unto death. It is a 
paradoxical sacrifice that is neither chosen nor willed, for, as Levinas says, “the sacrifice 
of a hostage designated who has not chosen himself to be hostage, but possibly elected by 
the Good, in an involuntary election not assumed by the elected one.”533 Furthermore, 
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this is not an act done by the same for the sake of the other, insofar as the self had already 
been shattered and substituted for the suffering other. The sameness and security of the 
self have already been undone. The experience of sacrifice does not stem from a free 
choice, but rather from “the impossibility of evading the neighbor’s call,”534 from a kind 
of primordial affectivity deep within us. The way I would like to interpret it, once again 
contra Levinas, is that once the very tissue of my being becomes intolerable, absurd 
suffering, thus affectively and morally binding me to the other I am facing, there is 
indeed no possibility of disengaging from it. This is the sense I am giving to Levinas’s 
claim that the other’s cry for help cannot be evaded. No matter what we do next, brute 
suffering touches us.535 Of course, encountering suffering in our daily life often does fail 
to incite an interest, let alone the feeling of revolt in the addressee. This is due to, at least 
in part, to the occlusion of the event of suffering, i.e., the fact that it is too obscured by 
the veil of justifications for the addressee to be truly affected by it. While Levinas would 
say that it is obscured by the reign of sameness or a failure of individuality, Ophir would 
attribute this lack of moral interest to habituation and the pretense of justification (‘This 
is all for the greater good’) and necessity. Whatever the case may be, the point here is 
that sacrifice without any measure, i.e., unto death, is seen as the pinnacle of measureless 
moral giving. To insist on preserving some degree of measure is, according to both 
thinkers, to taint one’s moral endeavors. 
 However, I want to problematize a theory that celebrates sacrifice unto death, 
even when what is at stake is a moral response to suffering. Even though it is undeniably 
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true that the “I for you,” the giving up of my self-interest for the sake of the other, is the 
precondition for any morality, the “I for you” can take many forms, such that giving unto 
death is not the only or even the preferred one.536 Going back to the experience of the 
victim and my reading of Amery’s haunting testimony, we can say that their predicament 
is such that their only reality, the reality flooding all their senses, is suffering. It is the 
resentment that the world is indifferent to your misery, the loneliness that no one seems 
to be able or even willing to lift, the senses that no longer know joy. It is inhabiting the 
time that is mutilated and broken. It is the subjective world as a closed totality, the 
unbreakable totality of suffering, for there is no escape from yourself and you are always 
coming back to your agony. We are told that “the more the injury suffered mutates into a 
sense of permanency…. the less likely any practical transformation of the situation 
becomes.”537  
In other words, ongoing suffering creates a suffocating and deadly sense of 
permanence and closure in the victim.538 The longer their suffering goes on, unbroken by 
even a moment of joy, the more their life-trajectory is organized by it and by it alone. In 
the darkness of senselessness and injustice, “all smiles have become archaic,”539 as we 
are told in Le Guin’s magnificent short story. Similarly, in Fanon’s words, “the 
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(e.g., the disabled and other groups seen as ‘inferior,’ feeling the need to make up for 
their very existence) will cross the limit readily and fall prey to possibly irrevocable self-
harm. However, those without a socially construed sacrificial drive will not get close to 
it. Either way, in emphasizing sacrifice, we will not get more people “on board” for the 
purposes of rendering ethical responses more common and consistent. 
537 Minkkinen, “Ressentiment as Suffering,” Law & Literature, 521. 
538 See also Henry Krystal, “Trauma and Aging: A Thirty-Year Follow-Up,” Trauma. 
539 Ursula Le Guin, “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas,” The Wind’s Twelve 
Quarters: Short Stories, accessed on 09/07/2017, 
https://www.utilitarianism.com/nu/omelas.pdf  
 248 
mutilation that they have suffered affected the very movement of their lives, the rhythm 
of their existence….”540 With this in mind, sacrificing yourself unto death, even if it is to 
diminish the suffering of the other, means ultimately reaffirming the totality of suffering 
qua tormenting absurdity for the victim. One’s sacrificial death, no matter how noble it 
is, reaffirms and amplifies the victim’s sense that there is no possibility of meaning or 
refuge. Death does not dissipate the darkness inhabited by the sufferer. To affirm 
sacrifice unto death is thus, I submit, to abandon the victim in their vicious circle of 
torment. It is, in short, to cause more suffering for the one who is already in pain. To be 
sure, some sacrifices are understandable and indeed morally necessary, e.g., we can 
easily imagine a mother trying to save his child from a burning house. The sacrifices do 
happen, there is no question about that, but they should not be upheld as a moral duty or 
principle. Once again, what I want to highlight here is while sacrifices may indeed be 
exceedingly admirable, sacrificial thinking, tacitly and possibly against itself, smuggles 
back the affirmation of ultimate senselessness, which is precisely what we take up as our 
guiding moral issue to begin with. 
 Furthermore, once we reinterpret the height and infinity of otherness as an event 
of human suffering, the suffering that always coincides with singular human beings and 
their specific worldly circumstances, it is not the questionable gift of death that the victim 
needs. Recalling Amery, to do justice and to honor his tormenting resentments is 
precisely to live in taking up radical agency, to live in accordance with the possibility of 
acting otherwise in the face of suffering. What has the chance of minimizing suffering is 
not noble death, but relating to it from the standpoint of radical agency and moral 
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urgency. The victim needs to rejoin the common world,541 to rejoin their fellow human 
beings, which is the exact opposite of what Lingis aptly calls ‘deathbound subjectivity’ 
and its sacrificial thinking. To give morally, without measure, is to resist indifference, 
vigilantly and continuously. It is to create a different, moral duration of living in the 
world alongside the victims. It takes only a split second to die. It takes a lifetime to stand 
by someone, without dismissing their suffering and without shrouding it in necessity and 
ineffability. 
In other words, the new moral heroism stemming from the view of evil as 
production and the present as the domain where evils can still be reduced is resisting any 
and all temptation of justification or meaning that erases the scandal of suffering. Of 
course, I can know that a possibility may rise where I am summoned to make the hard 
choices and in fact give up my own life for the sake of ending the other’s suffering. Yet, 
there is no compelling reason to conflate the awareness of this possibility with the ideal 
of sacrifice unto death. To give without measure is to live for and alongside someone in 
torment. 
 Lastly, I would like to lead us, however tentatively, from the abolition of a 
concrete event of suffering, which is both our fundamental and humble imperative, to 
reclaiming the world for the singular others. This is a departure from Ophir who asserted 
his lack of concern with good or even happiness, for the sake of suggesting a less 
negative utilitarianism, with the aim of reducing evils. In all of our expositions of 
suffering, we have seen it as assaulting the senses through the relentlessness of its 
duration, turning the human body into the source of prolonged torture, and mutilating 
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one’s sense of time, such that the victim is chained to the selfsame present of torment. 
Yet, how is this possible vis-à-vis Ophir’s refusal to go beyond the elimination of evils, 
Amery’s rejection of healing, and Levinas’s suffering other? 
 We saw the co-mingling of broken temporalities in the Levinasian encounter with 
the suffering other. These temporalities are suffused with the passions of persecution, 
haunting, traumatism, and obsession. However, the scene of sharing under discussion is 
confined, as Levinas insists, to two people, the sufferer and the addressee. Going all the 
way back to Spinoza, we recall his ‘intricate relationality’ and fluctuations of passions, 
bodies, ideas, intensities, and durations, which, I believe, translates into the affective time 
we all share. To reiterate, the Spinozist time is given to us as a bodily impact of nearly 
infinite affective durations. In step with my efforts to disabuse us of the idea that 
suffering is ineffable, we can say that all of us know, viscerally and experientially, the 
texture of a joyful duration and the unbearable slowing down of time at the heart of 
suffering. These are the affective chunks of lived knowledge we all have, shaped and 
molded by time. Now, imagine someone who has experienced the senselessness and the 
evil of pain, but only briefly and half-mercifully. After all, “anybody can search his 
memories for the emotion which proved the most devastating or for the cruelest blow of 
fate.”542 That someone can reflect on and ‘vary’ their experience of pain, such that they 
think, “This was my experience, fortunately cut short. But what if I knead this affective 
chunk of knowledge like clay, pulling and stretching it, until I can imagine a suffering 
other whose very days are darkened by this unbearable presence of pain, going on, and 
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on, and on, and on.”543 This variation, I argue, bears a strong resemble to moral 
understanding, animated by the teleological desire to reduce an other’s suffering and 
equipped with the well-defined practices of alleviation. As Lispector puts it, elegantly 
and powerfully, “I found a knowing sensibility much more important when it comes to 
living with others and trying to understand them… I daresay this kind of sensibility, 
which is capable of stirring emotions and making one think even without using the mind, 
is a gift. A gift which can be diminished with neglect or perfected if exercised to the 
full.”544 
While Levinas speaks of the multiple experiences that overwhelm us, 
undermining the primacy of the cogito and initiating us into radical passivity, the absolute 
other being the epitome of such, as Bernet argues,545 traumatic events, the moral 
understanding, made out of durational chunks, I am articulating invites a more active 
comportment, judgment, and imagination. This is no longer strictly between the suffering 
other and the addressee, but it also draws other potential addressees into its orbit, once 
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the efficacy of the moral practices in question has been made visible and the possibility 
of a different kind of understanding, both visceral, cognitive, and imaginal, has been laid 
bare. 
In other words, to go beyond the negative utilitarianism of Ophir, it is to inhabit 
the world continuously in such a way that does justice to the experience of the victim. It 
is to act otherwise in the face of suffering, exercising our agency such that ‘the next’ 
victim, in the throes of suffering, experiences others as morally present for them. It is to 
include them in the world not formally, but in an active, singular sense, where we gain a 
degree understanding of the suffering of concrete others by disassembling our own 
experiences of various affective durations into bits of lived knowledge that we can 
cultivate into the practice of compassionate variation, leading to moral understanding. As 
suggested a moment ago, this type of knowledge or understanding is both lived and 
visceral, forever incomplete, inseparable from and animated by the innumerable 
intensities swarming around and right inside human bodies.  
Here I am using passional time as an epistemic tool, albeit laden with vibrancy 
and transience. I do not wish to say that once we understand each other’s experiences 
better, we will become a true community. What this epistemic tool does for us is that it 
eliminates the excuse of lack of understanding and enhances the practices of those who 
are already interested in the well-being of others. It does not take the love of every 
suffering other you encounter. It takes only an interest. 
Let us note that, contra Freud, I am not arguing that the inassimilable grain of 
trauma keeps haunting the sufferer continues to survive ‘alongside’ or ‘beneath’ 
conscious thinking because it, by definition, overwhelms and disables our cognitive and 
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psychic structures. For Freud, for something to be traumatic is to elude consciousness. 
What I am arguing is that the afterlife of an event of suffering varies in important ways 
from one person to the next based on the world’s recognition of and response to their 
suffering, on their access to support channels, like medical care and legal representation, 
not to mention a network of friends, and on their experience of the others and their 
agency when the chips are down. 
 Let me provide a concrete example here. The disabled living in Russia are 
essentially imprisoned in their apartments, should they be lucky to have a roof over their 
heads at all, since the latter routinely lack ramps and elevators. Again, what this means is 
being confined to your tiny room for the rest of your life, should you be unfortunate 
enough to be disabled. Indeed, 
in Sochi, “Maria” (not her real name), a 26-year-old woman who uses a 
wheelchair, spends months confined to her third-floor municipal apartment 
because her building lacks an accessible ramp and functioning elevator. She 
crawls from room to room because the corridors in her apartment are too narrow 
for her wheelchair. Since 2000, Maria has written to the local administration 
officials requesting an accessible apartment as mandated by her state medical 
documents. The authorities responded that no such housing is available.546 
 
The experiences of the Russian disabled writer Ruben Gallego, whose memoir about his 
childhood in Soviet orphanages won the prestigious Russian Booker Prize and has been 
translated into several languages are even more harrowing, 
Gallego wished he had been born in America, where (he had been told) the 
disabled were simply put down. (Later he visited the country and was deeply 
impressed with McDonald’s.) There was euthanasia of a sort practised on disabled 
Russian children. If after 10 years of education they hadn’t learned to make a 
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living, hardly likely for those who couldn’t walk, they would be transferred to an 
old people’s home, where they would be unlikely to last more than weeks.547 
 
Here Gallego is clearly telling us that there are types of suffering worse than death. His 
own book opens with the following line, unparalleled in its bleak intensity: “I’m a hero. 
It’s easy to be a hero. If you don’t have hands or feet, you’re either a hero or dead.”548 
The disabled in Russia and multiple other, often ostensibly civilized countries, are 
deprived of access to the shared world and, as such, our pain, the pain stemming both 
from our often painful medical conditions and from the reign of indifference around us, 
remains hidden.549 We cannot take a stroll down the street or enjoy the sunshine in a leafy 
park.550 Everything that the shared world has to offer is denied to us thoroughly and with 
a chilling finality. Here we also begin to see that the Levinasian subject arising out of 
worldly enjoyment is closer to being a privilege than a universal condition. To reduce 
someone’s suffering is a negative, yet necessary goal and to usher the victim back into 
the light of the world where suffering is given to comprehension through our bits of 
affective time is a constructive, positive one, as if the two were the sides of the same coin. 
Conversely, depriving someone of participating in the common world must be seen as an 
evil that ought to be abolished. 
                                                
547 Mars-Jones, Adam. “White on Black by Ruben Gallego: From victim to hero,” The 
Guardian, 2006, accessed on 05/17/2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2006/jan/29/biography.features2.  
548 Ruben Gallego, White on Black (Fort Washington: Harvest Books, 2007), 2. 
549 See Siebers for his notion of ‘the new realism of the body,’ where the pain that often 
accompanies multiple disabling conditions is not swiftly converted into a hidden 
advantage or whisked away by a theoretical sleight of hand. Siebers, Disability Theory, 
pp. 53-70. 
550 Cf. Sara Ahmed on queerness, comfort, and discomfort in The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University  Press, 2004), pp. 147-48. 
 255 
 Thus, going beyond Ophir means emphasizing the flipside of minimizing 
suffering, which is to be flooded with the world. This is the world where suffering is 
never completely abolished, just like my own illness will always remain incurable and 
painful, but recognized and fragmented, time and again, once it arises and endures. This 
is the world where the affective reality of the victims is recognized and honored when 
others assume the kind of radical agency that the sufferers expect of them. This is the 
world where the sufferers and others are bound to each other through affective 
temporality, since most of us have experienced pain, however trivial and brief. Only a 
failure of imagination can stop us from sensing what it must be like for the sufferer when 
their pain is prolonged and unmitigated. 
 This is the not world without suffering, but rather the world without indifference. 
To be sure, this is an ideal state of affairs. However, I submit that scrutinizing the specific 
conditions that produce evils, i.e., refusing to be duped by the mask of necessity, 
reinstating the idea of urgency as the only way to respond morally to the suffering one 
who cannot wait, and doing justice to the affective reality of the victim by taking up my 
freedom are the resources that are required to even begin to make this state of affairs a 
reality.  
 Radical agency is not about grandiosity or the utilitarian ideal of responding to the 
suffering of the greatest amount of people.551 It is about recognizing that the victims do 
not suffer the same and about helping one singular individual, the one whose social 
circumstances are such that the other in question, in his or her suffering, cannot wait. It is 
about admitting and letting this admission inflect our moral thinking that we cannot help 
                                                
551 Cf. the celebrated utilitarian theorist Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 256 
everyone, due to the obvious limitations of finite human beings, even if the suffering 
around us is so overwhelming that it often becomes paralyzing. We form our judgment 
and decide to offer relief to an other in the greatest not only because they are likely facing 
the irremediable, but also because the feeling of being fully abandoned when the 
possibility of relief was present will keep preying on the victim’s mind and life itself for 
many years to come. 
It is about admitting that while we cannot help everyone, we are capable of 
discerning those few who, in their suffering, are still abandoned and cut off from any 
support channels and we are capable of responding to their predicament, even if it means 
doing something seemingly minor so as to work even a tiny fissure into the monolithic 
duration of their torment. It is about keeping in mind that even something as seemingly 
minor as taking someone in grief for a walk on a summer day injects something new into 
their time-sense of unbearable duration. This morality is not likely to find any reward or 
even recognition, at least not any time soon, since we are still very far from seeing the 
truths hidden in the affects of the victims, moving away from the utilitarian value placed 
on helping the greatest possible number of people at the expense of the weaker one, and 
taking up our freedom in the face of suffering. Indeed, we are far from hearing the 
victims who are telling us that what hurts the most is not even brute physical pain or a 
terrible loss. What truly hurts and undoes the suffering others is the other’s the 
indifference to their predicament, i.e., the refusal to admit that one can act otherwise. 
The moral truth of suffering at its harrowing, gnawing worst, with its socially produced 
circumstances alongside indifference and neglect. 
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 To conclude with, let me sum up the lessons on temporality we have learned from 
each thinker under consideration here, in order to highlight the transition from biological 
time to the normativity of a different kind of temporality, since the latter has been one of 
the main organizing threads of the present project. We began with Spinoza and his 
argument that time is an illusion and that the perfect intellect can see it for what it is. I 
then turn to the question of passions or affects, which have nothing illusory about them if 
we consider their fully real impact on us and which play a key role in human well-being 
or malaise. While biological time may be lacking in reality, a sense of time is given to us 
through passions, a sense of time that is both fully real and visceral, experienced, felt. 
The time-sense in question wanes and waxes with the materiality of our body and it 
pulsates in and through us, reaching a kind of crescendo when we are happy and slowing 
down to a cruel still when we suffer. This is the origin of what I have been calling 
affective temporality.  
With Ophir, we draw an important distinction between the catastrophes of the past 
and the catastrophes of the present, no matter what their monstrosity is, since the former 
can no longer be halted and the latter still can. We ‘turn toward the disaster’ insofar as it 
is still happening or about to happen, for our central goal is the reduction of socially 
produced evils in the world. This attention to the evils that are still open to reduction, i.e., 
have enough ontological fluidity to go either in the direction of increase or decrease, is 
closely aligned with the notion of moral urgency. If a lot of forms of evils are man-made, 
it is the present where we learn to unmake them. As such, we reclaim the domain of the 
present as the site where evils can either decrease or increase from the reign of universal 
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time, where the past, the present, and the future are certainly experientially unique, yet 
never truly seen as complicit in the production of evils or their amelioration. 
Amery, in turn, postulates the existence of moral time of the victim. More 
precisely, he turns us toward the possibility of agency and its time. His normative time is 
the refusal to accept the thought that human beings are exempt from agency, understood 
as the freedom to make one’s own judgments, choices, and decisions in the face of 
suffering. His moral time is the duration of the refusal to accept that the overwhelming 
indifference of others he experienced as a victim signals the impossibility of acting 
otherwise, which is a revolt against facts and against the time of the world that tells the 
victim that even if the addressees of their suffering could have responded otherwise, it no 
longer truly matters. In accordance with biological time, the way someone may or may 
not have acted in the past, barring punishable crimes, is of little relevance, since it the 
arrow of universal human life-time flies forward, inexorably increasing the distance 
between the actions in question and the present. However, moral time does not care about 
this distance, thus making visible the idea that the over-saturation of resentful temporality 
is the over-saturation of inaction in the face of suffering, suspending the victim between 
their initial form of distress (an act of violence, disability, wartime conditions, grief, and 
so on) and the degree of indifference to it, experienced during and after the event. The 
refusal of the promise of healing made by the natural time is the refusal of the well-
meaning wisdom that ‘We all make mistakes, some worse than others, but we’re all the 
same really.’552 Amery’s normative temporality submits that we are not all morally the 
                                                
552 Perhaps Arendt had something similar in mind when she mused that forgiveness is the 
only way to genuinely free someone from the crushing weight of their past misdeeds. 
Arendt, The Human Condition, 65. 
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same and clock-time should not blind us to this fact or exempt us from the task of 
judgment.553 Put otherwise, Amery turns us toward the possibility of agency and its time. 
His normative time is the refusal to accept the claim that human beings are exempt from 
agency.  
Finally, Levinas places radical alterity and the broken time of suffering at the 
heart of his moral inquiry. Re-articulating radical alterity as a life-negating event of 
suffering deepens our analysis of the ways in which suffering runs counter to all human 
endeavors, further presenting it as the realm where the senselessness of evil is at its most 
visible. To give up on alleviating suffering and all the harm it does to human corporeality 
is to give up on responding to the problem of evil altogether.554 The otherness of time 
signals one’s violent distancing from the world brought up by suffering. In other words, a 
mutilated time-sense alerts us to the fact that, in suffering, someone’s world is dying, that 
they are no longer experiencing the world as a site of belonging. Crucially, given 
Levinas’s unwavering insistence on the face-to-face relation, i.e., an encounter with a 
suffering other, both the victim and the addressee, the way I read it, begin to inhabit and 
share ‘time out of joint.’ While the time-sense of the sufferer and the time-sense of the 
addressee undoubtedly have important differences, both are now initiated into a kind of 
unhinged temporality of the disaster.  
                                                
553 “Indifference to the suffering of sentient beings would demarcate the moral domain 
from the outside, in the same way that indifference to error, deception, and illusion 
demarcates the limits of science, and indifference to appearances marks the limits of the 
visual arts.” Ophir, “Disaster as a Place of Morality,” Qui Parle, Vol. 16, No.1 Summer 
2006, pp. 95-96. 
554 For Ophir, the raison d’être of morality is “the ongoing presence of others in distress, 
their unbearable suffering and humiliation, and the obligation to reduce their mal-being,” 
ibid., 95. 
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By arguing for the shareable, even contagious nature of a broken time-sense and 
Spinoza’s affective durations we all inhabit by defining suffering as the impossibility of 
all refuge, i.e., a kind of terrible duration, both thinkers offer us a language of suffering, 
turning it into something we can understand and discuss, however inadequately. Whether 
we speak of the duration that never quite seems to end or of the clock slowing down, the 
phenomenon of altered time can be discussed, broken down, and studied. What is at stake 
here is discerning the structural and experiential dimensions of this temporality, so as to 
lift the weight of incommunicability from suffering. We are tasked with examining this 
temporality, since understanding the workings of suffering in their temporal dimension 
brings us closer to understanding the workings of evils. 
 Short of that, we cannot be cognizant of the measures to be taken up with a view 
to the twinned phenomenon of evil and suffering, which means that we are unable to 
relate to Ophir’s theoretical tools as we relate to weapons in the struggle against the 
intolerable and unjust. To be sure, some of us are in the position to join the struggle, but 
some are not, which means that we enter the fray on their behalf. Without making visible 
the foundations of what I have called ‘numeral ethics’ and the internal contradiction of 
those who speak ever-so-loudly about their commitment to social justice while taking no 
notice of a suffering other who happens to be in the same room as they are, a singular one 
in distress stands no chance. Furthermore, the very act of extending a hand to a destitute 
other before or even while embarking on ‘greater’ ethical projects has no chance of 
becoming a moral exemplar, if not a model. We must make clear the value of addressing 
one singular other’s suffering for the sake of everyone who is in pain, hungry, and cold, 
in the obscurity of abandonment.  
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There she stands, a suffering other, possibly a neighbor or some such ‘familiar 
stranger,’ failing to part the sea of clamorous well-wishers and empty-handed warriors of 
an utopian future. 
She looks on, her gaze darkening the space around her, lost deep in her sorrowful 
questions, incessantly gnawing at her mind, pushing it further and further to its breaking 
point, like eternally hungry vultures circling around the tender prey. 
Why me? 
Who will account for me? 
What happens at the end of two hundred nineteen lions? What happens at the end 
of ten thousand or a hundred thousand water lilies?555 
Conclusion 
The Lamb Becoming a Lion; or, Hear me Roar 
 
His catatonic alter ego soon begins to speak, then to sing, and at last opens his 
blue eyes wide to the world. 
 
—Gérard de Nerval 
 
You don’t always have to cut with the sword of truth. You can point with it too. 
 
—Ann Lamott 
 
The explosion will not happen today. It is too soon . . . or too 
late. 
 
—Frantz Fanon  
 
                                                
555 Hélène Cixous, “The Last Painting or the Portrait of God,” “Coming to Writing” and 
Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 127. 
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“Evil is an experience as old as history,” muses Alford in What Evil Means to Us. 
“In The Symbolism of Evil Paul Ricoeur characterizes the primordial experience of evil in 
terms of dread. Kakia, the New Testament term we translate as “evil,” has a similar 
sense… Dread is not the whole of evil, possibly not even its most important, but it is its 
ground: the dread of human beings, vulnerable, alone in the universe, and doomed to 
die.” Furthermore, he notes with succinct acuity, “people live an experience of evil, and it 
lives them.”556 
In the final analysis, we affirm that an encounter with the evil of an other’s 
suffering is the origin of ethics. In responding to this instance of suffering, we utilize the 
tools given to us by Ophir’s insight into the superfluity of evil and Amery’s tormented 
desire for a different kind of agency in the face of suffering. We note that she who stands 
at the center of our ethical endeavors is a concrete, singular individual, the weak one, the 
one in moral and societal abandonment.  
Who will defend the one in neglect when every act of postponement of relief is 
expressed as the imperative to study the structural conditions of evils in the hope of 
alleviating them on a greater scale in the future, as if thinking and action were not in fact 
interwoven and co-present and as if care for a single person were genuinely incompatible 
with greater-scale efforts, assigning it a negative value of inferiority upon offering relief 
to ‘only one’ individual? 
Someone will. Someone ought to. 
                                                
556 Alford, What Evil Means to Us, 4. 
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For if it is true that the value of a singular human being is decided in their hour of 
greatest need557 and if the majority continues to privilege offering relief to the greatest 
number of people at the expense of the single suffering one, eventually the wretched ones 
will feel ‘knife blades opening within them’558 and rise out of their abandonment in 
revolt, resulting in the collapse of rational dialogue and the eruption of violence, echoing 
Fanon,559 the violence of the millennially forgotten ones under the mocking promise of a 
better future for everyone. Indeed, the possibility of the singular suffering ones, the ones 
who cannot wait and who do not have the privilege of patience, the forgotten ones, rising 
in violence, in the violence of those who have nothing left to lose, haunts this work like 
the memories of an unjust death might haunt a moral subject. If we continue to overlook 
a suffering other in our vicinity, the lamb will eventually become a lion and the ones 
steeped in the practice of continuous deferral will tremble before it. The never-ending 
excuses to hide under will crumble when the hour of righteous violence arrives and the 
winter will come for those indifferent to the victims they are in fact capable of extending 
a helping hand to.  
In a less dramatic register, a similar collapse of dialogue takes place when 
someone is presented with the fact of an other’s suffering, twinned with a set of ways to 
alleviate it, i.e., even when moral response has been broken down into fairly 
straightforward theoretical ‘nuggets,’ exposing the mechanisms of relief, and distilled 
into an entirely feasible, even seemingly insignificant series of practices, only to turn 
                                                
557 It is the chance for others to either take up their agency so as to alleviate the agony of 
the suffering one or fail to do so, turning away in indifference, which wears many masks 
and disguises. 
558 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 89. 
559 “I had rationalized the world and the world had rejected me…. Since no agreement 
was possible on the level of reason, I threw myself back toward unreason.” Ibid., 93. 
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away in indifference. According to Ophir, the antithesis to morality is not cruelty, but 
rather indifference, such that “indifference to someone who suffers superfluous evils is 
the end of moral interest and of the moral matter,”560 which also means a deep failure to 
link “the acceptance of responsibility to a sense of self, as a creative, responsible 
agent.”561 
It is, however, entirely in our power to alter moral axiology with the proper 
intellectual rigor in favor of a single life, to avert the collapse of any rational discourse 
between the addressees of one’s plea for help and the those who cannot wait in their 
torment, as well as the promise of violence on the part of the devalued and neglected both 
socially, morally, and interpersonally.  
I submit that true ethics begins only when we respond to the suffering of a 
concrete other nearest to us and when we reject the unquestioned primacy of ‘good for 
the greatest amount of people,’ as utilitarianism would have it, which is rarely anything 
more than an excuse to turn a blind eye to a singular instance of suffering. Furthermore, 
true ethics begins when we learn to differentiate and exercise judgment vis-à-vis the 
victims and their particular circumstances in the name of moral urgency. In withholding 
judgment, we refuse to see the victims as particular, embodied individuals and their 
socio-political circumstances, with their distinct trajectories of suffering, which is to say 
that we refuse to see them at all. To be sure, we know that suffering is all around us, we 
feel bad about it, and that is that. 
                                                
560 Ophir, The Order of Evils, 12. 
561 Fred Alford, Psychoanalytic Theory of Greek Tragedy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 139. 
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As finite, singular, embodied beings, each in a different situation, with a greater 
or lesser means of remediation to offer, we become moral subjects when we engage with 
singular, equally finite others, such that our capacity to alleviate suffering is 
commensurate to those who address us. Barring that, our capacity for moral 
comportment, pitted against the overwhelming number of suffering others whom we are 
unlikely to ever meet, is nothing but an abstraction. If it is the case that conduct and 
choice depend on perception,562 then it is also the case that currently we do not have the 
means to see the morality of saving one suffering other or experience one as irreducibly 
valuable and singular. Since a moral optics is an assemblage are perceptual patterns, 
cognitive habits, deep-seated values, intensive inclinations, clingy ideas, and an assorted 
collection of affective blind spots, it is up to all of us to do the work of making an other 
in distress morally visible.  
Conversely, the first and the last instance of evil emerges when we abandon one 
singular person, that is to say, the weaker one, the overlooked one, the silent one. Worse 
yet, this practice of evil becomes fully acceptable and altogether socially and morally 
invisible when we justify abandoning one concrete other, that is, when we tacitly affirm 
and judge that one specific life in suffering is less important than multiple distant others, 
as if our uniquely situated, embodied capacity to offer relief to some people, but not to 
others, who are just as deserving and yet whose suffering is inaccessible to us and 
prevents us from taking up the position of the addressee, had no moral relevance 
whatsoever. 
                                                
562 Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency, 246. 
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 One of the key tasks of this work has been to make visible and to articulate with 
every precision I could muster not only the moral value of offering relief to a single 
person in torment, but to argue that it is the forgotten, archaic core of all ethical 
endeavors. Furthermore, “by stressing both consequences and those affected by them is 
utterly real, gravity is given to our acts, showing them to matter in the world…”563 The 
thrust of the task at hand has been to assign gravity to reducing the suffering of one other. 
As the famous Riddle of Bologna goes,  
 
This is a tomb without a corpse, 
 
This is a corpse which is not contained by a tomb; 
 
but the corpse and the tomb are one and the same.564 
 
Radically together yet forever without each other. Perhaps the answer has something to 
do with life and death. The latter is part of the former only insofar as we see it as the first 
and the last enemy. The enemy always triumphs, yet we go on fighting it.  
If we apply this maddeningly cryptic logic to evil and suffering, we realize that 
we take up the fight not because we are certain that we will eliminate suffering for once 
and all, but because we owe it to those in torment right now, in our proximity, because 
the moral grain within us can find its expression in appropriate practices and ways of 
behavior, because we have the potential of becoming luminous, sublimely fierce warriors 
                                                
563 Ibid., 239. 
564 This cryptic Latin inscription was discovered in the 16th century on a tombstone near 
Bologna. It has challenged many thinkers for over four hundred years to come up with a 
solution. Mario L. Michelangelo, for instance, published a 400-page manuscript 
dedicated to the riddle in question. Carl Jung addressed the enigma in his Mysterium 
Conjunctionis and Gerard de Nerval referred to it in two of his tales. To this day, no 
solution has been found. Source: personal notes. 
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of intensities and the kneading of clay-like moral time, in the name of a singular suffering 
other. 
I am fully aware of my possibly naïve faith in the existence of moral sensibility, 
to use Ophir’s term. If it is coupled with a more fine-tuned moral practices and a rigorous 
theoretical assemblage, which is something I have attempted to sketch out, will ‘stick 
around’ long enough to become part of what I called ‘moral imaginary,’ i.e., the 
provenance of acting a certain way in the face of suffering, as a matter of course. When 
you’re a cripple, you find out who’s decent and who’s professed care isn’t worth a dime 
very quickly, even if you start out as a slow learner. In an act of the testimony of an 
almost-fully disabled woman, I submit that I have seen genuine moral comportment and I 
do not know why it cannot be amplified.    
My hope is that failing to respond to the plight of one specific individual will 
eventually be seen as a type of evil, the evil that hides in plain sight and has gradually 
amassed a plethora of justifications, to the point of almost disappearing from our moral 
horizon altogether. This inquiry attempted, among other things, to give expression to the 
crime of overlooking a single other. If the present work contributed to the thinking that 
abandoning even a single person in one’s proximity is the veritable scandal and the 
clearest expression of the insidiousness of evil, that evil begins with walking away from 
the one in need of urgent relief, that facing neglect and indifference when the addressee 
of an other’s cry for help is perfectly capable of acting otherwise and yet chooses not to 
forever splinters the sufferer’s mind due to their inability to comprehend such 
indifference, then all my struggles will not have been for nothing. 
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As I’ve learned that I am not allowed to make any edits after the submission of 
the dissertation, the finality of my last edit and my last words here began weighing down 
on me. As I am making this very final edit, I want to believe that somewhere, someplace, 
a fierce, oversized swan takes to the blackening sky. 
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